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Abstract
This Article addresses the lawfulness of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (”North Korea” or “DPRK”). I address the topic from
three perspectives: 1) North Korea’s own statements of the matter; 2) U.S. statements of the law
as applied to its own nuclear weapons; and 3) my evaluation of the matter based on international
law as stated by the United States and as found by the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Decision.
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LAWFULNESS OF NORTH KOREA'S USE
AND THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR
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LEGITIMIZATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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This Article addresses the lawfulness of the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons by the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea ("North Korea" or "DPRK"). I address the topic from
three perspectives: 1) North Korea's own statements of the mat-
ter; 2) U.S. statements of the law as applied to its own nuclear
weapons; and 3) my evaluation of the matter based on interna-
tional law as stated by the United States and as found by the
International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Decision.'
Because of the relevance of the potential effects of nuclear
weapons to this legal issue, I review such facts. Because North
Korea justifies its nuclear weapons program on the grounds of
self-defense, I also review the history of hostilities between the
United States and North Korea, and the current strategic posi-
tions of the two States.
The thesis of this Article is that the United States' efforts to
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Unlawfulness of the Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Sept. 11, 2000, available at
http://www.nycla.org/NuclearWeaponssept2000.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2004). Profes-
sor Moxley is a member of the board of directors of the Lawyers' Committee for Nu-
clear Policy ("LCNP").
Professor Moxley acknowledges and thanks Fordham Law School students Lissa
Schaupp, Frank Raimond, and Michael Yim, and New York attorney Brian J. McBreen
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1. Advisory Opinion No. 95, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996
I.CJ. 95, pt. VI, 35-36 (July 8, 1996) (question presented to the Court by U.N. General
Assembly resolution 49/75 K, adopted on Dec. 15, 1994), available at http://
212.153.43.18/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunanframe.htm [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Opinion]. The Court's decision and all but five of the fourteen individual
opinions in the case are available at 35 I.L.M. 809 (1996). The remaining five, the
declarations of Judges Bedjaoui, Herczegh, and Bravo and the individual opinions of
Judges Guillaume and Ranjeva, appear at 35 I.L.M. 1343 (1996).
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curtail the nuclear aspirations of North Korea and other States
are hampered by the United States' unsupportable position that
the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons are generally legal.
Due to its legitimization of nuclear weapons and its support of
the right of States broadly to withdraw from arms control agree-
ments, the United States has largely deprived itself of law as a
basis for opposing nuclear proliferation.
INTRODUCTION
North Korea, having previously espoused the unlawfulness
of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons before the Inter-
national Court of Justice ("ICJ"), now asserts that it is entitled to
use and threaten to use such weapons in self-defense because of
the United States' hostile actions and threats - including the
U.S. policy of preemptive strike, exemplified by the recent war in
Iraq.
The United States has long acknowledged the binding na-
ture of international law, including the law of armed conflict. It
has specifically acknowledged the rules of necessity, proportion-
ality, and discrimination arising under that law which provide
that: (1) it is unlawful to use weapons involving a level of force
not necessary in the circumstances to achieve the military objec-
tive; (2) it is unlawful to use weapons whose probable effects
upon combatant or non-combatant persons or objects would
likely be disproportionate to the value of the anticipated military
objective; and (3) it is unlawful to use weapons that cannot dis-
criminate between military and civilian targets.
The United States recognizes that under the rules of neces-
sity, proportionality, and discrimination it is unlawful for a State
to use or threaten to use weapons, including nuclear weapons,
whose potential effects would be uncontrollable. The United
States however, puts forth the following contentions in support
of its argument that the use of nuclear weapons is generally law-
ful:
1. There is no applicable per se rule, and accordingly,
each potential use of nuclear weapons must be evalu-
ated independently to see if it can comply with the re-
quirements of international law, including the rules of
necessity, proportionality, and discrimination.
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2. The -United States is able to control the effects, includ-
ing the radiation effects, of nuclear weapons.
3. With its technologically advanced modern delivery sys-
tems, the United States is able to deliver nuclear weap-
ons, particularly highly accurate low-yield weapons,
with great accuracy to desired targets, avoiding exces-
sive collateral damage to civilians, neutrals, and other
protected persons and objects.
4. The effects of nuclear weapons are no worse than
those of conventional weapons.
5. The radiation effects of nuclear weapons are not rele-
vant to the lawfulness of the use of such weapons.
6. Only specifically intended effects of nuclear weapons
are unlawful, so that effects that result from mere reck-
lessness or gross negligence are not unlawful.
7. A potential use of a nuclear weapon could only be
deemed unlawful in advance if it were clear that it
would "necessarily" and "inevitably" lead to impermis-
sible effects or other violations of law.
8. Only the immediate and direct effects of nuclear weap-
ons - particularly the blast and thermal effects -
need be considered in evaluating the lawfulness of the
use of the weapons, so that it is unnecessary to con-
sider other effects, such as the likely resultant escala-
tion of use of nuclear, chemical, and/or biological
weapons by one's adversaries and their allies and ulti-
mately by oneself.
9. The collateral killing of civilians is lawful as long as the
civilians are not targeted "as such."
10. Nuclear weapons may lawfully be used in reprisal.
These rationales for the U.S. nuclear program, which serve
at least equally to legitimize the North Korean program, are fac-
tually and legally unfounded. Based upon the facts and law, it is
clear that virtually any use of nuclear weapons, in the circum-
stances in which such weapons might actually be used, would be
unlawful and that the policy of deterrence is unlawful.
The North Korean nuclear program is an interesting case
study as to how these legal issues arise since North Korea finds
itself in a strategic position analogous to that of the United
States vis-A.-vis the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Just as the
United States was vulnerable to the overwhelming conventional
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weapons capabilities of the Soviet Bloc, so too, and even more
so, is North Korea vulnerable to the overwhelming conventional
capabilities of the United States.
North Korea justifies its putative nuclear weapons program
in part on its economic problems, specifically on the ground that
it does not want to spend the greater amounts that would be
necessary to develop a more powerful and reliable conventional
weapons program. This implicates the emerging international
law issue of whether a State may justify its use of a more indis-
criminate weapon when the need for such use results from its
intentional failure to have developed and maintained more dis-
criminate weapons.
I. BACKGROUND TO CURRENT NORTH KOREAN
NUCLEAR POSTURE
The lawfulness of North Korea's nuclear program is affected
not only by the rules of customary, conventional, and other in-
ternational law applicable to the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons, but also by the 1992 Joint Declaration of the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula ('Joint Declaration") 2
between the Republic of Korea ("South Korea") and North Ko-
rea, and the October 21, 1994 Agreed Framework between the
United States and North Korea (the "Agreed Framework").'
A. Joint Declaration
The Joint Declaration provided that neither North nor
South Korea would "test, manufacture, produce, possess, store,
deploy, or use nuclear weapons." 4 The Joint Declaration further
provided that nuclear energy would be used by the two States for
peaceful purposes and that neither would possess nuclear
reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities.5
2. See Joint Declaration by South and North Korea of the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula, Jan. 20, 1992, S. Korea-N. Korea, IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/660, Attach-
ment (1992), 33 I.L.M. 569 (1994) [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
3. See Agreed Framework to Negotiate Resolution of the Nuclear Issue on the Ko-
rean Peninsula, S. Korea-U.S., Oct. 21, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 603 (1995), available at http://
www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2004) [hereinafter
Agreed Framework].
4. See Joint Declaration, supra note 2, at § 1.
5. See id. at §§ 2-3.
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B. Agreed Framework
The Agreed Framework provided for North Korea's termi-
nation of its nuclear weapons program in exchange for financial
assistance for its energy program from an international consor-
tium, and security assurances from the United States against the
threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States.6 Specifi-
cally, North Korea agreed to replace its graphite-moderated re-
actors and related nuclear facilities with "proliferation-resistant"
light water reactor power plants, to be financed by the United
States, Japan, and South Korea, among others,7 and to continue
as a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons ("NPT").'
C. NPT
The NPT9 provides that the five identified nuclear weapon
States ° agree to pursue general and complete disarmament
through good faith negotiations," t and to refrain from transfer-
ring nuclear weapons or in any way encouraging their manufac-
ture, 2 and that the non-nuclear weapon States agree to forego
developing or acquiring nuclear weapons." North Korea be-
6. See Agreed Framework, supra note 3, pt. III(1); see also Larry A. Niksch, North
Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Con-
gress, IB91141, available at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/IB91141.pdf (last vis-
ited April 6, 2004). The Agreed Framework represented an accommodation between
Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("North Korea" or "DPRK") and the United
States following North Korea's threat to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons on March 12, 1993. See id. at 10; see also Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729
U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
7. See CHARLES J. MOXLEY, JR., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
POST COLD WAR WORLD 563-64, n.ll (2000). This financing is orchestrated through
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization ("KEDO"). See KEDO: Pro-
moting Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula and Beyond, at http://
www.kedo.org/index.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2004).
8. See Agreed Framework, supra note 3, at pt. IV(l).
9. See NPT, supra note 6.
10. The five identified nuclear weapons States are China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. See Arms Control Fact Sheet: "The Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty at a Glance" (Jan. 2003), available at http://
www.armscontrol.org/pdf/npt.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2004). The five nuclear weapons
States are the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 23, para. 1.
11. See NPT, supra note 6, art. VI.
12. See id. art. I.
13. See id. art. II; see also U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation, Treaty on
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came a party to the NPT in 1985, stating that it was doing so to
remove the nuclear threat from the United States, 14 and to re-
solve North Korea's need for nuclear energy.
15
Under the NPT regime, non-nuclear weapons States are re-
quired to enter into a "safeguard agreement" with the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Association ("IAEA").16 North Korea
delayed entering into such an agreement because of what it
characterized as nuclear threats from the United States, includ-
ing the United States' continued placement of nuclear weapons
in South Korea, and the "Team Spirit" nuclear war exercise 7 the
United States directed against North Korea.18
In 1992, North Korea entered into a safeguard agreement
with the IAEA' 9 after receiving assurances from the United
States that it would not use nuclear weapons against North Ko-
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, History, at http://www.state.gov/t/np/
trty/16281.htm (stating that Iran, Iraq, and North Korea have all failed their obliga-
tions under NPT at one time or another) (last visited Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter History
of NPT].
14. See Detailed Report on Circumstances of DPRK's Withdrawal from NPT, KOREAN CEN-
TRAL NEWS AGENCY OF DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REP. OF KOREA, Jan. 23, 2003, available at
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200301/newsO1/23.htm#1 (last visited Apr. 7,
2004) [hereinafter KCNA Detailed Report]. U.S. nuclear weapons were withdrawn
from the Republic of Korea ("South Korea") in late 1991. See Niksch, supra note 6, at 9.
This was one of several actions taken by the first Bush administration aimed at securing
North Korea's adherence to the NPT. See id.
15. See KCNA Detailed Report, supra note 14.
16. The International Atomic Energy Association ("IAEA"), which was created by
the statute of the Atomic Energy Agency, 8 U.S.T. 1093 (1957), is responsible for verify-
ing that the parties to the NPT are complying with its terms. See History of NPT, supra
note 13.
17. The Team Spirit exercises were military drills held annually from 1976 until
1994, when they were suspended as part of the Agreed Framework. See South Korean
Ministry Says Military Exercise Can be Revived at "Anytime", BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING,
May 3, 1999.
18. The South Korean Ministry of Defense characterized these exercises as defen-
sive and contended that North Korean allegations of the offensive nature of the exer-
cises are unfounded; North Korea was reportedly invited to send representatives to at-
tend as observers. See Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Military Exer-
cises, available at http://www.mnd.go.kr/cms.jsp?p-id=01918010000000 (last visited
Apr. 7, 2004).
19. See Democratic People's Republic of Korea-International Atomic Energy
Agency: Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty
on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 33 I.L.M. 315 (1994); INFCIRC/403,
May 1992 [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement]. Under the 1992 Safeguards Agree-
ment, North Korea was required to report all nuclear programs to the IAEA and allow
IAEA access to conduct inspections of North Korean nuclear installations and pro-
grams. See Niksch, supra note 6, at 10.
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rea,20 and after receiving representations from South Korea that
there were no nuclear weapons within its borders.2' In entering
into the agreement with the IAEA, North Korea stated that it was
doing so on the premise that "none of the NPT member coun-
tries will deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and
pose a nuclear threat to DPRK. 22
D. North Korea's Withdrawal from the NPT and Assertion of the
Invalidity of the Joint Declaration and of the U.S. Breach of the
Agreed Framework
On January 10, 2003, however, North Korea announced its
immediate withdrawal from the NPT on the ground that it was
"most seriously threatened" by the United States. 23 North Korea
stated that the United States had threatened it with preemptive
nuclear attack and other belligerent actions such as blockades. 24
North Korea further stated that the United States had breached
the Agreed Framework by failing to provide light-water reactors
("LWRs") 25 and suspensing its promised heavy oil shipments.2 6
North Korea also alleged that the United States had "instigated
even the IAEA to internationalize its moves to stifle the DPRK,
thus putting into practice its declaration of a war against the
20. See KCNA Detailed Report, supra note 14.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.; see also Democratic People's Republic of North Korea, Statement Re-
garding Withdrawal from the NPT, Jan. 10, 2003, available at http://www2.law.colum-
bia.edu/course_00SL9436_001/materials%20North%20Korea.shtml.
After withdrawing from the NPT, North Korea began reprocessing the 8,000 spent
fuel rods that had been under IAEA safeguards. See Ted Galen Carpenter, Outside View:
Illusions on N. Korea Nukes, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Oct. 8, 2003, available at http://
www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20031008-050533-1217r.
On March 12, 1993, North Korea threatened withdrawal from the NPT after the
IAEA invoked its special inspection rights in response to finding that North Korea had
reprocessed more plutonium than the 80 grams it had disclosed to the IAEA pursuant
to the terms of its 1992 safeguards agreement. See Niksch, supra note 6, at 10.
24. See Fredric L. Kirgis, North Korea's Withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, ASIL INSIGHTS, Jan. 2003, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/in-
sigh96.htm.
25. See KCNA Detailed Report, supra note 14 (stating that, according to Agreed
Framework, United States was to have provided North Korea with light-water reactor
power plants ("LWRs"), but that thus far only basic site preparations have been made in
LWR project).
26. See KCNA Detailed Report, supra note 14 (stating that on November 14, 2002,
Bush administration decided to suspend December 2002 HFO shipments, abandoning
last commitment it had been honoring in Agreed Framework).
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DPRK. 
27
North Korea stated at the time that, even though it was with-
drawing from the NPT, its nuclear activities would be limited to
"peaceful purposes including power generation at the present
stage. '28 It further stated, "If the U.S .... legally assures the
DPRK of its non-aggression including the non-use of nukes, the
"129DPRK can also clear the U.S. of its security concerns..
In a May 12, 2003 Detailed Report, North Korea further as-
serted that the United States had invalidated the Joint Declara-
tion by, inter alia, maneuvering with South Korea to "reinforce
weapons by behind the screen talks," carrying out a joint U.S.-
South Korea nuclear war exercise, and introducing depleted nu-
clear bombs into South Korea and later deploying them in Feb-
ruary 1997.3
In its January 22, 2003 Detailed Report, North Korea stated
that the United States has repeatedly violated its obligations
under the Agreed Framework, concluding that the Agreed
Framework had been "undisguisedly abolished" by the United
States.3'
E. North Korean Announcement of Potential Nuclear Deterrent Force
North Korea stated onJune 9, 2003 that, "[i]f the U.S. keeps
threatening the DPRK with nukes instead of abandoning its hos-
tile policy toward Pyongyang, the DPRK will have no option but
to build up a nuclear deterrent force."32 North Korea has, how-




30. See DPRK, KCNA 's 12 May "Detailed Report'Says US "Ruptured'Denuclearization Pro-
cess, KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY ("KCNA"), May 12, 2003, translated in FEDERATION
OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS: NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM, Apr. 24, 2003,
available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/dprk51203.html [hereinaf-
ter DPRK Says U.S. 'Ruptured' Process]; see also DPRK, U.S. to Blame for Derailing Process of
Denuclearisation on Korean Peninsula, KCNA, May 13, 2003, available at http://
www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200305/newsO5/13.htm#1.
31. See KCNA Detailed Report, supra note 14.
32. See DPRK 'Nuclear Deterrent Force' To Be Built If US Maintains 'Hostile Policy',
KCNA, Jun. 3, 2003, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/
dprk060903.htm [hereinafter DPRK Radio Statement] (translating Statement on
P'yongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station); see also infra notes 63-70 and accom-
panying text.
33. See DPRK Says U.S. "Ruptured' Process, supra note 30.
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and purports to continue to be committed to denuclearizing the
area.3
4
II. THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
There is considerable uncertainty as to what, if any, nuclear
weapons North Korea has. North Korea has reportedly stated
that it has a nuclear weapons program3 5 and at least suggested
that it has nuclear weapons. 36 However, North Korea's official
posture appears to be that it denies having such weapons and
disputes the reports that it has admitted having them.3 7 As to its
capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, North Korea states
34. See id.
35. See Dick K. Nanto, North Korea: Chronology of Provocations, 1950-2003, CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, RL30004, at 24, available at http://
www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30004.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2004) (reporting that on Octo-
ber 17, 2002 North Korea admitted to U.S. envoy James Kelly that it was pursuing nu-
clear weapons program and that statement was confirmed later by North Korean U.N.
delegate). Information for the CRS Report was taken from South Korean and Western
sources and generally is denied by the North Korean government. See Visit to Yongbyon
Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 9 (Jan. 21, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/
012104hecker.pdf [hereinafter Hecker Statement] (providing statement of Siegfried S.
Hecker, Senior Fellow, Los Alamos National Laboratory and reporting that Ambassador
Li and Vice Minister Kim "stressed that the DPRK now has a nuclear deterrent and that
U.S. actions have caused them to strengthen their deterrent.").
36. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., 108TH CONG., NORTH KOREA: STATUS RE-
PORT ON NUCLEAR PROGRAM, HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, AND ECONOMIC REFORMS vii (Comm.
Print 2004), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senatellcp108.
html (reporting that in discussions with Foreign Ministry officials on the North's nu-
clear program following a U.S. delegation's visit to Yongbyon, "Vice Foreign Minister
Kim Gye-gwan claimed that, unlike Iran and Libya, North Korea actually has weapons of
mass destruction[,]" and that North Korea had provided the United States with evi-
dence of their "nuclear deterrent"); see also Federation of American Scientists, North
Korea Special Weapons Guide: Nuclear Weapons Program, Current Status, Apr. 24,
2003, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html (stating that
North Korean officials admitted for first time that they possessed nuclear weapons in
roundtable discussion with United States and China in Beijing on April 24, 2003);
George Edmonson, North Korea Warns U.S. it has Nukes, ATLANTA J. CONST., Apr. 25,
2003, at Al (citing Washington Post as reporting that top North Korean negotiator
pulled Kelly aside and "in effect, told him, 'We've got nukes"'); N. Korea 'admits having
nukes', CNN.coM, Apr. 25, 2003, available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asia
pcf/east/04/24/nkorea.us/ (reporting that Bush administration sources told CNN
than North Korea admitted to having at least one nuclear bomb); Niksch, supra note 6,
at I (reporting that North Korean Vice Foreign Minster Kang Sok-ju reportedly not
only admitted existence of North Korea's uranium enrichment program, but also told
Kelly that it possesses "more powerful" weapons).
37. See Niksch, supra note 6, at I (reporting that North Korea denies that any ad-
missions were made by Vice Foreign Minster Sok-ju to Kelly); see also N. Korea 'admits
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that it has reprocessed enough nuclear fuel rods for six pluto-
nium bombs, 8 but denies that it has a program for enriching
uranium. 9
U.S. officials have estimated that North Korea has approxi-
mately two nuclear weapons4" and enough plutonium to pro-
having nukes', supra note 36 (reporting that North Korea denies having made such
admission and says United States is using it as justification for military action).
38. See David E. Sanger, North Korea Says It Has Made Fuel For Atom Bombs, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2003, at Al (reporting that North Korean officials told Bush administra-
tion that they had produced enough plutonium to make six nuclear bombs and that
they intended to move ahead quickly to turn material into weapons); see also Andrew
Ward, Musharraf Retains Ties with N. Korea Despite Nuclear Scandal, FIN. TIMES (London),
Feb. 19, 2004, at 7 (Asia-Pacific) (reporting that North Korea offered to freeze its pluto-
nium-based program in return for compensation from the United States); Niksch, supra
note 6, at 2-3.
39. See Hecker Statement, supra note 35, at 11 (reporting that officials of North
Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated categorically that North Korea has no pro-
gram for enriching uranium and no equipment or scientific expertise to do so). See also
Ward, supra note 38, at 7 (stating that "Pyongyang's denials that it possesses an HEU
(highly enriched uranium) programme have emerged as a serious obstacle to the diplo-
matic process because the United States will not accept any settlement to end the nu-
clear crisis unless it includes dismantlement of the uranium enrichment facilities");
North Korea May Complete Uranium Program in 1-2 Years, KOREA (Seoul) TIMES, Jan. 27,
2004 (stating that "[t]he U.S., however, does not seem to have hard evidence on the
North Korean HEU program, although it is strongly pressuring North Korea to come
clean on the issue at the next six-party talks"). North Korean Vice Minister Kim Gye
Gwan has reportedly stated that North Korea has no HEU program and has chosen the
plutonium path to a deterrent. See Hecker Statement, supra note 35, at 10; see also
Charles L. "Jack" Pritchard, What I Saw in North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at A27.
Jack Pritchard was a member of the January 2004 unofficial delegation to North Korea
with Hecker.
The United States' position is that North Korea has stated that it has a HEU pro-
gram, and that the program does in fact exist. See Niksch, supra note 6, at 1. On Octo-
ber 16, 2002, the second Bush administration disclosed that North Korea revealed to
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in Pyongyang that North Korea was devel-
oping a secret nuclear weapons program based on uranium enrichment. See id. Accord-
ing to the Niksch report, North Korea began its clandestine uranium enrichment pro-
gram after 1995 with assistance from Pakistan. See id.
40. The CIA estimates that North Korea produced one or two nuclear weapons in
the early 1990's prior to the Agreed Framework. SeeJon Wolfsthal, The Intelligence 'Black
Hole' over North Korea, BBC NEWS, July 17, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/I/
hi/world/asia-pacific/3073677.stm; Sharon A. Squassoni, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons:
How Soon An Arsenal?, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS 4, RS
21391, available at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RS21391.pdf (quoting Secre-
tary of State Powell as saying that "[w]e now believe they [North Koreans] have a couple
of nuclear weapons and have had them for years"); see also Untitled CIA Estimate Pro-
vided to Congress on Nov. 19, 2002, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/
nuke/cia111902.html (estimating that North Korea has had one or two plutonium
bombs since 1992) [hereinafter Untitled CIA Estimate]; Niksch, supra note 6, at 8 (stat-
ing that U.S. National Intelligence Council issued revised finding in December 2001,
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duce up to five warheads.4 The U.S. estimates are apparently
that North Korea possessed one, possibly two nuclear weapons); David E. Sanger, Pakis-
tani Says He Saw North Korean Nuclear Devices, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2004, at A12 [herein-
after Sanger, North Korean Nuclear Devices].
41. See Niksch, supra note 6, at 8 (reporting that in August 2001, Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld stated that "North Korea possessed enough plutonium to pro-
duce two to three, maybe even four to five nuclear warheads"). Rumsfeld's estimate is
the largest official U.S. estimate as to the possible number of North Korean nuclear
weapons. See id.; see also Director of Central Intelligence ("DCI"), U.S. Central Intelli-
gence Agency ("CIA"), Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technol-
ogy Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions,
Jan. 1 throughJune 30, 2001, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721-reports/
jan_.jun2001.htm#5 (stating that during period of January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2001,
North Korea continued procurement of raw materials and components for its ballistic
missile program from various foreign sources, especially North Korean firms based in
China, and that North Korea has produced enough plutonium for one to two nuclear
weapons). An unclassified CIA paper from November 2002 stated that the assessment
that North Korea has enough plutonium for one or two weapons has not changed since
the 1990's. See Squassoni, supra note 40, at 4 (citing CIA unclassified paper on North
Korea dated November 19, 2002).
There is a general consensus that North Korea has the technology to produce plu-
tonium, that it did so at least in small quantities in the 1980's and 1990's, and is likely
doing so now. But estimates vary as to how much plutonium they can currently pro-
duce. See Wolfsthal, supra note 40.
North Korea's nuclear plant at Yongbyon reportedly can produce enough pluto-
nium for one nuclear weapon a year. See id. In 1989 North Korea shut down the plant
for over two-months, giving North Korea enough time to have removed the plutonium-
containing fuel from the facility and extracted enough plutonium for one weapon.
However, North Korea admits to having purified only 100 grams of plutonium dur-
ing this time, well short of the four kilograms required for a nuclear weapon. See id.
Wolfsthal points out that samples from the plutonium produced suggest that North
Korea's statements are not a complete picture of their nuclear program prior to the
reinstatement of nuclear inspections in 1992. See id.
Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea shut down its Yongbyon nuclear
plant and removed the 8000 spent fuel rods from the five MWe reactor. See Agreed
Framework, supra note 3; see also Hecker Statement, supra note 35, at 6. The 8000 rods
were placed under IAEA monitoring in exchange for two LVWrRs, to generate electricity
and an interim supply of heavy fuel oil until the first reactor is complete. See Agreed
Framework, supra note 3. The process of removing the rods was not completed until
June 2000. See Hecker Statement, supra note 35, at 6. In December 2002, the IAEA
inspectors were dismissed by North Korea and no one else has had access to the 8000
rods since. See id. North Korean officials stated to Hecker that they removed all 8000
fuel rods from the spent fuel storage pool and shipped them to the Radiochemical
Laboratory, a plutonium reprocessing facility. See id. They stated that they reprocessed
all 8000 spent rods in a continuous campaign from mid-January 2003 to June 2003. See
id. Hecker confirmed that the rods were no longer in the spent fuel pool. See id. The
Radiochemical Laboratory confirmed that North Korea possesses an industrial-scale
reprocessing facility in good repair. See id. at 7.
Gary Samore, a former deputy to the chief negotiator of the 1994 Agreed Frame-
work, concluded that North Korea's nuclear capacity could increase greatly in over the
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based on spy satellite surveillance,4 2 inference from available in-
formation as to what North Korea has the capability of doing,4
3
and North Korea's purported statements on the matter, al-
though additional information has recently come from the
Pakistani debriefing of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the "father of
the Pakistani bomb," who reportedly saw two to three North Ko-
rean plutonium nuclear devices in 1999 while selling North Ko-
rea equipment and know-how to North Korea for the enrich-
ment of uranium.4 4 The United States apparently does not con-
tend that it has seen such weapons. U.S. sources have
acknowledged that the clandestine nature of the North Korean
nuclear program,45 the closed nature of North Korea's society,4 6
and the fact that North Korea has apparently not tested nuclear
next several years to the point where it might be able to produce eight to thirteen
warheads a year. See North Korea May Complete Uranium Program, supra note 39.
42. In June 2003, U.S. satellites collected inconclusive evidence that krypton-85, a
gas released during reprocessing, was being emitted from secret development facilities
located near the Chinese border. See David E. Sanger, Intelligence Snarl over North Korea,
INT'L HERALD Tiuri., Oct. 15, 2003, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/
113591.html. In early 2003, U.S. spy satellites observed rods being taken away from a
storage shed, but it is unclear where they were being taken. See id.; see also Wolfsthal,
supra note 40; Squassoni, supra note 40 (stating that tests to detect krypton-85 were
initially inconclusive but eventually suggested that some reprocessing had taken place).
Kim Dae Ho, who worked on the North Korea nuclear program for ten years until
defecting in 1994, stated that the hardest part of hiding the nuclear processing plant
from IAFEA "was preventing the release of tell-tale krypton into the atmosphere."Jasper
Becker, Building the Bomb: North Korean Exile Reveals 15 Year History of Nuclear Cheating,
INDEP., Feb. 11, 2004.
43. See supra note 41 (providing support for U.S. inferences about North Korea's
nuclear program).
44. See Sanger, North Korean Nuclear Devices, supra note 40. Dr. Khan, after leading
the development of the Pakistani nuclear weapons, embarked on a program of selling
nuclear technology throughout the world, including to North Korea. According to
Asian and American officials who have been briefed by the Pakistanis, Dr. Khan recently
disclosed under Pakistani interrogation that on a trip to North Korea five years ago he
was taken to a site approximately an hour out of the North Korean capital and shown
"what he described as three nuclear devices." Id. See also supra note 36 and accompany-
ing text.
Pakistan has conducted six nuclear tests and claims weapon yields as high as thirty-
six kilotons ("kt"), although the Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory reports that
they were more likely in the range of nine to twelve kt. See Federation of American
Scientists, Pakistan Nuclear Weapons: A Brief History of Pakistan's Nuclear Program, at
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke (Dec. 11, 2002).
45. See Untitled CIA Estimate, supra note 40. Information on North Korea's nu-
clear weapons production is dependent largely upon remote monitoring and defector
information and has had mixed results. See Squassoni, supra note 40, at 6.
46. See Untitled CIA Estimate, supra note 40.
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weapons make it difficult to know what weapons they have.47
The United States' failure to find nuclear and other weap-
ons of mass destruction in Iraq, notwithstanding its prior asser-
tions on the matter, calls into question its assertions as to North
Korea's nuclear weapons. Both the United States and North Ko-
rea have varying political and strategic agendas as to how they
might want to posture the matter.
Independent sources add little clarity or certainty. China
and South Korea have recently questioned the accuracy of U.S.
intelligence as to North Korea's nuclear weapons, particularly af-
ter the U.S. intelligence failure or manipulation as to Iraq.48 Rus-
sia also questioned the matter in 1998.4" Reports from a recent
unofficial delegation of U.S. nongovernmental experts,5 ° who
were granted access to North Korean nuclear reactors, generally
confirmed North Korea's capability to produce certain volumes
of plutonium5 and reported the assertions of North Korean offi-
cials as to their having reprocessed some 8000 fuel rods to ex-
tract plutonium metal in 2003.52 However, the delegation was
not able to confirm whether North Korea had reprocessed the
fuel rods,53 whether it has a program for enriching uranium,54
whether it has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons grade
materials 55 or whether it has nuclear weapons at all.56
47. SeeJohn M. Donnelly, North Korea "Validates'Its A-Bomb Designs, DEF. WEEK, Nov.
10, 2003. There is dispute as to the significance of the fact that North Korea has not
tested a nuclear weapon. The CIA has reportedly concluded that it is not necessary for
a country to test a nuclear weapon design in order to validate it and has reported that
North Korea has conducted certain high-explosive conventional tests that could have
served to validate its nuclear weapons program. Georgy Kaurov, Press Secretary of the
Russian Atomic Energy Ministry, however, has stated, "[i]f North Korea did have a nu-
clear bomb, it would have to have been tested." Russia Rules out Possibility that Pyongyang
has Nuclear Weapons, BBC NEWS, June 5, 1998. Such a test would have been clearly
visible from space. See id.
48. SeeJohn Wolfsthal, Crying Wolf on Iraqi WMD Costs U.S. Credibility on North Korea,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Jan. 29, 2004; see also Stephen Collinson, U.S. Credibility on
North Korea on Line After Iraq Intelligence Fiasco, AGENCE FRcANcE-PREsSE, Feb. 1, 2004.
49. Russia Rules out Possibility that Pyongyang has Nuclear Weapons, supra note 47.
50. See generally Hecker Statement, supra note 35, at 3.
51. See id.; see also Pritchard, supra note 39.
52. See Hecker Statement, supra note 35, at 3; see also Pritchard, supra note 39.
53. See Hecker Statement, supra note 35, at 3; see also Pritchard, supra note 39.
54. See Hecker Statement, supra note 35, at 11.
55. See id. at 8, 10.
56. See id. at 3; see also Pritchard, supra note 39.
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III. THE NORTH KOREAN AND U.S. POSITIONS AS TO THE
LAWFULNESS OF NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR
WEAPONS PROGRAM
A. The North Korean Position
In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Case, North Korea took
the position before the ICJ that "the threat or use of nuclear
weapons in any case is violation [sic] of the U.N. Charter and the
existing international laws," 7 and that "the use of nuclear weap-
ons by a State in a war or other armed conflict is a clear breach
of its obligations under the international conventions . *."..58
North Korea asserted that the use of nuclear weapons would be a
breach of the Charter of the United Nations and the IAEA man-
date, "which seeks that the atomic energy should only be used
for peaceful purposes . . . ." Further, North Korea stated that
"it is deplorable that the legality of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons is debated when complete elimination of nuclear weap-
ons is under serious discussion on the international arena. 60
By subsequently withdrawing from the NPT and accusing
the United States of having breached the Joint Declaration
based on nuclear threats, North Korea appears to be invoking a
theory of self-defense. 6' North Korea stated as follows in its May
12, 2003 Detailed Report.
We will more strongly consolidate our massive self-reliant de-
fense forces that are capable of thoroughly responding to
U.S. air strikes with air strikes and U.S. ground strategies with
ground strategies and thus, annihilate the aggressors at a
blow. These facts clearly show that the United States is the
57. Letter from Pak Gil Yon, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the
U.N., DPRK, to Mohammed Sedjaoui, President, International Court of Justice (May
18, 1995), available at http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunan-ipleadings/
iunanjipleadings_199506_WriStats_01.Korea.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) [hereinaf-
ter May 18, 1995 Letter].
58. Letter from Kim Yong Nam, Minister of Foreign Affairs, DPRK, to Bernard
Noble, Deputy-Registrar, International Court of Justice (Jan. 26, 1994), available at
http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/icases/ianw/ianw_pleadings/ianw ipleadings_199409_
WriStats_02jKorea.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Jan. 26, 1994 Letter].
59. Id.
60. May 18, 1995 Letter.
61. See, e.g., DPRK Says U.S. 'Ruptured'Process, supra note 30. See also Pyongyang Says
Disarment Will Only Lead to Invasion, ASSOCIATED PRESS (TAIWAN NEWS), Mar. 19, 2005,
available at http://www.etaiwannews.com/Asia/2004/03/19/1079661874.htm (report-
ing that North Korea has restated its position that inspections and disarmament will
only lead to U.S. invasion, as is proven by U.S.-led invasion in Iraq).
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ringleader that violated the North-South Declaration of the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
6 2
North Korea further stated in the Detailed Report that "l[t] he
[second] Bush administration that has been systematically and
extensively destroying the process of denuclearization of the Ko-
rean Peninsula, finally made it a policy in March 2002 to mount
a nuclear preemptive strike against seven countries including
our Republic."6 3 North Korea asserted:
This is a violent infringement upon the fundamental spirit of
the NPT in which countries possessing nuclear weapons
should not threaten other countries with nuclear weapons or
use nuclear weapons; should not create a state of emergency
that endangers the fundamental interests of the non-nuclear
[S]tates; and exert all efforts to avoid nuclear war.6
4
Contending that U.S. accusations as to North Korea's pos-
sessing weapons of mass destruction are provocative, North Ko-
rea stated:
U.S. espoused nuclear suspicion, suspicion of development of
weapons of mass destruction, and suspicion of terrorism sup-
port are all to find an excuse to wage war. Also, the war in
Iraq proved that sincerely accepting disarmament through so-
called inspections by international agencies does not prevent
war but, rather, invites war.65
Specifically as to the war on Iraq, North Korea stated:
The bloody lesson of the war in Iraq for the world is that only
when a country has physical deterrent forces and massive mil-
itary deterrent forces that are capable of overwhelmingly de-
feating any attack by state-of-the-art weapons, can it prevent
war and defend its independence and national security.
66
North Korea further asserted:
The reality shows that, under circumstances in which the
United States does not show any political will or intent to
abandon its hostile policy toward the DPRK, the issue of us
equipping ourselves with our own physical deterrent forces is
an urgent demand for preventing a nuclear war from break-
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ing out on the Korean Peninsula and guaranteeing peace and
security in the work.
6 7
Reflecting what can be seen as the de facto irrelevance of
international law in light of the nuclear programs of the United
States and other nuclear powers, North Korea has stated that,
now that it has withdrawn from the NPT, it, like the other nu-
clear powers, is no longer subject to international law as to such
weapons:
Now that the DPRK is no longer bound to the safeguards ac-
cord with the International Atomic Energy Agency after its
withdrawal from the NPT the DPRK has the same legal status
as the United States and other countries possessing nuclear
weapons not bound to international law, as far as the issue of
nuclear deterrent force is concerned.68
It becomes relevant to note the economic rationale/justifi-
cation North Korea has stated for its nuclear program:
The DPRK's intention to build up a nuclear deterrent force is
not aimed to threaten and blackmail others but reduce con-
ventional weapons under a long-term plan and channel man-
power resources and funds into economic construction and
the betterment of people's living.
The DPRK will build up a powerful physical deterrent force
capable of neutralizing any sophisticated and nuclear weap-
ons with less spending unless the U.S. gives up its hostile pol-
icy toward the DPRK-69
North Korea contends that, in exchange for its agreeing to a
moratorium on long-range missile testing and refraining from
further exporting of missiles and missile technology, it wants a
non-aggression pact and/or a new nuclear agreement with the
United States. 7
67. See id.
68. See DPRK Radio Statement, supra note 32. Upon withdrawing from the NPT,
North Korea considered itself free from IAEA safeguards, stating that it now enjoyed
"the same legal status as the United States and other countries possessing nuclear weap-
ons... ." Charles Whelan, North Korea Admits Nuclear Weapons Drive, Blames Washington,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 9, 2003, at Int'l News.
69. See DPRK Radio Statement, supra note 32.
70. See Niksch, supra note 6, at 1-2, 7; see also DPRK Says U.S. 'Ruptured'Process, supra
note 30. The North Korean position is as follows:
[W]e proposed several times to hold direct talks between the DPRK and the
United States and firmly insisted on settling the nuclear issue by concluding a
non-aggression treaty so as to by all means prevent the rupture of the process
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IV. THE U.S. POSITION7t
While the United States continually has objected to North
of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula even when maneuvers to abro-
gate the DPRK-US Agreed Framework and scrap the North-South Joint Decla-
ration of the Denuclearization reached the extreme.
Id.; see also Paul Kerr, U.S. and North Korea at Impasse Over Talks, ARMS CONTROL TODAY,
Jan./Feb. 2004, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_01-02/NK-asp.
North Korea wants the United States to "issue security assurances, normalize bilateral
diplomatic relations, refrain from hindering North Korea's 'economic cooperation with
other countries' and increase food aid," in addition to completing the nuclear reactor
project and resuming the fuel shipments promised under the Agreed Framework. See
id.; see also Gady A. Epstein & Mark Matthews, North Korea Lays out Nuclear Intent; Envoys
at Beijing Talks Told North Korea Will Test Bomb, Prove it Can Deliver One; U.S.: 'Exactly what
we expected; Diplomats from Russia, South Korea, Japan 'Taken Aback; Chinese 'Angy', BALT.
SUN, Apr. 29, 2003, at IA (reporting North Korea seeks non-aggression pact from
United States in return for abandoning its nuclear weapons program); Edmonson,
supra note 36.
North Korea reportedly told a visiting delegation of congressional staffers in Au-
gust 1998 that it would stop its ballistic missile sales to countries such as Iran in ex-
change for U.S. compensation of U.S.$1 billion annually. See Niksch supra note 6, at 8.
In the April 2003 Beijing talks, North Korea reportedly asked that the United States: 1)
provide it with energy, presumably electricity; 2) facilitate the completion of LWRs pur-
suant to the terms of the Agreed Framework; 3) remove North Korea from the list of
terrorist countries; 4) establish full diplomatic relations with North Korea; and 5) issue
a written, legal security guarantee against either a nuclear or conventional attack
against North Korea. See Niksch, supra note 6, at 3. North Korea reportedly stated that
in exchange, it would dismantle its nuclear weapons program as the final step. See id.
71. The U.S. position on North Korea's nuclear program has evolved over time.
When the CIA first identified the North Korean nuclear program in the early 1980s, it
did not treat the matter as cause for concern, but rather focused on North Korea's
energy concerns as the rationale for its nuclear ambitions. See Robert A. Wampler, North
Korea and Nuclear Weapons: The Declassified U.S. Record, Apr. 25, 2003, available at http://
www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/.
The Reagan administration passed on an opportunity to address this issue when
China approached the United States to broker direct talks between the United States
and North Korea. See id. Interestingly, it was then-Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Paul Wolfowitz's ideological opposition to any Chinese
Intervention that prevented pursuit of the idea. See CHINA CONFIDENTIAL: AMERICAN
DIPLOMATS AND SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 1945-1996 (Nancy Bernkopf Tucker ed.,
2001).
The first Bush administration expressed concern over the developing North
Korean nuclear capacities in violation of the NPT and asked China to request that
North Korea abide by its commitments under the NPT regime. See id. Simultaneously,
the United States was also pressuring South Korea to give priority to denuclearization as
a requisite for Korean reunification. See id.
The Clinton administration pursued a strategy of direct engagement with North
Korea, negotiating a number of international agreements, including the Agreed
Framework in 1994 in hopes of keeping the North Korean nuclear program in check
via diplomacy, international inspection, and regulatory regimes. See Agreed
Framework, supra note 3; see also Tyler Marshall, Threat from N. Korea is Growing GOP
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Warns; Security: Report, Faulting Clinton Engagement Policy, Says Asian Nation Continues to
Develop Nuclear Capability, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1999, at A4.
The first position the administration of President George W. Bush took towards the
nuclear weapons program of North Korea was an extensive period of policy analysis,
followed by a skeptical view of the utility of negotiation with North Korea. See Seung-
Hwan Kim, Anti-Americanism in Korea, 26 WASH. Q. 109 (2002).
This policy of neglect was revised after North Korea restarted its nuclear reactor,
expelled IAEA inspectors, and withdrew from the NPT. Three months subsequent to
its withdrawal, North Korea, in the course of three-way talks with the United States and
China, reportedly informed Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that it possessed
nuclear weapons. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
The current Bush administration then chose a policy of confrontation over
engagement, referring to North Korea as a threat to the nonproliferation regime, while
simultaneously making it clear that it chose to address such problems with preemptive
military action. See Wade L. Huntley, Countdown on the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, 2
STRATEGIC INSIGHTS 5, May 2003, available at http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/may03/
eastAsia.asp. Secretary of State Colin Powell, however, has stated that the United States'
principal focus is a negotiated - as opposed to military - resolution to the
confrontation. See Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Dept. of State,
U.S. Seeks Diplomatic Resolution for North Korea, Powell Says, Jan. 11, 2004, at http://
usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/nkoreapg.htm.
North Korea has enunciated a set of conditions for abandoning its nuclear
weapons program. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. The Bush administration
has responded that the United States is willing to offer a written, multilateral security
agreement, "in the context of North Korea's complete and verifiable and irreversible
dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program." Kerr, supra note 70. The
administration has recently indicated more flexibility regarding whether North Korea
must first dismantle all of its nuclear facilities before an agreement can be reached. See
id.
While the United States has not enunciated clear criteria for a resolution of the
confrontation, it has stated that it is willing to provide multilateral security
arrangements, so long as North Korea begins dismantling its nuclear weapons program.
In February 2004, the six parties met again to negotiate a resolution to the crises, but
failed to come to a settlement on the future of North Korea's nuclear program. See
Andrew Ward, North Korea Sees Little Hope of Ending Stalemate, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2004, at
7. The parties agreed to hold a third round of talks in July and establish a permanent
working group but North Korea has expressed doubt as to the efficacy of talks in solving
the dispute over its nuclear weapons program. See id. The Bush administration has not
clarified what North Korea would have to do before security assurances would be
provided. As to North Korea's demands for economic aid, the administration has made
it clear that it will not provide concessions until disarmament is under way. See id.
At the same time, the United States has taken steps to strengthen its strategic
position vis-A-vis North Korea. In April 2003, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Lawless, while meeting with his South Korean
counterpart, announced the United States' intention to reposition its forces, removing
them from their current position along the Demilitarized Zone ("DMZ") to south of the
Han river and moving U.S. military command in the region from Seoul to Osan. See
International Institute for Legal Studies, American Forces in South Korea: The End of an
Era?, 9 STRATEGIC COMMENTS 10, available at http://www.iiss.org/stratcomfree.php?
sclD=277.
The military has provided three rationales for this redeployment: 1) the need for
South Korean forces to take a more active role in defense of the DMZ; 2) the "tripwire"
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Korea's development of nuclear weapons72 and in the past has
asserted North Korea's violation of its obligations under the
NPT, the Joint Declaration, the Agreed Framework, and North
Korea's IAEA safeguards agreement,7 3 it does not appear to have
based its objections on the ground that the use or threat of use
of nuclear weapons is unlawful.7 ' The United States also has ob-
jected to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, but it does
not appear to have set forth a legal basis for its objections.7 5
conception of defense for the Korean Peninsula no longer comports with reality, since,
in a conflict with South Korea, North Korea would most likely bypass traditional
invasion corridors and attack with missiles and Special Forces units, making defense of
the DMZ of less importance; and 3) by repositioning U.S. forces further south of the
DMZ, it would make them more mobile and more convenient for deployment to nearby
areas where regional conflicts are more likely. See id. Along with this repositioning, the
United States will provide technology grants to the South Korean forces, upgrading
their ground- and air-defense, counter-battery fire, and airborne early warning
capabilities. See id.
A significant policy shift came in September 2003 when the current South Korean
administration decided to push for an end to the 1954 Armistice Agreement, which
previous South Korean governments saw as a linchpin to stability on the peninsula,
envisaging that the end of the Armistice would mean the United States would be likely
to withdraw its troops from South Korea. See South Korean Minister Says U.S. to Address
North Korean Security Concerns, BBC MONITORING INT'L REPORTS, Sept. 27, 2003.
72. Regarding North Korea and its nuclear weapons program, President George
W. Bush, in his 2003 State of the Union address, stated, "[N]uclear weapons will bring
only isolation, economic stagnation, and continued hardship. The North Korean re-
gime will find respect in the world and revival for its people only when it turns away
from its nuclear ambitions." President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan.
28, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-
19.html [hereinafter 2003 State of the Union Address].
73. See, e.g., Richard Boucher, Spokesman, U.S. Dept. of State Press Statement on
North Korea Nuclear Program (Oct. 16, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2002/14432.htm (stating that "North Korea's secret nuclear weapons program
is a serious violation of North Korea's commitments under the Agreed Framework as
well as under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), its International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards agreement, and the Joint North-South Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula").
74. The U.S. State Department merely stated that the North Korean withdrawal
from the NPT was "regrettable" and urged North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weap-
ons program. See N. Korea Move on inter-Korean Nuclear Accord 'Regrettable'- U.S. State
Department, AFX EUROPEAN Focus, May 13, 2003. The United States may be taking this
position since it, unlike North Korea, espoused the legality of nuclear weapons before
the ICJ. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (setting forth North Korea's state-
ments to ICJ as to the illegality of nuclear weapons); see also infra notes 353, 371, 377,
397, 417, 430-31, 433, 447, 451, 461-63, 465-66, 477 and accompanying text (setting
forth U.S. position before ICJ espousing general legality of nuclear weapons).
75. This may result from the similarity of North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT
to the United States' withdrawal, on December 13, 2001, from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems Treaty that it signed with the Soviet Union in 1972. See Treaty Between the
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United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1334, available at http://
www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html [hereinafter ABM Treaty];
see also America Withdraws from ABM Treaty, BBC NEWS, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1707812.stm (Dec. 13, 2001).
Each of these withdrawals from a leading international arms control treaty was
based on alleged changes in circumstances. As to North Korea's alleged basis for with-
drawal from the NPT, "[e]ach Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the
right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country ... "
See NPT, supra note 6, at art. X; see also KCNA Detailed Report, supra note 6. As to the
United States' alleged basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, "[e]ach Party shall, in
exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it de-
cides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopard-
ized its supreme interests .... " Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and Interim
Agreement and Protocol on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Oct. 3, 1972,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 944 U.N.T.S. 13, 11 I.L.M. 784; see also America Withdraws from ABM Treaty,
supra note 75; Patricia Hewitson, Nonproliferation and Reduction of Nuclear Weapons: Risks
of Weakening the Multilateral Nuclear Nonproliferation Norm 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 405,
419-20 (2003).
Upon withdrawing from the NPT, North Korea considered itself free from IAEA
safeguards, stating that it now enjoyed "the same legal status as the United States and
other countries possessing nuclear weapons . . . ." Whelan, supra note 68.
South Korea then reminded North Korea that the inter-Korean nuclear accord was
still valid and a legal bar to North Korea's developing nuclear weapons. See N. Korea
Move on inter-Korean Nuclear Accord 'Regrettable' - U.S. State Department, supra note 74.
North Korea responded that the agreement was dead and blamed Washington for
its need to abrogate the arrangement. See S. Korea Says Nuclear Accord with N. Korea Still
Valid, AFX-AsiA, May 19, 2003; see also Seo Hyun-Jin, N. Korea Promotes Its Stance; Declares
Denuclearization Pact 'Dead, KoREA (Seoul) HERALD, May 14, 2003.
News sources cited the end of the inter-Korean nuclear accord as the last legal
barrier to the North Korean nuclear program. See id.; see also S. Korea Says Nuclear Accord
with N. Korea Still Valid, supra note 75; U.S.-N.Korea Tension Grows, AP/CBS NEWS, May
14, 2003, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/14/world/main5538
45.shtm.
Ironically, just as North Korea justified its withdrawal from the NPT in part on
alleged actions and intentions of the United States, so also the United States justified its
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in part on alleged actions and intentions of North
Korea. The second Bush administration withdrew from the ABM Treaty so that the
United States could pursue missile defense technologies. See, e.g., America Withdraws from
ABM Treaty, supra; Patrick E. Tyler, Global Reaction to Missile Plan is Cautious, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 2001, at A10.
The Bush administration wanted missile defense to protect against perceived dan-
gers from "rogue nations," such as North Korea, including from the proliferation of
missiles possessed by such States. See David E. Sanger, AFI'EREFFECTS: STRATEGIC
ARMS; Bush Issues Directive Describing Policy on Antimissile Defenses, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
2003, at A21; see also Hewitson, supra, at 419-20 (citing Richard Boucher, Spokesman,
U.S. Dept. of State, Text of Diplomatic Notes Sent to Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia,
Ukraine (Dec. 14, 2001), available at http://www.usembassy.org. uk/acda283.htm).
Alternatively, another reason for the U.S. pursuit of missile defense is to permit the
United States to intervene in regional hot spots without fear of retaliation against U.S.
territory. Nick Childs, Analysis: Uncertain End to ABM Treaty, BBC NEWS, June 13, 2002.
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V. BACKGROUND TO THE U.S./NORTH KOREAN
ADVERSARY RELATIONSHIP
A. Korean War
From 1905 until the end of World War II, Korea was a col-
ony of the Japanese empire.7 6 Pursuant to U.S./Soviet agree-
ment following the war, Korea was divided into U.S. and Soviet
sectors, pending Korean independence at some unspecified
time in the future.7 The Russians, who previously had been
sweeping south through Manchuria, agreed to limit their ad-
vance at the 38th parallel. 78 The area north of the 38th parallel
was to be occupied by the Soviet Union and that to the south by
the United States.
Russian forces departed North Korea peacefully, leaving be-
hind a Stalinist regime under Kim II Sing and the North Korean
Peoples' Army.79 Operating under a U.S. military administration
directed by General Douglas MacArthur from headquarters in
Tokyo," ° the United States backed an administration headed by
Syngman Rhee, who had previously been elected president of
When North Korea withdrew from the NPT, John Bolton, Undersecretary of State
for Arms Control and International Security, stated, "[I] t is hard to see how we can have
conversations with a government that has blatantly violated its agreements." John Bur-
roughs, Nonproliferation Treaty Applies to Both North Korea and United States, in BOMBS
AWAY!, Spring 2003, available at http://lcnp.org/pubs/BASpring03/article3.htm (citing
North Korea Says Nuclear Program Can Be Negotiated, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2002, at Al).
This contrasted with Mr. Bolton's comment when the United States withdrew from
the ABM Treaty, "There may be good and sufficient reasons to abide by the provisions
of a treaty, and in most cases one would expect to do so because of the mutuality of
benefits that treaties provide, but not because the United States is 'legally' obligated to
do so." Burroughs, supra (citingJohn Bolton, Is There Really 'Law' in International Affairs,
10 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2000)).
This Article does not address the point developed by Mr. Burroughs to the effect
that a binding norm of international law has developed outlawing the possession of
nuclear weapons or the argument that the United States is itself in breach of the NPT
by not fulfilling its Article VI obligations to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effec-
tive measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament." Burroughs, supra.
76. See MAx HASTINGS, THE KOREAN WAR 25 (1987); see also Michael Hickey, The
Korean War: An Overview, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/coldwar/ko-
rea hickey_01.shtml. See generally AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY- ARMY HISTORICAL SE-
RIES, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MILITARY HISTORY, UNITED STATES ARMY ch. 25, available at
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/amh/AMH-25.htm.
77. See HASTINGS, supra note 76, at 27.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 43.
80. See id. at 27; see also Hickey, supra note 76, at 46.
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the Korean Provisional Government while in exile and was
elected South Korean president in 1948; President Rhee's
openly declared aim was the imposition of national unity by
force. s
After several years of border clashes, 2 North Korea directly
attacked on South Korea and moved its army south across the
38th parallel early in the morning ofJune 25, 1950.83 The North
Korean army, led by Premier Kim II Sun, had eight full divisions
totaling 135,000 troops, with soldiers who had served in the Chi-
nese and Soviet World War II armies making up a large part of
the force.8 4 The South Korean army had only 95,000 troops,
who were generally less experienced. 5
The North overwhelmed the South while the United States
called on the Security Council to invoke the United Nations
Charter branding North Korea as the aggressor. The Security
Council responded and called on member states to send military
assistance to South Korea.8 6 The Security Council's action was
supported by fifty-three U.N. members, and twenty-nine of these
made specific offers of assistance. The United States sent
troops,s" and the British government responded by placing its
81. See Hickey, supra note 76, at 46..
82. According to Hastings' account, North Korea did not hold a monopoly as to
responsibility for border incidents. See HASTINGS, supra note 76, at 46. One of the most
serious incidents occurred in May 1949 when South Korean forces penetrated 2.5 miles
into North Korean territory attacking local villages. See id.
83. See AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY, supra note 76. But see Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, The Great War for the Liberation of the Motherland - Korean War, availa-
ble at http://www.korea-dpr.com/history3O.htm [hereinafter The Great War for the Libera-
tion of the Motherland] (providing brief account of North Korean perspective of Korean
War). Some contend that North Korea's invasion of the South was in response to South
Korean President Syngman Rhee's openly declared policy of national unity by force.
According to North Korean accounts of June 25, 1950 and events leading up to that
day, the United States was the aggressor, and on June 25th it began its "invasion to the
north" under the directions of John Foster Dulles, Advisor to the U.S. State Depart-
ment. According to this account, Dulles had President Syngman Rhee issue propa-
ganda statements indicating that North Korea was the initial aggressor, so that the
United States could invade North Korea under the flag of the U.N. See The Great War for
the Liberation of the Motherland, supra.
84. See AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY, supra note 76.
85. See id. at 25.
86. See Hickey, supra note 76, at Introduction.
87. U.S. occupation troops had only just left Korea in June 1948, on the basis that
they had done all that was necessary to aid in South Korea's transition from Japanese
protectorate to independent state. See HASTINGS, supra note 76, at 42.
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Far East Fleet along the Korean coast.8 8 In total, twenty Nations
sent military assistance to Korea and were led by a single United
Nations commander, General Douglas MacArthur of the United
States.8
In mid-September 1950, General MacArthur, leading two di-
visions of U.N. troops, pushed the North Koreans back across
the 38th parallel and proceeded deep into the north.9" China,
in response to U.N. forces approaching its border with Korea,
launched a preemptory attack, pushing the U.N. forces south.9 '
ByJanuary 1951, U.N. forces were defending a line well to
the south of Seoul. 2 The United States and its allies regrouped
and by mid-April 1951 were back in the area of the 38th parallel,
at which time China launched a spring offensive. This time the
line stabilized in the general area of the 38th parallel, where it
remained for the next two years.93
In mid-1951 the land battle had reached a stalemate, and
both sides agreed to go to the conference table for armistice
talks. The negotiations continued for two years.94 In July 1953,
an armistice was reached.95
B. Armistice Agreement
The Korean Armistice Agreement ("Armistice Agreement")
was signed on July 27, 1953 by the Commander-in-Chief of the
United Nations Command, representing U.N. forces, and the
Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the
Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, representing
North Korean and Chinese forces. 6 Providing for a cease-fire,
the Armistice Agreement established a military demarcation line
88. See Hickey, supra note 76, at Introduction. The U.N.'s response was unprece-
dented in that it was the first time since its founding that the U.N. reacted to aggression
with a decision to use force. See AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY, supra note 76.
89. See WALTER G. HERMES, UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR: TRUCE TENT
AND FIGHTING FRONT 67 (Stetson Conn ed., 1966), available at http://www.army.mil/
cmh-pg/books/korea/truce/fm.htm.





95. See infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
96. See Text of the Korean War Armistice Agreement, July 27, 1953, available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/korea/kwarmagr72753.html. The Armistice
Agreement is purely a military document. No Nation is a signatory.
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and demilitarized zone, and created the Military Armistice Com-
mission to supervise the Agreement. 97 The Armistice Agreement
was intended to be temporary, pending the parties' agreement
to a peace treaty following a political conference that was set to
take place within three months. The conference's goal was to
resolve all outstanding questions, including the withdrawal of all
foreign forces from Korea and a peaceful settlement to the Ko-
98rean question.
But the Armistice Agreement has never been replaced with
a treaty.99 In recognition of the need for a peace treaty, the
North and South in late 1991 signed the Agreement on Recon-
ciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation be-
tween South and North, and in 1992 signed the Joint Declara-
tion.' 0
C. North Korean Provocations According to the United States
Despite the Armistice Agreement, there continued to be
provocations and conflicts among the parties. The U.S. Con-
gressional Research Service ("CRS"), in a study updated in 2003,
documented some 124 provocations by North Korea against
South Korea, the United States, and/or Japan between June
1950 and March 2003.101
Such provocations included infiltrations of thousands of
armed agents into South Korea, followed by kidnapping and ter-
rorism; 10 2 attempted assassinations of South Korean President
97. See id. arts. I(1), II(A)-(B).
98. See id. art. V.
99. See Pak Chol Gu, Replacement of the Korean Armistice Agreement: Prerequisite to a
Lasting Peace in the Korean Penninsula, 4 DPRK PERSPECIVES ON ENDING THE KOREAN
ARMISTICE (1997), available at http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/4aDPRKonKA.
html.
100. See Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Coop-
eration Between North and South, entered into Force on Feb. 19, 1992, available at
http://wvw.korea.net/issue/sn/summit/summit_012106.asp; see alsoJoint Declaration,
supra note 2; Chol Gu supra note 99, at 1; Federation of American Scientists, supra note
36.
101. See Nanto, supra note 35.
102. See id. at Summary. "North Korea is reported to have infiltrated a total of
3,693 armed agents into South Korea from 1954 to 1992 .... " Id. at 2. North Korea
was particularly active in the latter half of the 1960s with 20% of the infiltrations occur-
ring during 1967 and 1968. See id. at Summary. In April 1996, "[o]n three occasions, a
combined total of seven hundred armed North Korean troops crossed the military de-
marcation line into the DMZ at Panmunjom . . .in violation of the Korean Armistice
Agreement ("KAA")". Id. at 13.
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Park Chung Hee in 1968 and 1974; an assassination attempt on
South Korean President Chun DooHwan in Rangoon, Burma
(Myanmar) in 1983;103 and the mid-air bombing of a South Ko-
rean Boeing 707 passenger plane in 1987.104 In 1968, North Ko-
rea captured a U.S. surveillance ship, the U.S.S. Pueblo, killing
one sailor and holding eighty-two crew members prisoner for
eleven months.1 °5 There have also been numerous direct mili-
tary confrontations between North Korea and the United States
over the years.'
0 6
In June 1998, "North Korea declared its intention to con-
tinue to develop, test, and deploy missiles as a means of coun-
tering the alleged U.S. military threat."1 ° 7 In October 2002, as
noted above, North Korea reportedly advised U.S. envoy James
Kelley "that it was pursuing a nuclear weapons development pro-
gram."' 0 8 On April 24, 2003, in a roundtable discussion among
representatives of China, North Korea, and the United States,
North Korea reportedly admitted that it had nuclear weapons.' 09
The North Korean officials reportedly "claimed to have
reprocessed spent fuel rods and threatened to begin exporting
nuclear materials unless the United States agrees to one-on-one
talks with North Korea." t 0
In addition, North Korea has exported substantial numbers
of ballistic missiles and related equipment and systems over the
103. See id. at 8-9. The explosion of a powerful bomb minutes before South Ko-
rean President Chun's arrival "killed 17 senior South Korean officials and injured 14
.... The explosion also killed four Burmese nationals and wounded thirty-two others."
Id. Two other North Korean plots to assassinate President Chun were uncovered in
1982 and 1984. See id. at 8-9.
104. See id. at 10. North Korean terrorists planted a bomb on a Korean Airline
Boeing 707 en route from Baghdad to Seoul, with 20 crewmembers and 95 passengers
aboard, [that] exploded in midair over the Andaman Sea off the coast of Burma." Id.
The North Korean motive for planting the bomb was reportedly to warn against those
planning to take part in the Seoul Olympics. See id.
105. See id. at 4.
106. In April 1969, North Korean MiGjet fighters shot down an unarmed U.S. EC-
121 reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan, about 90 miles off the North Korean
coast, resulting in the loss of 31 lives; and in October 1969, four U.S. soldiers were
ambushed and killed near the southern boundary of the DMZ. See id. at 5. In March
2003, four North Korean fighter jets intercepted a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance plane
in international airspace over the Sea of Japan. See id. at 25-26.
107. Id. at 16.
108. Id. at 24.
109. See id. at 35; see also Federation of American Scientists, supra note 36.
110. See Niksch, supra note 6; see also Federation of American Scientists, supra note
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past several decades, establishing it as a leading ballistic missile
proliferator.'11 Its markets have included Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pa-
kistan, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates,1 2 yielding it hun-
dreds of millions of dollars annually. 11 3
In October 2002, North Korea reportedly provided Pakistan
with help in developing long range missiles, in addition to the
intermediate range ballistic missiles it had supplied to Pakistan
in the late 1990's, 4 in exchange for centrifuge enrichment
technology ostensibly intended for use in nuclear weapons.115
North Korea's proliferation efforts appear to be pervasive
and ongoing. 16 In December 2002, a North Korean ship was
111. SeeJoseph S. Bermudez, A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK, 12
OCCASIONAL PAPER, No. 2, at 1 (Monterey Inst. of Int'l Stud. 1999), available at http://
cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op2/op2.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2004).
112. See id. Iraq would have been included as one of North Korea's customers had
the deal gone through. See Bob Drogin, Botched Iraqi Deal is Detailed: CIA Advisor Says
Hussein Lost $10 Million in a Plan to Smuggle North Korean Technology That Never Went
Through, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2002 (reporting that Saddam Hussein lost $10 million in
botched deal with Kim Jong I1 for North Korean ballistic missile technology and other
prohibited missile equipment prior to war).
113. See Andrew Ward, Trade Ties Grow Between Two Koreas, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2003, at 2; see also Douglas Frantz, North Korea's Nuclear Success is Doubted: Experts Question
U.S. Claims About North's Atomic Abilities, Warning a Showdown Based on Dubious Evidence
Could Further Damage Trust, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at Al (stating that selling missiles
and related technology is North Korea's chief source of hard currency).
114. See Niksch, supra note 6, at 1. Most of North Korea's exports are short range
missiles (but it has also exported medium and possibly long range missiles). See
Bermudez, supra note 11; U.S. North Korea at 'Critical Juncture' Over Missiles, CNN.coM,
available at http://www.cnn.com/world/asiapcf/9811/20/korea.missiles/index.html.
North Korea is believed to have provided between twelve and twenty-five complete No-
Dong medium-range missiles to Pakistan in the late 1990s. See Niksch, supra note 6, at 9.
115. See Squassoni, supra note 40, at 2 (quoting Pakistan's Benazir Oversaw Korea
Nuclear Deal- sources, REUTERS NEWS, Nov. 20, 2002).
116. Apropos of U.S. allegations as to North Korea's proliferation of ballistic mis-
siles, it is interesting to review U.S. proliferation activities. The United States dominates
the international market for arms. In 2002, it had worldwide sales of some "$13.3 bil-
lion, or 45.5 percent of global conventional weapons sales, a rise from $12.1 billion in
2001 ." Thom Shanker, U.S. Remains Leader in Global Arms Sales, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2003, at A12.
In 2002, the Pentagon had an estimated $15.534 billion in proposed conventional
arms transfer agreements with twenty-nine countries. See ARMS CONTROL Assoc., PRO-
POSED U.S. ARMS EXPORT AGREEMENTS FROM JANUARY 1, 2002 TO DECEMBER 31, 2002,
available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/armexp2002.asp (last visited Apr.
12, 2004).
Kuwait was at the top of the list of all potential arms recipients with requests for
$2.29 billion in weaponry that included eighty AIM-120C Advanced Medium Range Air-
to-Air Missiles. See id. Ranking second and third respectively were the United Arab
Emirates ("U.A.E.") and Taiwan. See id.
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Included in the U.A.E.'s order were 237 Sea Sparrow ship-to-air missiles. See id.
Taiwan ordered 290 TOW-2B anti-tank missiles with spare and repair parts, four Kidd-
class guided missile destroyers, 248 SM-2 Block IIIA Standard ship-to-air missiles, 323
RGM-84L Block II Harpoon anti-ship missiles. See id.
The United States is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime
("MTCR") and the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
("ICOC"). North Korea is not a member of either organization. The MTCR was cre-
ated in 1987 by seven countries including the United States to restrict the proliferation
of nuclear-capable missiles and related technology. See Bureau of Nonproliferation,
U.S. Dept. of State, Missile Technology Control Regime Fact Sheet, Dec. 23, 2003, avail-
able at http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/27514.htm. As of December 2003, there were
thirty-three members to the MTCR and four unilateral adherents. See id. In 1993, the
focus of the MTCR was expanded to include missiles for the delivery of chemical or
biological weapons. See id.
The MTCR is not a treaty, but rather a voluntary agreement among its members
purportedly interested in controlling missile proliferation. See id. The MTCR restricts
transfers of missiles, in particular focusing on unmanned delivery systems capable of
delivering a payload of 500kg a distance of at least 300km. See id. (defining missiles as
"rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and sounding rock-
ets) and unmanned aerial vehicle systems (including cruise missile, target drones, and
reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering WMD-and their related equipment and
technology"). In 2003 the MTCR mandate was expanded to include preventing ter-
rorists from acquiring missiles and missile technology. See id.
The United States also actively participated in the ICOC, which was formally
brought into effect on Nov. 25, 2002 at a launching conference hosted by the Nether-
lands, at The Hague, and is one of the ninety-three original subscribing States. See Bu-
reau of Nonproliferation, U.S. Dept. of State, International Code of Conduct Against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation Fact Sheet, Jan. 6, 2004, available at http://www.state.gov/
t/np/rls/fs/27799.htm. As of November 9, 2003, there were 111 subscribing States.
The ICOC is intended to supplement the MTCR and not supplant it. It is intended to
set general principles, elicit modest commitments, and establish confidence-building
measures. See id.
At the ICOC launching conference, the United States made clear its support of the
ICOC and MTCR, but also stated that it sees its missile defense program as another
important element to protect against the dangers posed by Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion ("WMD") and ballistic missile proliferation. SeeJohn R. Bolton, Undersecretary for
Arms Control and International Security, Remarks at the Launching Conference for
the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, The Hague,
The Netherlands (Nov. 25, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/15488.
htm. Bolton stated that the United States views its missile defense program as, "comple-
mentary to, and consistent with the objectives of the ICOC and the MTCR." Id.
Towards the end of his remarks at the launching conference, Mr. Bolten made
specific reference to North Korea's recent violation of the NPT by its announcement
that it has a program to enrich uranium. See id. Speaking of the States that did not
subscribe to the ICOC, he stated, "[F] ar better to know who is actually prepared to live
under its terms, and who is not. Far better to know who is truly serious about stopping
the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and the risk that such technology could
be used to carry weapons of mass destruction against innocent civilian populations." Id.
In addition to its sales of military supplies throughout the world, United States
military hardware is located throughout the world, both on foreign bases of allies and
on ships and submarines throughout the high seas.
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found in the Persian Gulf carrying Scud missiles to Yemen.'
17
Recently, Nigeria has shown interest in acquiring missile tech-
nology from North Korea. According to a Nigerian government
spokesman, visiting North Koreans showed Nigerian military
leaders a "catalog of what they have," but "Nigeria has not taken
any concrete steps in acquiring it yet."' 18 According to David
Kay, a U.S. weapons inspector, North Korean dictator Kim Jong
I1 cheated Saddam Hussein out of $10 million in an aborted deal
to smuggle ballistic missile technology and other prohibited mil-
itary equipment to Iraq shortly before the recent war.11
Notwithstanding being a member of the Biological Weap-
ons Convention, which largely prohibits the possession of biolog-
ical weapons,' 20 North Korea is believed to have pursued such
weapons and methods through which to weaponize them since
the 1960's through dual-use acquisitions,1 21 and it is currently
believed to possess anthrax, cholera, plague, smallpox, and yel-
low fever, among others.122 North Korea also ostensibly has a
well-developed chemical weapons program. 2
3
117. See id. at 24.
118. Editorial, Missiles for Sale: North Korea Spreading Weapons Technology to Largest
African Nation, COLUMBUS (Ohio) DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 2004, at 10A.
119. See Drogin, supra note 112.
120. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruc-
tion, 26 U.S.T. 571, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 (1972) [hereinafter Biological Warfare Conven-
tion]. North Korea joined on March 13, 1987.
121. See DCI, supra note 41; see also Federation of American Scientists, North Korea
Special Weapons Guide: Chemical Weapons Program, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/
dprk/cw/index.html (noting that North Korea obtained some of these chemicals from
Japan through contract for delivery of agricultural chemicals, allowing them to make
tabun, mustard gas and later chlorine and phosphorous-containing organic com-
pounds). It is also believed that North Korean intelligence agents are involved in clan-
destine operations to acquire technology and information to aid in their chemical
weapons program. See U.S. Dept. of Defense, Northeast Asia, in PROLIFERATION: THREAT
AND RESPONSE (Report 1997), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif/
neasia.html.
122. See Federation of American Scientists, North Korea Special Weapons Guide:
Biological Weapons Program, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/bw/
index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2004).
123. North Korea is not a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Con-
vention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Senate Treaty Doc. 103-21, 32 I.L.M. 800
(1993), available at http://www.opcw.org/html/db/cwc/eng/cwc-frameset.html.
North Korea is believed to have acquired and developed its chemical and biologi-
cal weapons in part through lax export controls in China and Japan. See Taking the Risk
of Mass Destruction Seriously, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 30, 2004, at 13. Recently the
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Although North Korea denies possession or intent to use
chemical or biological weapons, 124 the United States and others
believe that North Korea possesses large quantities of chemical
and biological agents 125 that can be delivered by missile war-
heads and other munitions, 126 including "domestically produced
artillery, multiple rocket launchers, mortars, aerial bombs, and
ballistic missiles." 127 As of 1998, the Federation of American
Scientists had identified twenty special weapons facilities in
North Korea that may be producing, storing, or developing
chemical or biological weapons. 121 South Korean intelligence
sources indicate that, as of 1999, "North Korea maintain[ed]
eight chemical factories, four research facilities, and six storage
facilities for mass producing chemical agents. "129 As outlined in
a White Paper published by the South Korean Ministry of De-
fense in 1999, North Korea is estimated to have some 5,000
pounds of chemical weapons - some capable of reaching the
United States has put pressure on East Asian countries to tighten their export controls,
which has prompted a multi-lateral meeting where dual-use technology export restric-
tions were agreed on and a system to exchange intelligence related to its trade estab-
lished. See id.
The United States has severely limited the manner in which it will comply with the
Chemical Weapons Convention, inter alia, by prohibiting the analysis of U.S. chemical
samples in laboratories outside of the United States, by asserting a Presidential right to
refuse on-site inspections, and by limiting the scope of the industrial facilities that have
to be declared. See RULE OF POWER OR RULE or LAw? 71 (S. Nicole Deller et al. eds.,
2003). Additionally, the United States - despite fears of bioterrorism - has generally
rejected efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention through the estab-
lishment of a reliable verification protocol. See id. at 76-81.
124. See Sheer Sophism, KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY OF DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S RE-
PUBLIC OF KOREA, Mar. 28, 1999, available at http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1999/9903/
news03/28.htm.
125. See John R. Bolton, U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security, Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion, Remarks to the Heritage Foundation (May 6, 2002), available at http://
www.state.gov/t/us/rm/9962.htm (stating that North Korea has developed biological
weapons and that United States believes that North Korea has stockpiled chemical
weapons). See also U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, NORTH KOREA COUNTRY HANDBOOK: MARINE
CORPS INTELLIGENCE AcrivTv 41-42 (May 1997), available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/
guide/dprk/nkor.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
126. See DCI, supra note 41.
127. See U.S. Dept. of Defense, supra note 121.
128. Federation of American Scientists, North Korea Special Weapons Guide: Spe-
cial Weapons Facilities, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/facility/in-
dex.html.
129. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, White Paper 1999, pt. 1, ch. 3,
sec. 3, available at http://www.mnd.go.kr/english/html/02.htm.
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southern tip of the Korean Peninsula. 130  North Korea has re-
portedly devoted significant resources to defensive measures for
protecting its population from the effects of chemical weapons,
arguably to provide greater latitude for their use in combat.3 '
On January 29, 2002, just four months after the September
11th attacks on New York and the Pentagon, President George
W. Bush issued his State of the Union address setting forth, inter
alia, his administration's two objectives in the war on terror: (1)
to "shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring
terrorists to justice;" 13 2 and (2) to "prevent the terrorists and re-
gimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from
threatening the United States and the world."133 In his discus-
sion of the second objective, President Bush referred to the
three States at the top of his list of "regimes that sponsor terror
[and threaten] America or our friends and allies with weapons
of mass destruction," as an "axis of evil."1 3 4
North Korea was named first, described by President Bush
as a "regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruc-
tion;" next came Iran, which "aggressively pursues these weapons
and actively exports terror;" and last Iraq, a "regime [that] has
130. See The Henry L. Stimson Center, North Korean Chemical and Biological Weapons
Threats Elaborated, 3 CBW CHRON. 1, Feb. 2000, available at http://www.stimson.org/
cbw/?sn=cb20020113258. See also Charles Lee, U.S., S. Korea Conduct Military Exercise,
UNITED PRESS INT'L, Oct. 26, 1999. In 1996, Jane's Intelligence Review estimated that
during peacetime North Korea was capable of producing 4,500 tons of chemical weap-
ons annually, expanded to 12,000 tons in wartime. See Armed Forces: North Korea, JANE'S
SENTINEL SECURITY ASSESSMENT, Feb. 5 2004.
The facts as to North Korea's chemical and biological programs are less than clear
because there have never been any international inspections. See Council on Foreign Rela-
tions Discussion with Gary Samore, Director of Studies and Senior Fellow for Nonproliferation, The
International Institute For Strategic Studies; and Adam Ward, Senior Fellow for East Asian Secur-
ity, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 23, 2004. Under
the Chemical Weapons Convention however, there is a robust inspection regime where
parties have to declare their chemical weapons facilities and stockpiles and they must
allow inspections of "dual-use" production facilities that could be used to create chemi-
cal weapons. See Deller, supra note 123.
131. See Federation of American Scientists, supra note 121.
132. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), availa-
ble at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html [herein-
after 2002 State of the Union Address]. In his discussion of the first objective, President
Bush lauded Pakistan and President Musharraf for "now cracking down on terror." Id.
133. See id. President Bush elaborated on the axis of evil in his 2003 State of the
Union Address, although he never explicitly referred to it as such. See 2003 State of the
Union Address, supra note 72.
134. See 2002 State of the Union Address, supra note 132.
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plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons
for over a decade.""3 5 President Bush went on to outline the
general strategies to be followed by the United States against the
threat posed by the axis of evil and States like them, including
the development and deployment of an effective missile defense
to protect American and its allies from attack and preemp-
tion. 13
6
David Frum and Richard Perle in their recent book, An End
to Evil, make the case that North Korea - along with Iran, Libya,
Saudi Arabia and Syria - are "terrorist states," requiring aggres-
sive action by the United States if it is to win the war on terror,
and "we don't have much time."137 Frum and Perle support the
approach of preemptive attack followed by the current Bush ad-
ministration. 38 Pursuant to this approach, which is stated to be
proven by our experience with bin Laden, they contend that,
"the responsible thing to do when confronted by a foreign threat
is to act when we can, and the earlier the better."'3 9 They state:
135. See id.
136. See id. President Bush described the rationale for his strategy of preemption
as the following: "I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as
peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's
most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons." Id.
137. See DAVID FRUM & RICHARD PERLE, AN END TO EVIL: HOW TO WIN THE WAR ON
TERRtOR 98 (2003). David Frum is currently a resident fellow at the American Enter-
prise Institute, a contributing editor at National Review, a columnist for Canada's Na-
tional Post, and a regular contributor to Britain's Daily Telegraph and National Public
Radio. He served as special assistant to the current President Bush for economic
speechwriting from Jan. 2001 to Feb. 2002, and helped coin the phrase, "axis of evil."
See Keppler Assocs., David Frum Biography, available at http://www.kepplerassociates.
com/speakers/frumdavid.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2004); Julain Borger, How I Created
the Axis of Evil, GUARDIAN, Jan. 28, 2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/
story/0,3604,883621,00.html. Richard Perle served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for
President Reagan, and was Chairman of the Defense Policy Board, during the current
Bush administration, an advisory group to the Secretary of Defense composed of non-
elected officials, until March 2003, and remains a member of that Board. In 1997, he
was a founding member of the Project for the New American Century ("PNAC"), whose
objective is to "rally support for American global leadership." See PNAC, Statement of
Principles (June 30, 1997), available at http://www.newamericancentury.org/statement
ofprinciples.htm. Other founding members and supporters of the group then included
current Vice President Dick Cheney, current Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
current Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, I. Lewis Libby, current Assistant
to the President and Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff, Florida Governor and
brother of the President, Jeb Bush, and former Vice President Dan Quayle. See Letter
from PNAC, to President WilliamJ. Clinton (Jan. 28, 1998), available at http://www.new
americancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm.
138. See, e.g., FRUM & PERLE, supra note 137, at 34-35.
139. Id. at 35.
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Even if we could predict dangers more accurately than we
can, what benefit do we gain from waiting for a threat to be-
come more imminent? Why let an enemy grow stronger un-
hindered? By waiting until the last minute, we forfeit the ini-
tiative. We cast away the opportunity to act at a time and
place of our choosing and gamble our security on future cir-
cumstances that may or may not be favorable to us. Quite
frequently, the real motive of those who advocate delay is the
hope that if we postpone action, somehow the threat will dis-
appear on its own. This isn't policy. It's fantasy.' 40
According to Frum and Perle, it is time for the United States
to use "stronger medicine" against North Korea. 4 t They pro-
pose various measures as part of a decisive action by the United
States to stop North Korea's attempt to go nuclear, including:
(1) a comprehensive air and naval blockade of North Korea;'42
(2) an accelerated redeployment of U.S. ground troops on the
Korean Peninsula (which has already begun);' 43 and (3) the de-
velopment of detailed plans for a preemptive strike against
North Korea's nuclear facilities.' 44 Their stated hope is that a
140. Id.
141. See id. at 101.
142. See id. at 103.
143. See id. at 103.
144. See id. at 103-104. The preemptive strike approach has generated some sup-
port, although it is generally contrary to established international law. See, e.g., William
H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict: Preemption,
Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 (July 2003) (arguing that United States
had firm basis for using preemptive force in Iraq, based on Iraq's past actions and
threat Iraq posed, as seen over protracted period of time). Citing President Bush's
National Security Strategy, Taft and Buchwald argue that it would be irresponsible to ig-
nore adversaries who "rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass
destruction - weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without
warning." Id. at 557 n. I (citing The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
15 (Sept. 17, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf). But see Ivo
Daalder, Policy Implications of the Bush Doctrine on Preemption, Memorandum to
Members of the Council of Foreign Relations/American Society of International
LawASIL Roundtable on Old Rules/New Threats, available at http://www.cfr.org/publi-
cation.php?id=5251 (distinguishing between preventative war and preemptive attack).
Daalder defines "preventative war" as "a premeditated attack of one state against an-
other, which is not provoked by any aggressive action of the state being attacked against
the state initiating the conflict." Id. In contrast, he defines a "preemptive attack" as one
"launched only after the state being attacked has either initiated or has given a clear
indication that it will initiate an attack." Id. Daalder concludes that the justification for
war on Iraq, a belief that Baghdad would soon acquire nuclear weapons which it would
then use to threaten others, is contrary to historical precedent. See id.; see also Jane E.
Stromseth, Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict: Law and Force After Iraq: A Transi-
tional Moment, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 628, 638 n.50 (July 2003) (stating that "in the absence
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credible build-up by the United States for a possible strike
against North Korea will prompt China to assert pressure on
North Korea to bring it into line. 45 Following such an ap-
proach, the authors project in time "all of Korea will be united
in liberty." '146
D. U.S. Provocations According to North Korea
North Korea claims that the United States has nuclearized
the Korean Peninsula and is pursuing aggressive policies
throughout the world.14 North Korea contends that, since the
signing of the Armistice Agreement, the United States has sub-
jected North Korea to persistent and direct nuclear threats, turn-
ing "South Korea into a nuclear base [that is] a direct and cru-
cial threat to peace on [the Korean Peninsula and Asia] ."148
North Korea asserts that the United States introduced nu-
clear weapons and related missiles and artillery systems into the
area in the 1950's after the Armistice Agreement, and readied its
combat forces in the area to wage atomic warfare.149 This made
South Korea one of the most substantial U.S. bases for forward
deployed nuclear weapons in the world.15 °
North Korea points to the fact that, on July 15, 1957, U.S.
Army officials announced that combat forces would be capable
of waging an atomic war from South Korea, and that in 1958, the
United States announced and displayed its missile and artillery
systems deployed in South Korea. 15 ' North Korea states that by
1970 the United States revealed during Congressional defense
of an imminent threat of attack, it would be hard tojustify such action legally within the
right of self-defense under the U.N. Charter as currently understood"); Lori Fisler
Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: Future Implication of the Iraq Conflict, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 553 (debating whether U.S. invasion of Iraq destroyed system of governance
restricting use of force under U.N. Charter); John Alan Cohan, The Bush Doctrine and the
Emerging Norm of Anticipatoy Self-Defense in Customary International Law, 15 PACE INT'L L.
Rv. 283 (2000).
145. See FRUM & PERLE, supra note 137, at 104.
146. See id.
147. DPRK Says U.S. 'Ruptured' Process, supra note 30.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See id. North Korea contends, "[T]he United States has pursued the so-called
NCND policy, under which it neither confirms nor denies the deployment of nuclear
weapons. However, it has not tried to conceal the fact that it deployed nuclear weapons
in South Korea but used it as a means to threaten us." Id.
151. Id.
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budget meetings that over 1,000 nuclear weapons and 64 aircraft
loaded with nuclear weapons were deployed in South Korea.152
Further, it points to the U.S. Defense Department announce-
ment in 1985 of the deployment of a nuclear missile battalion in
South Korea, the first such overseas base outside of Europe.'53
North Korea contends that it has objected to the U.S.
nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 154 and has engaged in
"consistent efforts at denuclearization."' 155 As discussed above,
North Korea has further alleged in recent years that the United
States is threatening North Korea, such that North Korea needs
a nuclear deterrent. Interestingly, North Korea does not appear
to have threatened the use of chemical or biological weapons
against the United States, but instead claims that the U.S. allega-
tion that North Korea possesses such weapons is similar to the
United States' insistence on North Korea's possession of nuclear
weapons, simply "part of their (the United States') moves to sti-
fle and isolate" North Korea.
56
E. U.S. Justification of its 2003 Attack on Iraq
Prior to the First Gulf War, the United States had a close
relationship with Saddam Hussein and his regime.157 During the
1980's, the United States supplied Iraq with substantial military
supplies and other aid.'
The United States knew during this period that Iraq had
chemical weapons and was using them against Iran and against
Iraq's rebelling Kurds, but that did not appear to affect U.S. sup-
152. See id. North Korea claims that the military hardware was displayed in an





156. Federation of American Scientists, North-South Korea: Cautious Optimism Builds
in Advance ofJune Summit - Foreign Media Reaction, May 3, 2000, at http://www.fas.org/
news/dprk/2000/wwwh0m03.htm; see also North Korea Denies U.S. Official's Assertion on
Biological Weapons, BBC MONITORING INT'L REPORTS, Sept. 10, 2002.
157. See Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts Toward Iraq, 1980-1984,
in NAT'L SECuRITy ARHirvE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK No. 82 (Joyce Battle ed. Feb. 25,
2003), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/.
158. See Christopher Marquis & Thorn Shanker, The Struggle For Iraq: Documents;
Rumsfeld Made Iraq Overture in '84 Despite Chemical Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2003, at
A10.
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port. '5 It did not prevent the United States from providing Iraq
with intelligence, planning information, bomb-assessments, and
other crucial military information as to Iran.'6 ° Donald H. Rum-
sfeld, as a special envoy of the Reagan administration, traveled to
Iraq in 1984 to improve U.S. ties with President Saddam Hussein
despite his use of chemical weapons. t6 '
The Reagan administration issued a public condemnation
of Iraq's already verified "almost daily" use of chemical weapons
against Iran and Kurdish rebels on March 5, 1984.162 However,
days later, Secretary of State, George P. Schultz reportedly met
with Iraqi diplomat, Ismet Kittani, to soften the blow and bolster
the American relationship with Iraq, including business inter-
ests, Middle East diplomatic objectives, and a shared interest in
preventing an Iranian victory. 163
In 1986, the U.N. Security Council issued a statement con-
demning Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the war,'6 4 but the
United States continued to support Baghdad militarily and polit-
ically.1 65
In the days leading up to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait,
159. See id. (reporting that during Iran-Iraq war, United States secretly provided
Iraq with combat assistance, even after Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons
against Iranians was widely known); see also Michael Dobbs, U.S. Had Key Role in Iraq
Buildup: Trade in Chemical Arms Allowed Despite Their Use on Iranians, Kurds. WAsH. POST,
Dec. 30, 2002, at Al (stating that in 1987, State Department reports noted chemical
attacks on Kurds, but U.S. policy was to do nothing because it would be "counter-
productive" in influencing Iraq).
160. See Dobbs, supra note 159.
161. See id. (reporting that Rumsfeld traveled to Iraq to persuade Iraqi officials




164. See U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2666th mtg., at 11, Res. 582 (1986), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1986/scres86.htm. U.N. specialists unanimously con-
cluded that chemical weapons were used by Iraqi forces on many occasions against
Iranian forces. See id. The Security Council strongly condemned Iraq's continued use
of chemical weapons. See id. As early as 1983, the Reagan administration was also aware
that Iraq had used gas against the Kurds and that Iraq had developed a chemical weap-
ons production capability, acquired "primarily from Western firms, including possibly a
U.S. foreign subsidiary." Battle, supra note 157 (citing to de-classified U.S. Dept. of State
Action Memorandum to Lawrence S. Eagleburger, from Jonathan T. Howe, on the
Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons, Nov. 21, 1983).
165. Saddam's Iraq: Key Events, Iran-Iraq War, Chemical Warfare, 1983-1988, BBC
NEws, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/shared/spl/hi/middle-east/02/iraqevents/html/
chemical warfare.stm.
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U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie, according to Iraqi transcripts,
told Hussein that the United States "[has] no opinion on the
Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Ku-
wait. "t 66 The State Department did not confirm the accuracy of
the Iraqi transcripts, but also did not dispute Glaspie's state-
ment,167 stating that Glaspie had warned against rash actions re-
garding Kuwait.' 68
In commencing the 2003 war against Iraq, the United States
offered the following legal justifications: (1) that Iraq was in
breach of U.N. Security Council Resolutions by continuing to
seek and develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons,
and prohibited long-range missiles; 169 (2) that Iraq was in breach
of cease-fire conditions agreed to at the end of the first Gulf
War, including its purported retention of WMDs that it had
agreed not to develop or possess; 171 (3) that Iraq threatened
U.S. security by aiding and harboring international terrorist or-
ganizations that threatened the United States;' 7 1 (4) that mem-
bers of al Qaida are known to be in Iraq; and (5) that the regime
of Saddam Hussein had brutalized the Iraqi people, committing
gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity. 7 2
166. See Confrontation in the Gulf: Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S.
Envoy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1990, at Al; see also Elaine Sciolino & Michael R. Gordon,
Confrontation in the Gulf: U.S. Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 1990, at Al; John K. Cooley, It's Time to Think Straight About Saddam,
INT'L HERALD TPiB., Dec. 23, 1997, at 8.
167. See Sciolino & Gordon, supra note 166.
168. See Cooley, supra note 166.
169. See U.S. White House, Report in Connection 'With Presidential Determination
Under Public Law 107-243, at 2-3 (Mar. 19 2003), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/
topical/pol/terror/03031910.htm [hereinafter March 19th Report]. Throughout the
seven years that Iraq allowed inspections, "it repeatedly obstructed access to sites desig-
nated by the United Nations Special Commission ("UNSCOM") and the International
Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA")." Id. at 3. In 1998, Iraq's obstructed UNSCOM inspec-
tors by restricting access to "presidential palaces" and refused to cooperate with inspec-
tions led to "Desert Fox," which led to a three-day bombing campaign by the United
States and British forces. See Saddam's Iraq: Key Events, Iraq Under Sanctions, Desert Fox 16-
19 December 1998, BBC, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middleeast/02/
iraq_events/html/desertIfox.stm; see also Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. 102-1 (1991); Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002). See generally
Raymond W. Copson, Iraq War: Background and Issues Overview, CRS REPORT FOR CON-
ciREss, RE 31715, available at http://www.usembassy.at/en/download/pdf/
iraq warl.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
170. See March 19th Report, supra note 169.
171. See id. at 2-3.
172. See id. at 3.
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In an interview with the CBS program 60 Minutes to pro-
mote the book, The Price of Loyalty, Paul H. O'Neill, President
George W. Bush's first Treasury Secretary, stated that President
Bush had been focused on removing Saddam Hussein from
power in Iraq from the start of his administration.173 According
to O'Neill, "From the very beginning, there was a conviction that
Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go. "174
According to the book, O'Neill was surprised that Iraq was on
the top of the agenda at the very first National Security Council
meeting held by President Bush, on January 30, 2001.175 At the
second meeting, of which Saddam Hussein was also a primary
topic, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld spoke of how re-
moving Saddam Hussein would "demonstrate what U.S. policy is
all about."
1 76
President George W. Bush was also apparently influenced in
his desire to make war on Iraq by the fact that Iraqi officials had
allegedly participated in a 1993 plot to assassinate his father,
President George H.W. Bush.1 77 The current President Bush
had repeatedly referred to the alleged Iraqi assassination plot
against his father as part of his basis for the recent war on
Iraq. 171 While speaking before the U.N in September 2002, he
made note of the plot to kill a former U.S. president, though he
omitted any reference to his father's name.179 Also, while speak-
ing in Houston at a fund-raiser, President Bush offered his usual
173. See Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Sought to Oust Hussein From Start, Ex-official
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2004, at Al1. But see Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Disputes Ex-
Official's Claim That War With Iraq Was Early Administration Goal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
2004, at A22 [hereinafter Stevenson, Bush Disputes Ex-Official's Claim]. See generally RON
SUSKIND, THE PRICE OF LOYALTY- GEORGE W. BUSH, THE WHITE HOUSE, AND THE EDUCA-
TION OF PAUL O'NEILL (2004). Secretary O'Neill cooperated extensively on the book,
turning over 19,000 documents from his years as Treasury Secretary, including tran-
scripts of National Security Council Meetings.
174. Stevenson, Bush Sought to Oust Hussein From Start, Ex-official Says, supra note
173, at All.
175. See Stevenson, Bush Disputes Ex-Official's Claim, supra note 173, at A22.
176. See id. (quoting SUSKIND, supra note 173).
177. See US.-Iraq Relations 1990-1998: President Bill Clinton on Retaliation for Iraqi Plot
to Assassinate President George H. W. Bush (C-Span broadcast, June 26, 1993), available at
http://www.c-span.org/iraq/history.asp; see also David Von Drehle & R. Jeffrey Smith,
U.S. Strikes Iraq for Plot to Kill Bush, WASH. PosT, June 27, 1993, at Al.
178. SeeJohn King, Bush Calls Saddam 'The Guy Who Tried to Kill my Dad', CNN.coM,
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complaints against Iraq in discussing the threat posed by Sad-
dam."' He then stated that much of Saddam's hatred was di-
rected at the United States, adding: "After all, this is the guy
who tried to kill my dad."'
' 81
It was reported on November 7, 2003 that in the days before
the U.S. attack on Iraq in 2003, Iraq contacted the United States,
seeking to avert war.' 8 2 Officials of the Iraqi regime, including
the Chief of Iraqi Intelligence, dispatched Imad Hage, a Leba-
nese-American businessman, to meet with Richard Perle as an
intermediary for the U.S. Defense Department, with a message
that Iraq no longer had weapons of mass destruction and was
prepared to permit American troops and experts to carry out
their search.183 Through Hage, Iraq also offered to turn over a
man being held in Baghdad who was accused of being involved
with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.18 4 Hage, based on
some six meetings with senior Iraqi intelligence officials, be-
lieved that the Iraqis he spoke to were desperate to avoid war' 85
and conveyed this impression to the Defense Department.'86
Perle contacted the CIA to get their approval to meet with the
Iraqis, but the CIA did not want to pursue this channel and con-
veyed to Perle, "Tell them that we will see them in Baghdad."1
8 7
More than a year after the U.S.-led 2003 invasion of Iraq,
the United States has still not found any weapons of mass de-
struction in Iraq.'88 While Secretary of Defense Donald Rum-
sfeld purported to believe that weapons of mass destruction will
turn up,'89 Secretary of State Colin Powell reportedly stated, "We
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See U.S. Rejected 11th-Hour Iraqi Offer to Avert War, Sources Say; An Intermediary
and Bush Officials Recount Attempt at a Deal. White House Plays Down Effort, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2003, at A15 [hereinafter U.S. Rejected 11th-HourIraqi Offer]; see also James Risen,
Iraq Offered U.S. a Deal as the War Loomed, INr'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 7, 2003, at 1.
183. See U.S. Rejected 11th-Hour Iraqi Offer, supra note 182.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. Risen, supra note 182 (stating that by early March, Hage characterized Iraqi's
tone as "begging").
187. See id.
188. See Bush Aids Defend War, CBS/AP, Mar. 14, 2004, available at http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/18/iraq/main607182.shtml.
189. See U.S. Defends Iraq War As One Year Anniversary Nears, CHI. TmiB., Mar. 15,
2004, at 12.
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may not find stockpiles."' 90 Secretary Powell, at a January 8,
2004 news conference at the State Department, further stated
that he had seen no "smoking gun [or] concrete evidence" of
ties between former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and al-
Qaida.19'
A somewhat softened enunciation of the second Bush ad-
ministration's justifications was recently given by President Bush
to host Tim Russert on NBC's Meet the Press on February 8, 2004.
President Bush stated that the war against Iraq to remove Sad-
dam Hussein was justified even in the absence of weapons of
mass destruction because Mr. Hussein was "a dangerous man
[who] .. . had the ability to make weapons, at the very mini-
mum."192
F. U.S. Position as to Nuclear Weapons in South Korea
Despite the Korean War, the U.S. nuclear presence in the
Pacific was modest until 1952 when the Joint Chiefs proposed
the introduction of additional weapons, fearing that if hostilities
broke out a subsequent communication breakdown may make
emergency transfers of weapons impossible. 9 By 1967 the
United States reportedly had more than 800 nuclear weapons in
South Korea, 194 by 1977 it had roughly 600, and by 1985 it had
151.'5 During 1991, the United States professedly removed its
nuclear weapons from South Korea, which by then was the last
forward base in the Pacific for U.S. nuclear weapons.' 96 The cur-
rent Bush administration in its 2002 nuclear posture review
nonetheless affirmed its commitment to the potential use of nu-
190. See id.
191. See No Proof Links Iraq, al-Qaida, Powell Says, NBC, MSNBC AND NEW SERVICES,
Jan. 08, 2004, available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3909150/.
192. See Bush and Kerry Frame Contrasts of Race Ahead: As Democrat Adds to Wins, Presi-
dent Defends Policies In Rare TV Appearance, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2004, at Al (quoting
President Bush).
193. See Robert S. Norris et al., Where They Were, 55 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 6, 26-
35 (1999), available at http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1999/nd99/nd99norris.
html.
194. See id.
195. See id.; Robert S. Norris & William M. Arkin, Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear
Weapons Locations, 51 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 6 (1995), available at http://
www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/nd95nukenote.html.
196. See Norris et al., supra note 193. See also Benjamin Friedman, Nuclear Issues,
Fact Sheet: North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, CTR. FOR DEF. INFO., Jan. 23, 2003, at
http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/nk-fact-sheet.cfm.
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clear weapons for the defense of South Korea. 19 7 As recently as
November 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated
that the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea from attack
includes "the continued provision of a nuclear umbrella."19
In a broader sense, the physical location of the United
States' nuclear weapons and other military assets would seem to
be of limited significance, given the size of the United States'
nuclear arsenal and its ability to deliver its nuclear weapons
across the world within very short time frames,' 99 as well as its
extensive military assets in the Korean area.200
VI. THE NORTH KOREAN STRATEGIC POSITION VIS-A-VIS
THE UNITED STATES
A. Economic and Political Position
North Korea is one of the most unfortunate places on earth.
Its economy is dismal, its people malnourished, its political struc-
ture repressive, and its sparse resources largely spent on the mili-
tary.
North Korea's gross domestic product for 2002 is estimated
at U.S.$22.26 billion,2 °1 compared with U.S.$941.5 billion2 2 for
South Korea. North Korea spent some U.S.$5.2 billion in 2002
on the military, 20 3 as compared to South Korea's military ex-
penditures of U.S.$13 billion in 2002.204
During the 1990s, floods decimated North Korean food sup-
197. See Donald H. Rumsfeld, Nuclear Posture Review Report [Excerpts] Submit-
ted to Congress on Dec. 31, 2001, at 1, GLOBALSECURrTY.ORG (Jan. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm; see also Charles J.
Moxley, 2002 Nuclear Posture Review Strategic and Legal Ramifications, Apr. 16, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.nuclearweaponslaw.org/2002-NPRMoxley.pdf (last visited April 15,
2004).
198. Bill Gertz, Nukes Option by U.S. in Korea, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2003, available
at http://www.washtimes.com/national/20031117-115816-2478r.htm.
199. See CHARLESJ. MOXLEYJR., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
POST COLD WAR WORLD 501-514 (2000) (citing Robert S. Norris & Williams M. Arkin,
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, End of 1998; Abstract, 55 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 1, 78-79
(1999)).
200. See infra notes 277-87 and accompanying text.
201. CIA, WORLD FACTBOOK 2003: NORTH KOREA (2003), available at http://
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kn.html (last modified Dec. 18, 2003).
202. CIA, WORLD FACTBOOK 2003: SOUTH KOREA, available at http://www.cia.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html (last modified Dec. 18, 2003).
203. See WORLD FACrBooK 2003: NORTH KOREA, supra note 201.
204. See WORLD FACTBOOK 2003: SOUTH KOREA, supra note 202.
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plies, inducing widespread famine,2° as political conditions am-
plified the shortages through inadequate distribution net-
works.2 ° 6 Two million North Koreans, approximately 10% of the
population, died from starvation in the mid-1990s. 2° ' North Ko-
rea's domestic needs became desperate, as it largely lost the sup-
port of its former Communist allies, Russia and China.21
8
One of the last remaining Stalinist states of the Cold War,
North Korea is dictatorial, centrally controlled and hierarchical.
The international community has condemned North Korea's
human rights record based on reports of torture, arbitrary de-
tention and imprisonment, and suppression of freedoms of ex-
pression, religion, and movement. 20  Scholars have character-
ized North Korea's economic policies as crimes against humanity
for the systematic and widespread hunger they perpetuate.21 0
In 2003, when North Korea announced plans to build a nu-
clear deterrent force if the United States maintained its hostile
policy, North Korea indicated that it would be able to do so at a
lower price than for conventional weapons. It stated that its de-
terrent would be "capable of neutralizing any sophisticated and
nuclear weapons with less spending."211
B. North Korea's Conventional Weapons
North Korea, a militarized State that devotes a substantial
205. See Where Famine Stalks the Land, BBC NEWS, Nov. 30, 2000, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1048557.stm; see also Barbara Demick, A Small
Problem Growing; Chronic Malnutrition has Stunted a Generation of North Koreans. The Crises
is at the Heart of Debate Over Food Aid to the Isolated Nation, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, at Al.
206. See David Marcus, Famine Crimes in International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 245,
259-61 (2003).
207. See Demick, supra note 205.
208. See BUREAU E. ASIAN & PAC. AFF., U.S. DEP'T. STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE:
NORTH KOREA (March 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/
2792.htm.
209. Report of the Fifty-Fourth Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commis-
sioner's Programme, U.N. Ex. Comm. High Comm. Prog., 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/
987 (Oct. 10, 2003).
210. See id.; see also Marcus, supra note 206, at 259-61 (arguing that international
law of genocide and crimes against humanity criminalizes government behavior that
abets or creates famine, and specifically notes North Korea as example of just such
regime).
211. DPRK 'Nuclear Deterrent Force' to be Built if US Maintains 'Hostile Policy,' KOREAN
CENT. NEWS AGENCY, June 3, 2003, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/
nuke/dprk060903.html. See also North Korea's Nuclear Threat, WORLD PRESS REV., availa-
ble at http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/1233.cfm.
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portion of its economy to the military, has an army of more than
one million soldiers,212 including 120,000 special operation
forces,213 and reserve forces of six million soldiers. 214 Two-thirds
of its troops are reportedly within sixty miles of the demilitarized
zone.
21 5
The North Korean military reportedly has some 11,000 for-
ward deployed artillery pieces capable of hitting South Korea,216
500 170-millimeter guns and 200 multiple-launch rocket systems
within range of Seoul,21 7 along with air defense weapons.1 The
artillery pieces are largely hidden in caves and the missiles are
on mobile launchers.2 1 9 North Korea also has an Air Force with
over 1700 aircraft and a Navy with over 800 ships220 and 62 sub-
marines.22
U.S. characterizations of the North Korean military forces
212. SeeJoseph Nye, Defusing the North Korean Threat, FIN. TIMES (London),Jan. 18,
2000, at 13.
213. See Kathleen T. Rhem, North Korean Military 'Very Credible Conventional Force,
AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 18, 2003, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Nov2003/n11182003_200311181.html (citing Gen. Leon LaPorte, USA, Com-
mander of U.S. forces in South Korea).
214. See Linda D. Kozaryn, Despite Progress, North Korea Poses Major Threat, AM.
FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 3, 2001, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Apr200l/n04032001_200104031 .html
215. See Nye, supra note 212. Seoul is less than fifty miles from the DMZ. See An-
drew Stephen, And Now, the Next American War: Just When You Thought the Horizon was
Cloudless, a New Conflict is Coming to a Head, NEW STATESMAN (London), Apr. 13, 2004.
216. See Eleanor Hall, North Korea a Greater Threat than Iraq: Analyst, WORLD TODAY
(ABC Local Radio Broadcast, Australia, Feb. 13, 2003), available at http://
www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/s783676.h tm.
217. See Phillip C. Saunders, Military Options for Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear
Program, CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, Jan. 27, 2003, available at http://
cns.miis.edu/research/korea/dprkmil.htm
218. See Kozaryn, supra note 214.
219. See North Korean Missile Proliferation Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Security,
Prolferation, & Fed. Services of the Comm. on Governmental Aff, 105th Cong. (1997) (Pre-
pared Statement ofJu-Hwal Choi Former Official Ministry of the People's Army North
Korea) (stating "[s]ince the North uses mostly mobile rocket launchers, not fixed ones,
it is assumed that the North does not have fixed rocket launchers").
220. See Kozaryn, supra note 214. The DPRK also has about 3800 tanks, mainly
Soviet T-54/55s and T-59s, but has recently developed the capacity to produce more
modern T-62s. See Korean People's Army - Introduction, available at http://www.globalse-
curity.org/military/world/dprk/army.htm (last modified Aug. 28, 2003); 1999 WHITE
PAPER, supra note 129, at pt. 1(3).
221. See Navy, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/agency/navy.htm (last up-
dated Mar 1, 2000). But see 1999 WHITE PAPER, supra note 129, at 1.1.3 (stating that
South Korean Ministry of National Defense says that North Korea has ninety subma-
rines).
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are mixed. The U.S. military has stated that North Korea has the
largest submarine and artillery forces in the world 222 and a "very
credible conventional force. ' 223 In a report to Congress in 2000,
the Secretary of Defense characterized the North Korean mili-
tary threat as "formidable" and noted that its asymmetric forces
are "cause for concern. 22
4
At the same time, the United States has noted that the
North Korean military has been severely affected by the coun-
try's economic problems, such that its equipment is aging and its
military production scant.225 The U.S. military has noted that
much of the North Korean's military equipment is technologi-
cally antiquated - particularly that of its Air Force and Navy,
leaving the army as the major threat.226 U.S. General Leon La-
Porte, Commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, has stated that
"[m] uch of their equipment is aged, but they have a lot of it." 227
Some commentators doubt the effectiveness of North Korea's ar-
tillery.228
Some commentators have estimated that North Korea's
weapons systems are less extensive and reliable than Iraq's
before the 1991 Gulf War.229 North Korea reportedly does not
have adequate amounts of oil to support its mechanized units,
and even less to conduct proper training exercises. 210 Most of
the artillery pieces that North Korea possesses are not in range
of Seoul, and the missiles it has that are capable of reaching the
capital are not believed to be accurate.23'
222. See Rhem, supra note 213 (citing Army General Leon LaPorte, Commander of
U.S. forces in South Korea).
223. Id.
224. Press Advisory, U.S. DEP'T. DEFENSE, REPORT ON THE MILITARY SITUATION ON
THE KOREAN PENINSULA § 2 (Sept. 22, 2000), available at http://www.dod.mil/news/
Sep2000/.
225. See John E. McLaughlin, North Korea: Engagement or Confrontation, Re-
marks at Texas A&M Conference (Apr. 17, 2001), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/
topical/pol/arms/stories/01042301.htm.
226. See Rhem, supra note 213.
227. Id. (citing Army General Leon LaPorte, Commander of U.S. forces in South
Korea).
228. See Yihong Chang & James Foley, Pyongyang Goes for Broke, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE
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C. North Korea's Chemical and Biological Weapons
North Korea is believed to have chemical and biological
weapons in significant numbers. It also has the missiles with
which to deliver them 23 2 and its military doctrine reportedly in-
structs the use of chemical weapons as standard munitions. 233
North Korea has also reportedly devoted significant resources to
defensive measures for protecting its population from the effects
of chemical weapons, ostensibly to provide greater latitude for
their use in combat.2 3 4 It is believed that North Korea is likely to
use chemical weapons in a conflict with South Korea.23 5
North Korea is believed to have "a sizable stockpile of chem-
ical weapons" and to have "achieved the capability to manufac-
ture large quantities of nerve, blister, choking, and blood
agents."2 6 Specifically, North Korea is known to have "[t]ons of
mustard gas and sarin," and unknown quantities of blood agents,
choking gases, riot control agents and VX. 23 7 U.S. intelligence
believes that North Korea possesses, at the very least, between
180 and 250 tons of chemical weapons. 23" The Nuclear Threat
232. See Hall, supra note 216; see also Saunders, supra note 217; Kozaryn, supra note
214.
233. See Chemical Weapons Program, supra note 121; Northeast Asia, supra note 121
(stating "chemical weapons may have become an integral part of North Korea's
warfighting strategy."); see also Attack Across the DMZ Special Report, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE
REv., Apr. 1, 1994. As early as 1947, the KPA's manual noted the utility of chemical
weapons solely for their fear factor; by forcing the enemy to "suit up" in preparation of
the possible use of such weapons, North Korea figures that it degrades the fighting
ability of enemy units. See Chemical Overview, at http://www.nti.org/eresearch/
profiles/NK/Chemical/. North Korea has between 500 and 600 Scud missiles capable
of striking targets throughout South Korea with chemical weapons or conventional war-
heads. See Saunders, supra note 217. Specifically, North Korea could use non-persistent
chemical agents to break through defenses around the DMZ and persistent chemical
agents against South Korean fixed military assets in rear areas. See Chemical Weapons
Program, supra note 121; see also NORTH KOREA CouNTRY HANDBOOK, supra note 125
(stating that "DPRK chemical weapons would compliment conventional military power.
In a surprise attack, DPRK forces are expected to use chemical weapons to demoralize
defending forces, reduce their effectiveness, and deny use of mobilization centers, stor-
age areas, and military bases without physically destroying facilities and equipment").
234. See Chemical Weapons Program, supra note 121.
235. See id. See also Chemical Overview, supra note 233 (noting "[North Korea] has
traditionally viewed chemical weapons as an integral part of any military offensive");
Attack Across the DMZ Special Report, supra note 233.
236. Northeast Asia, supra note 121.
237. See Rebecca MacKinnon, N. Korea's Bio-Chem Warfare Threat, CNN.coM, Mar. 3,
2003, available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/03/02/nkorea.
cbw/.
238. See Chemical Weapons Program, supra note 121.
THE SWORD IN THE MIRROR
Initiative cites official reports and testimony from North Korean
defectors and stipulates that North Korea may have as much as
2500 to 5000 tons of chemical weapons.239
North Korea is also believed to have biological weapons, in-
cluding anthrax, cholera, and plague.2 4 ° In May 1996, South Ko-
rean Foreign Minister Yu Chong-ha reported that North Korea
possessed approximately 5000 tons of biological and chemical
weapons.241  The Federation of American Scientists, noting
North Korea's extensive production facilities, stated that this "es-
timate may constitute the low end of the actual stockpile.
242
Because of North Korea's many missiles and doctrine that
instructs the use of chemical weapons as standard munitions,
U.S. military planners regard North Korea as a significant asym-
metrical threat. 2
43
D. North Korea's Missiles
North Korea has numerous short-range missiles and a lim-
ited number of intermediate range missiles capable of delivering
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. North Korea ap-
pears to be making progress in developing long-range missiles
for the delivery of such weapons. It has one of the "largest ballis-
tic missile forces in the Third World" with over thirty-six launch-
ers and 700 missiles (by a 1999 report) in its arsenal.244
North Korea reportedly has some 500 short-range missiles,
including the Scud-B, Hwasong 5 and 6.245 The Hwasong 5 has a
range of 320 kilometers while carrying a 1,000 kilogram war-
head.246 The Hwasong 6, thanks to a lighter warhead and spe-
cial stainless steel imported from Russia, has a range up to 500
239. See Chemical Overview, supra note 233.
240. See Biological Weapons Program, supra note 122.
241. See Chemical Weapons Program, supra note 121.
242. Id.
243. See id.; Attack Across the DMZ Special Report, supra note 233.
244. See Bermudez, supra note 111, at 1. But see Missiles, at http://www.fas.org/
nuke/guide/dprk/missile/index.html (last updated May 13, 2003) (citing North Korea
as having roughly 536 missiles).
245. See Missiles, supra note 244; Bermudez, supra note 111, at 16; Hwasong 6/Scud-
C, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/missile/hwasong-6.htm (last updated May
13, 2003) (citing Gen. Thomas Schwartz, Commander-in-Chief United Nations Com-
mand/Combined Forces Command and Commander, U.S. Forces Korea in 2000, esti-
mating that North Korean ballistic missile inventories included over 500 short range
missiles).
246. See Bermudez, supra note 111, at 11.
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kilometers while carrying a payload of up to 770 kilograms
(1,700 pounds).247 These missiles are variants of the Scud mis-
sile 248 and are regarded as thoroughly tested and reliable.249
North Korea's short range missiles can reach all of South Korea
with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. 250
North Korea's medium range missile is the No-Dong. In de-
velopment since 1988 and successfully tested in 1993, the No-
Dong is designed to strike regional targets, e.g., U.S. bases in
Japan, to develop a base ballistic missile system that can be used
as a first stage for further developments, and to carry a first gen-
eration nuclear weapon. 25 1 North Korea reportedly possesses be-
tween 50 and 100 No-Dong's, 252 capable of carrying a 1,200 kilo-
grams warhead 1,350 kilometers or a 1,000 kilograms warhead
1,500 kilometers. 25' These missiles, capable of carrying chemi-
cal, biological, and nuclear warheads, can reach targets in Japan,
China, and Russia. 254
North Korea has been developing long-range missiles, the
Taepo-dong 1 and Taepo-dong 2, since the early 1990s. 255 North
Korea is believed to have made the Taepo-dong 1 "operational"
by 2000,256 and may have built between one and ten by 1999.257
247. See id. at 16.
248. See Missiles, supra note 244.
249. See id.; see also Hwasong 6/Scud-C, supra note 245.
250. See David C. Wright, Assessment of North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, UNION
OF CONCERNED SCIENTIsTs, Feb. 25, 2003, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/
global-security/missiledefense/page.cfm?pageD=603. The range required of a
North Korean missile to reach U.S. bases in Japan and major Japanese cities would be
1000-1500 km. See Bermudez, supra note 111, at 16; see also Niksch, supra note 6, at 7.
251. See Bermudez, supra note 111, at 20-21.
252. See id. at 22-23; see also Niksch, supra note 6, at 7. But see Missiles, supra note
244 (stating that North Korea possesses between twelve and thirty-six No-Dong mis-
siles).
253. See Bermudez, supra note 111, at 20.
254. In 2002 the Department of Defense noted that North Korea fielded No-Dong
missiles able to strike U.S. forces based injapan. No-Dong, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/
guide/dprk/missile/nd-l.htm (last updated May 13, 2003). See also Bermudez, supra
note 111, at 16.
255. See id. at 26.
256. See id. at 30. Operational is a relative term, and the KPA may have been using
the Taepo-dong 1 earlier than 2000. See id. Since North Korea has lower standards of
reliability and readiness than do Western Nations. See id.
257. See id. at 29. But see Wright, supra note 250 (stating that any such variant of
Taepo-dong 2 would be appreciable advancement in North Korea's missile technology,
and would not be possible without number of significant improvements and multiple
flight tests).
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The Taepo-dong 1 is designed to have a range of 1,500 to
2,500 kilometers carrying an estimated payload of 1,000 to 1,500
kilograms (2,200 to 3,300 pounds).258 These missiles are poten-
tially capable of reaching all U.S. bases in East Asia. 259 To the
surprise of the U.S. intelligence community,260 North Korea in
1998 launched a Taepo-dong 1 missile over Japan, with the in-
tent of putting North Korea's first satellite - the Kwangmyong-
song 1 - into orbit.261 The third stage of the missile suffered
technical difficulties and did not insert the satellite into orbit.
26 2
North Korea, however, did not acknowledge this failure, and
contends it was a successful launch, stating that "our scientists
and technicians succeeded in launching its first satellite into or-
bit with multi-staged delivery rockets.
26 3
The Taepo-dong 2 missiles are of concern to the United
States because of the possibility that they are capable of reaching
U.S. land. Media reports cite U.S. intelligence estimates that
provide that, even without further flight tests, North Korean bal-
listic missiles would be able to strike Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S.
west coast.2 6 4 The Taepo-dong 2 is reportedly designed to carry
a warhead of 1,000 to 1,500 kilograms a distance of 4,000 to
8,000 kilometers. 265 Currently North Korea is not believed to
have a functional version of the Taepo-dong 2.266
The accuracy of missiles is generally stated in terms of circu-
lar error probability or "CEP," the radius of the circle drawn
around the target in which, on average, half of the re-entry vehi-
cles fired at the target will fall. 267 Of North Korea's short range
missiles, the Scud-B has a CEP of 450 meters, 268 the Hwasong 5 a
CEP of approximately 500-800 meters,26 9 and the Hwasong 6 a
258. See Bermudez, supra note 111, at 26.
259. See id. at 16.
260. See id. at 30.
261. See id. at 29.
262. See id.
263. Id. at 30 (quoting N. Korea Says it Launched 'Satellite', UNITED PRESS INT'L, Sept.
4, 1998).
264. See Niksch, supra note 6, at 7.
265. See Bermudez, supra note 111, at 16, 26.
266. See Missiles, supra note 244.
267. See MOXLEY, supra note 7, at 525 (citing KOSTA Tsipis, ARSENAL: UNDERSTAND-
ING WEAPONS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 69-76 (1983)).
268. See Scud-B Shahab-1, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/shahab-
1.htm (last updated May 13, 2003).
269. See Bermudez, supra note 111, at 11. The CEP of the Hwasong 5 is unknown,
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CEP of 50 meters. Analysts are uncertain of the No-Dong's CEP;
with GPS guidance it could be as small as fifty meters, but ana-
lysts believe that at the extremities of its range, the No-Dong has
a CEP of as high as 2,000 to 4,000 meters.2 70 As noted, North
Korea does not have completely functioning versions of the
Taepo-dong one or two in its possession. 271 The CEP of these
weapons is not known, although they have been characterized as
"poor."2 72
E. South Korean Economic, Political, and Military Capability
South Korea is in far better shape than North Korea eco-
nomically, politically, and militarily. Its economy is booming,273
its political system is effectively functioning in a democratic fash-
ion,2 74 and its military, although substantially smaller than North
Korea's, is strong and well-supplied. In addition, it is strongly
allied with the United States, enjoying the U.S. economic and
military umbrella.
South Korea can mobilize up to 4,500,000 troops, all excel-
lently supplied with modern equipment, including more than
but the missile is an indigenously produced version of the Soviet R-17E, which has a
CEP of 500 to 800 m. See id. at 11. Later models of the Hwasong 5 used an improved
North Korea guidance system however, and may have better accuracy. See id. But see
Hwasong 5/Scud-B, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/missile/hwasong-5.htm
(last updated May 13, 2003) (stating that Hwasong 5 has CEP of 450m).
270. See Nodong, supra note 254.
271. The KPA may have considered the Taepo-dong 1 operational as early as 1999
or 2000. See Bermudez, supra note 111, at 30. Operational, however, is a relative term,
and the KPA may have been using the Taepo-dong I earlier than 2000 since North
Korea has lower standards of reliability and readiness than do Western Nations. See id.
at 30.
272. Id. at 30; see also Missiles, supra note 244. The CEP of a missile is inherently
subject to surrounding circumstances. As the Navy Judge Advocate General stated, in
his review of the lawfulness of the Trident I (C-4) Missile, any actual launch contains a
"variation in CEP as a function of range, launch and trajectory condition ... ." U.S.
DEP'T NAVY, OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, REVIEW OF THE LEGALITY OF THE
TRIDENT I (C-4) MISSILE, MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (OP-21),
at 3 (Nov. 22, 1976) (quoting formerly restricted data, redacted version obtained under
the Freedom of Information Act by Charles J. Moxley Jr.), available at http://
www.nuclearweaponslaw.org/FOlAMaterials.html [hereinafter NAVY JAG TRIDENT I].
273. See BUREAU E. ASIAN & PAC. AFF., U.S. DEP'T. STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE:
SOUTH KOREA (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm
(providing that South Korea has per capita GNP of U.S.$10,000 and is twelfth largest
economy in world).
274. See id. (providing that South Korea is republic and held its first democratic
elections in 1987).
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1,500 strike aircraft and 3,000 tanks.2 75 The South Korean mili-
tary also has two surface to surface missile battalions and 5,300
mortars.276
F. U.S. Available Forces
The United States has a significant presence in the Pacific
region. The Army has 37,000 troops in South Korea and exten-
sive equipment in the country, including Patriot missile batter-
ies, Apache helicopter squadrons, a mechanized infantry bri-
gade, an air assault brigade, and various other units. 2 7 7
Aside from the 37,000 troops that patrol the DMZ, the
United States has a significant presence in the Pacific region. In
the vicinity of North Korea, the main U.S. naval presence is the
7th Fleet, the largest of all forward-deployed fleets in the Navy.2 71
The 7th Fleet fluctuates between forty and fifty ships, 200 aircraft
and generally has about 20,000 Naval and Marine personnel at-
tached to it. 279 The naval vessels generally include one to two
aircraft carriers, three to five Aegis guided-missile cruisers, and
five to ten destroyers and frigates. 280
The U.S. Air Force also has a significant presence in the
Pacific with the Seventh Air Force located in Korea and the Fifth
in Japan. 21' Assigned to the Seventh Air Force are the Fifty-first
and Eighth Fighter Wings, with 117 planes supported by 8,300
air force personnel. 28 2 The Fifty-first Fighter Wing flies the A-
1028' and three squadrons of F-16 fighter aircraft. 28 4 Overall, the
275. See Kozaryn, supra note 214.
276. Orders of Battle and Major Equipment: South Korea and North Korea, at http://
www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/orbat-comp.htm.
277. See U.S. Forces Order of Battle - 17 March 2004, at http://www.globalsecurity.
org/military/ops/korea-orbat.htm.
278. See U.S. NAVY, COMMANDER, U.S. SEVENTH FLEET, FORWARD PRESENCE, at http:/
/www.c7f.navy.mil/New/Pages/Forward%20presence.html.
279. See id. Of the forty to fifty ships that traditionally comprise the Seventh Fleet,
eighteen are based in Japan. See id.
280. See id.
281. See U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, at http://www.usa.or.th/
services/docs/reports/ussec1.htm. Additional forces would be available in a short pe-
riod of time. See Attack Across the DMZ Special Report, supra note 233.
282. See 7th Air Force, at http://www.osan.af.mil/Facts/7th%20Air%2OForce.htm
(last modified Apr. 2003).
283. See History of Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, at http://www.osan.af.mil/Facts/
Osan%20Air%20Base.htm (last modified Apr. 2003).
284. See Attack Across the DMZ Special Report, supra note 233.
14272004]
1428 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:1379
Pacific command has 45,000 military and civilian personnel with
approximately 300 fighter and attack aircraft under its control,
with additional major bases located in Hawaii and Alaska.285
In 1991, the first Bush administration decided to withdraw
U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea, both as part of a larger
effort to reduce the number of tactical nuclear weapons
deployed abroad and as a step towards denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. 286 This withdrawal was completed by the
early 1990's, and since then the United States has pledged to use
its other nuclear forces, including primarily ballistic missile sub-
marines, to protect South Korea from any nuclear threat. 28 7
In a world where U.S. high speed bombers can take off from
bases in the U.S., drop their bombs virtually anywhere in the
world and return to base, where gigantic aircraft carriers can
quickly bring large numbers of troops and extensive equipment
to areas where they are needed, where missiles can traverse the
world in a matter of minutes, the location of military assets
seems secondary to a considerable extent. The result is that U.S.
forces throughout the world are of significance to the strategic
situation on the Korean Peninsula.
VII. OUTCOME OF A FUTURE WAR IN KOREA
North Korea, whatever its economic and polities infirmities,
is a formidable military power. With over seven million available
troops, 120,000 special operation forces, 11,000 forward
deployed artillery tubes, 500 170-millimeter guns, 200 multiple-
launch rocket systems, air defense weapons, mobile launchers,
cave bases, 1,700 aircraft, 800 ships, 62 submarines and other
military assets, North Korea has a formidable conventional mili-
tary force. 288
With the addition of its apparent supplies of chemical, bio-
logical, and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them at
least at short and intermediate ranges, North Korea would also
285. See Pacific Air Forces, at http://www.osan.af.mil/Facts/Pacific%20Air%
20Forces.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
286. See Robert A. Wampler, North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: The Declassified U.S.
Record, available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87 (Apr. 25,
2003).
287. See Gertz, supra note 198.
288. See Rhem, supra note 213; see also Hall, supra note 216; Saunders, supra note
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appear to have a potent non-conventional deterrent as well as
war-fighting capability. 28
9
North Korea's military capabilities threaten extraordinary
damage on South Korean and U.S. forces in the South. Military
planners have projected that in the first three months of fighting
following a North Korean invasion of the South, U.S. and South
Korean forces would suffer between 300,000 to 500,000 casual-
ties, with hundreds of thousands more civilians killed.29" Doug
Bandow of the Cato Institute has cited estimates that over
1,000,000 total casualties could be expected from a conflict with
North Korea.2 9 ' The U.S. military's plan for the region, Oplan
5027, envisions massive North Korean artillery and rocket bom-
bardments of Seoul, striking with up to 500,000 shells a hour, in
an effort to turn the city into a "sea of fire. '2 2 Overall, experts
believe that efforts by the United States and South Korea to
blunt an initial North Korean assault would be unable to prevent
North Korea from inflicting an unacceptable level of damage on
South Korea and U.S. forces in the area.293
Nor could the United States count on being able to preemp-
tively destroy the bulk of North Korea's military assets - includ-
ing missiles, artillery, and ground forces - since those assets are
so numerous. 29 4 Many of North Korea's artillery pieces are hid-
den in caves and hence difficult to destroy.295 North Korean
missiles are also mounted on mobile launchers, making them
difficult to locate and strike.296 North Korea would likely use
non-persistent chemical agents to facilitate penetration of the
South Korean/U.S. defenses around the demilitarized zone and
289. See Chemical Weapons Program, supra note 121; Attack Across the DMZ Special Re-
port, supra note 233.
290. See R. Jeffrey Smith, North Korea Deal Urged by State Dept., WASH. POST, Nov. 15,
1993, at A15.
291. See Doug Bandow, N. Korea is No Place to Apply Iraq Lessons, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2003, at B13.
292. Paul Richter, North Korea Crises; Two-Strategy Faces Test; Battling North Korea
Amid Iraq Conflict Could Mean Longer Fighting and More Casualties, L.A. TiMES, Feb. 13,
2003, at Al.
293. See Saunders, supra note 217.
294. See id.; see also North Korean Missile Proliferation Hearing, supra note 219.
295. See Saunders, supra note 217; see also Barbara Demick, N. Korea's Ace in the
Hole, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2003, at Al (explaining that North Korea has placed heavy
artillery pieces in mountain bunkers that are positioned to quickly slide in and out on
rails).
296. See Saunders, supra note 217.
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persistent chemical agents against South Korean and U.S. troops
and other assets in rear areas.29 7
While recent U.S. military actions have heavily relied on air
power, there appeared to be a risk that bad weather and difficult
terrain on the Korean Peninsula could hamper U.S. air power,
based upon experience in the first Gulf War where laser-guided
bombs were severely affected by bad weather and inclement bat-
tlefield conditions such as smoke. 298 However, the subsequent
emergence of Joint Direct Attack Munitions ('JDAM") appar-
ently has virtually nullified the effects of bad weather, due to
their reliance on the Global Positioning System ("GPS") and an
inertial navigation system ("INS") .299 In addition, flight trials of
an Inertial Terrain-Aided Guidance system demonstrate the abil-
ity of bombs to determine the profile of the ground from high
altitudes and match this with stored three dimensional maps in
real time, providing a CEP of three meters.300
Nor do U.S. military planners believe the United States
could count on being able to destroy or neutralize the North
Korean nuclear capability. Exposed North Korean nuclear facili-
ties would be vulnerable to attack by cruise missiles and stealth
bombers, despite significant North Korean air defenses.Y How-
ever, North Korea has concealed and hardened a number of its
nuclear facilities30 2 and would have a range of retaliatory options
- from conventional attacks to the use of chemical, biological,
and to the extent they have them, nuclear weapons. 303
Most analysts believe that, while a war with North Korea
would involve substantial losses, the United States would ulti-
mately win without the need to resort to nuclear weapons. 30
4
297. See Chemical Weapons Program, supra note 121.
298. See Smart and Smarter, JANE's INT'L DEF. REv.,Jan. 1, 2000; Attack Across the DMZ
Special Report, supra note 233.
299. See Smart and Smarter, supra note 298.
300. See id.
301. See Saunders, supra note 217.
302. See id. While a number of North Korean nuclear facilities - including nu-
clear reactors and reprocessing plants - have been located, its reprocessing facilities,
particularly those for uranium, could be operated in relatively small, underground facil-
ities. See id. Additionally, it is most likely that any warheads North Korea possesses
would be hidden in underground facilities. See id.
303. See id. There is also a complication in that attacking any nuclear facilities
could spread radioactive material throughout the Korean Peninsula, and even as far as
Japan and China. See id.
304. See generally Attack Across the DMZ Special Report, supra note 233; see also Hall,
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The timetable for getting substantial additional U.S. forces into
the region is relatively short.3 0° In addition, South Korea has
recently embarked on its own program to develop missiles with a
range of up to 300 kilometers, after the United States agreed to
the South Korean withdrawal from the Missile Technology Con-
trol Regime.30 6
Economically, the cost of the war would be tremendous.
The South Korean economy would likely be devastated, making
it impossible to rely on Korean reunification as the cure for the
power vacuum in North Korea at the end of any conflict.30 7 The
effects on the South Korean economy would likely have rever-
berating effects throughout the world. 0 8
While there is no doubt a limit to the extent to which the
U.S. military can be stretched, it seems likely that the military
could handle a war with North Korea even while engaged in the
tail end of ones with Afghanistan and Iraq.3 °9
supra note 216; Saunders, supra note 4; Kozaryn, supra note 214. Some have argued
that North Korea would not attack the South even in circumstances where it was at-
tacked first-acknowledging that would be suicide-but instead would use its missiles
and attack U.S. bases in Japan, hoping to wedge apart the U.S.-South Korean alliance
and induce South Korea to stand with the North against the United States and Japa-
nese. See Hall, supra note 216. Dr. Marcus Noland has argued that, while the United
States sees North Korea as a threat to the non-proliferation regime, South Korea sees it
as a direct threat to South Korea national security, and accordingly that South Korea
has a much greater incentive to avoid conflict with North Korea. See id.
305. See Hall, supra note 216.
306. See Don Kirk, U.S. to Back Seoul's Plan for Extended Missile Force, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., July 13, 2000, at 1.
307. See Bruce Bennett & Nina Hachigian, Don't Try Regime Change in North Korea,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 31, 2004.
308. The South Korean economy is a leading exporter of electronics and automo-
biles and in 2002 had a GDP of $941.5 billion. See WORLD FAcTBOOK 2003: SOUTH
KOREA, supra note 202.
309. See Paul Eckert, North Korea Says U.S. Courts Confrontation, REUTERS, Dec. 27,
2002 (citing U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld). The idea that the U.S. mili-
tary has the capability to fight two regional wars simultaneously is one that was articu-
lated in the first Bush administration and carried through the Clinton administration.
See Michael O'Hanlon, Has U.S. War in Iraq Slowed War on Terror?; Missions: Maintaining
U.S. Military Focus on Two Wars at Once Provides Complex Challenge, BALT. SUN, Jan. 18,
2004, at 1C. This ability has been illustrated recently with the U.S. military engaging in
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. See id. This is not to say that it has
not strained U.S. military means, particularly regarding intelligence assets and linguists
who had to be diverted from the fight against al-Qaida to the war in Iraq. See id. Other
sources state that sophisticated electronic warfare devices and specialized munitions
such as cruise missiles would become scarce. See Richter, supra note 292, at Al. But see
John Diamond & Dave Moniz, Officials: Gulf Buildup Limits Options on Korea, USA To-
DAY, Feh. 3, 2003, at 8A. The author posits that the strains on the military are much
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A. International Law Applicable to the Use of Nuclear Weapons310
The United States acknowledges the applicability of the law
of armed conflict, including the rules of necessity, proportional-
ity, and discrimination, to the use of nuclear weapons. However,
when it comes to the application of such law to nuclear weapons,
the United States distorts the facts as to the effects of nuclear
weapons and misstates the law.
If the facts and law were as stated by the United States, the
use of nuclear weapons would indeed be lawful in many circum-
stances. Based upon a true statement of the facts and law, the
use of nuclear weapons is unlawful in virtually all circumstances
in which such weapons might actually be used.
I first review the United States' general acknowledgment of
the applicable rules of law and then demonstrate the United
States' distortion of the facts and law in applying the law. I then
apply the law, as acknowledged by the United States, to the true
facts as to nuclear weapons.
B. U.S. Acknowledgment of the Applicability of the Law of Armed
Conflict to Nuclear Weapons"1 '
The U.S Constitution provides that treaties entered into by
more restrictive, and that in 2002 even Secretary Rumsfeld admitted that U.S. forces
could not defeat two major regional forces at the same time, stating, "We weren't able
to meet that." Id. Retired Army Col. Kenneth Allard, a professor of national security at
Georgetown University, said that our goal going into the latest Iraq war was to invade
Iraq and contain North Korea; we "do not have enough to do both." Id.; see also Richter,
supra note 292, at Al. Marine General Peter Pace, vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, said that while the outcome of a two-front war would "not be in doubt," he said
what would be at risk is the timeline you would achieve victory in; and qualified that by
saying that "anything that is longer will have more risk." Id.
310. The analysis as to the applicable law of armed conflict is adapted in part from
CHARLESJ. MOXLEY, JR., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE POST COLD
WAR WORLD (2000).
311. I base my statements of the law herein primarily on the United States' own
statement of the law, as stated in U.S. military manuals and in the memoranda and oral
arguments presented to the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons in
the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, at 809. Military manuals relied
on include: International Law Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies,
U.S. Naval War College, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY ANNOTATED
SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
(1987) [hereinafter NAVAL/MARUNE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK]; U.S. Dep't. A.F.,
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF ARMED CONFLICT (Air Force Pamphlet 110-34,
1980) [hereinafter A.F. COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK]; U.S. Dep't. A.F., INT'L LAw - THE
CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS (A.F. Pamphlet 110-31, 1976)
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the United States are "the supreme Law of the Land.131 2 The Air
Force Manual on International Law notes that "state and federal
courts have declared international law to be part of the law of
the land."313 The Air Force Manual on International Law states that
the United States is bound to follow customary international law
"not because a treaty requires it, but because international law
imposes the obligation on all States."3" 4
The United States acknowledges that the use of nuclear
weapons is subject to the law of armed conflict, including the
rules of proportionality, necessity, and discrimination, modera-
tion, civilian immunity, neutrality, and humanity.3 15
The Naval/Marine Commander's Handbook states that the use
of nuclear weapons "against enemy combatants and other mili-
tary objectives" is subject to the following principles:
the right of the parties to the conflict to adopt means of injur-
ing the enemy is not unlimited; it is prohibited to launch at-
tacks against the civilian population as such; and the distinc-
tion must be made at all times between combatants and non-
combatants to the effect that the latter be spared as much as
possible.316
The Naval/Marine Commander's Handbook describes these rules as
"fundamental principles" of the law of armed conflict.317
[hereinafter A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAW]; U.S. Dep't. Army, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE
(FM27-10/18 July 1956) with Change No. 1 (July 15, 1976) [hereinafter LAW OF LAND
WARFARE].
312. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see also LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 311, at 7
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, §2). My analysis of the applicable law is drawn in large
measure from statements of that law by the United States.
313. A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 311, at 1-5 n.26.
314. Id. at 1-7.
315. See generally International Court ofJustice: Advismy Proceedings of the Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Question Posed by the General Assembly), Written Observations
on the Request by the General Assembly for an Advisory Opinion, 7 CRIM. L.F. 401 (1996)
[hereinafter U.S. ICJ Memorandum/GA App.]; NAVAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HAND-
BOOK, supra note 311, at 10-2; A.F. COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 6-1.
The Law of Land Warfare states that, in the absence of a customary rule of law or interna-
tional convention restricting the employment of atomic weapons, the use of such weap-
ons cannot be deemed unlawful, although the manual appears to recognize the subju-
gation of the use of such weapons to the principles of moderation and necessity. See
LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 311, at 18; see also A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra
note 311, at 6-1 to 6-8; U.S. DEP'T. ARmy, 2 INr'L LAW 27-161-2, at 42 (Pamp. 27-161-2,
Oct. 1962); ELLIOTr L. MEVROWITZ, PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE RELE-
VANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 223 (1990) (quoting from U.S. DEPT'T ARMY, supra).
316. NAVAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 10-2.
317. See id. at 10-2.
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The Air Force Commander's Handbook, while stating that the
United States "takes the position" that the use of nuclear weap-
ons is not unlawful, confirms that such use is "governed by ex-
isting principles of international law." 18
The Air Force Manual on International Law, while stating that
"[t]he use of explosive nuclear weapons, whether by air, sea or
land forces, cannot be regarded as violative of existing interna-
tional law in the absence of any international rule of law restrict-
ing their employment," '319 similarly recognizes that such use is
subject to the principles of the law of war generally.3 20 The Air
Force Manual on International Law states that "any weapon may be
used unlawfully, such as when it is directed at civilians and not at
a military objective 3 21 or "to inflict unnecessary suffering. "322
The Air Force Manual on International Law states that, in com-
paring the military advantages to be secured by the use of a new
weapon to the effects caused by the weapon, the following ques-
tions are relevant:
(1) [C]an the weapon be delivered accurately to the target;
(2) [W]ould its use necessarily result in excessive injury to
civilians or damage to civilian objects, so as to be termed
an "indiscriminate weapon;"
(3) [W]ould its effects be uncontrollable or unpredictable in
space or time as to cause disproportionate injury to civil-
ians or damage to civilian objects; and
(4) [W]ould its use necessarily cause suffering excessive in
relation to the military purpose which the weapon serves
so as to violate that prohibition.323
The Army, in its International Law Manual, states that the
"provisions of international conventional and customary law that
may control the use of nuclear weapons" include:
318. A.F. COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 6-1. The Law of Land War-
fare states that, in the absence of a customary rule of law or international convention
restricting the employment of atomic weapons, the use of such weapons cannot be
deemed unlawful, although the manual appears to recognize the subjugation of the use
of such weapons to the principles of moderation and necessity. See LAW OF LAND WAR-
FARE, supra note 311, at 18.
319. A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAw, supra note 311, at 6-5.
320. See id. at 6-1 to 6-8.
321. Id. at 6-1.
322. Id. at 6-8.
323. Id. at 6-7.
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(1) Article 23(a) of the Hague Regulations prohibiting poi-
sons and poisoned weapons,
(2) [T]he Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use
not only of poisonous and other gases but also of 'analo-
gous liquids, materials or devices,'
(3) Article 23(c) of the Hague Regulations which prohibits
weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, and
(4) [T]he 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg which lists as
contrary to humanity those weapons which 'needlessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their
death inevitable.'
3 2 4
VIII. RULES OF PROPORTIONALITY, NECESSITY,
AND DISCRIMINATION
A. Rule of Proportionality
The rule of proportionality prohibits the use of a weapon if
its probable effects upon combatant or non-combatant persons
or objects would likely be disproportionate to the value of the
anticipated military objective.
The Air Force Manual on International Law states the rule
against attacks "which may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects ...
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated. "325 The Naval/Marine Com-
mander's Handbook recognizes the proportionality requirement as
a customary rule of international law and describes the require-
ment as codified in the prohibition by Additional Protocol I of
attacks causing excessive damage. The handbook states that it is
not unlawful to cause "incidental injury or death to civilians, or
collateral damage to civilian objects, during an attack upon a le-
gitimate military objective," but that such effects "must not...
be excessive in light of the military advantage anticipated by the
attack."
3 26
324. See 2 INT'L LAw 27-161-2, supra note 315, at 42; see also MEYROWITZ, supra note
315, at 223.
325. A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAw, supra note 311, at 5-9.
326. NAVAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 8-4; see id. at 5-7,
8-4 n.17, 8-5; see also A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAw, supra note 311, at 3-3.
The Naval/Marine Commander's Handbook elaborates that the law "recognizes that a
certain number of noncombatants may become inadvertent victims" and permits this
unavoidable destruction "when not disproportionate to the military advantage to be
gained." NAVAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 6-38. The Naval/
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B. Rule of Necessity
The rule of necessity provides that, in conducting a military
operation, a State, even as against its adversary's forces and prop-
erty, may use only such a level of force as is "necessary" or "im-
peratively necessary" to achieve its military objective, and that
any additional level of force is prohibited as unlawful. The State
must have an explicit military objective justifying each particular
use of force in armed conflict and there must be a reasonable
connection between that objective and the use of the particular
force in question. If a military operation cannot satisfy this re-
quirement, the State must use a lower level of force or refrain
from the operation altogether.
This is a rule of customary international law memorialized
in numerous conventions. Violations of this rule served as the
basis of convictions at Nuremberg. It is a rule of reason, requir-
ing that a judgment be made as much in advance as possible by
appropriately responsible decision-makers in light of the reason-
ably available facts. The State, in planning its military opera-
tions, is required to exercise all reasonable precautions to assure
that the level of force to be used is within the scope of this rule.
The protection of the rule runs to combatant as well as non-
combatant persons and objects.
The rule of necessity precludes the use of a particular
weapon if a less destructive weapon could reasonably be ex-
pected to achieve the objective, and outlaws the use of a weapon
not capable of being regulated or not in fact regulated by the
user. If the military objective is to take out a particular bridge
and this can be accomplished through a direct attack on the
bridge, it is unlawful to launch a massive attack against the entire
county to take out the bridge. If the military objective could be
achieved with conventional weapons, the use of nuclear weap-
ons, with the appreciably higher likely levels of destruction,
Marine Commander's Handbook further states that the use of force in self-defense against
armed attack or the threat of imminent armed attack rests upon the elements of neces-
sity and proportionality. See NAVAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311,
at 4-10 (citing 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 905(1)(a), cmt. 3, at 387; 2 RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 905(1) (b) & Reporters' Note 3, at 388-89; U.S. Navy Reg. 1973, art. 0915
(1973)).
The A.F. COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK adds that "every feasible precaution should be
taken to keep civilian casualties and damage to a minimum." A.F. COMMANDER'S HAND-
BOOK, supra note 311, at 3-3.
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would generally be unlawful. If, on the other hand, it were nec-
essary to destroy the county to take out the bridge, the necessity
requirement would ostensibly be met if the other prerequisites
were present, but, even then, if taking out the bridge had minor
military value compared to the level of resultant devastation, the
proportionality requirement would not be met and the strike
would be prohibited.
The United States recognizes this rule. The Naval/Marine
Commander's Handbook states that the law of war seeks to prevent
"unnecessary suffering and destruction," and thereby permits
"only that degree and kind of force ...required for the ...
partial or complete submission of the enemy with a minimum
expenditure of time, life and physical resources. ' 327 The Hand-
book repeats that the employment of "any kind or degree of
force not required" for that purpose "is prohibited 3 2 ' and
quotes with approval the statement in The Hostage Case3 2 9 that
the destruction of property in war "to be lawful must be impera-
tively demanded by the necessities of war" and that there must
be some "reasonable connection between the destruction of
property and the overcoming of the enemy forces."3"' The
Handbook emphasizes that the protection of this rule extends to
both combatants and noncombatants.3 31
327. NAVAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 5-5 (citing Lt.
Col. William Fenrick, USMC, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional War-
fare, 98 MIL. LAW REv. 91 (1982); Solf A. Waldemar, Protection of Civilians Against the
Effects of Hostilities Under the Customary International Law Protocol I, 1 AM. U.J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 117, 128-35 (§86)); see also NAVAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note
311, at 6-38; A.F. MNUAL ON INT'L LAw, supra note 311, at 6-1. As to the demanding
nature of the necessity requirement in the jus ad bellum context of self-defense, The
Naval/Marine Commander's Handbook quotes the requirement of U.S. Navy Regulations,
1990, Article 0915, that the right of self-defense must be exercised only "as a last resort"
and then only "to the extent absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required." NA-
VAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 4-10.
328. NAVAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 5-5.
329. Id. at 5-4 n.6 (citing United States v. List et al., 11 TWC 1253-54 (1950)).
330. NAVAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 5-4 n.6.
331. See id. at 5-3. The AF. Manual on Int'l Law relies upon this same statement of
the rule by the U.S. Military Tribunal in The Hostage Case: "The destruction of prop-
erty to be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction
as an end in itself is a violation of international law. There must be some reasonable
connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy
forces." A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAw, supra note 311, at 15-5, 15-10 n.40 (citing The Hos-
tage Case, United States v. List et al., 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREM-
BERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW 10, at 1253-54 (1950)).
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C. Rule of Discrimination
The rule of discrimination prohibits the use of a weapon
that cannot discriminate in its effects between military and civil-
ian targets. This is a rule designed to protect civilian persons
and objects. The law recognizes that the use of a particular
weapon against a military target may cause unintended collateral
or incidental damage to civilian persons and objects and permits
such damage, subject to compliance with the other applicable
rules of law, including the principle of proportionality. How-
ever, the weapon must have been intended for - and capable of
being controlled and directed against - a military target, and
the civilian damage must have been unintended and collateral
or incidental.
Thus, if the weapon or its effects were not susceptible of
being controlled and directed against a military target in the first
place, the resultant damage to civilian persons and objects would
not be unintended, collateral or incidental - and the use would
be prohibited. Similarly, if the very purpose of the strike was to
put pressure on the adversary through attacks on its population,
the classic Cold War deterrence theory of "mutual assured de-
struction" (or "MAD"), the strike would be unlawful.
The discrimination requirement is recognized by the
United States. The Air Force Commander's Handbook states that a
weapon is not unlawful "simply because its use may cause inci-
dental casualties to civilians, as long as those casualties are not
foreseeably excessive in light of the expected military advan-
tage," but that weapons that are "incapable of being controlled
enough to direct them against a military objective "332 are unlaw-
ful. The Air Force Manual on International Law defines indiscrimi-
nate weapons as those "incapable of being controlled, through
design or function," such that they "cannot, with any degree of
certainty, be directed at military objectives. 313 3
The Naval/Marine Commander's Handbook states that the law
of war "is based largely on the distinction to be made between
combatants and noncombatants" ' 4 and hence prohibits making
332. A.F. COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 6-1.
333. A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAw, supra note 311, at 6-3.
334. NAvAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 5-7. The hand-
book defines "noncombatants" as "those individuals who do not form a part of the
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noncombatants the "object of attack"3 5 or targeting them "as
such33 6 and requires that civilians be safeguarded against "injury
not incidental" to attacks against military objectives. 37
Two of the three "fundamental principles of the law of war"
identified by the Naval/Marine Commander's Handbook focus upon
the requirement of discrimination:
2. It is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian popu-
lation as such.
3. Distinctions must be made between combatants and non-
combatants, to the effect that noncombatants be spared as
much as possible.338
The Naval/Marine Commander's Handbook states that the
foregoing points 2 and 3 were customary rules of international
law codified for the first time in Additional Protocol I, articles
51(2) and 57(1), respectively. 339
IX. UNCONTROLLABILITY AS CONNOTING UNLAWFULNESS
The United States recognizes that the rules of discrimina-
tion, necessity, and proportionality prohibit the use of weapons
whose effects cannot be controlled by the user.
A. Uncontrollability under Rule of Discrimination
The Air Force Commander's Handbook states that weapons that
are "incapable of being controlled enough to direct them
against a military objective" are unlawful. 4 ° The Air Force Man-
ual on International Law defines indiscriminate weapons as those
"incapable of being controlled, through design or function,"
such that they "cannot, with any degree of certainty, be directed
at military objectives."341
In its military manuals the United States has acknowledged
armed forces and who otherwise refrain from the commission or direct support of hos-
tile acts." Id. at 5-7.
335. Id. at 5-8.
336. Id. at 8-1; see also LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 311, at 16.
337. NAVAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 5-8.
338. Id. at 8-1 (citations omitted). Principle No. 1 identified by the handbook is
"[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." Id.
at 8-1.
339. Id. at 8-1 nn.3-4.
340. See A.F. COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK supra note 311, at 6-1.
341. A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAw, supra note 311, at 6-3.
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that the scope of this prohibition extends to the effects of the use
of a weapon. The Air Force Manual on International Law states
that indiscriminate weapons include those which, while subject
to being directed at military objectives, "may have otherwise un-
controllable effects so as to cause disproportionate civilian inju-
ries or damage."34 The Air Force Manual on International Law
states that "uncontrollable" refers to effects "which escape in
time or space from the control of the user as to necessarily cre-
ate risks to civilian persons or objects excessive in relation to the
military advantage anticipated." '3 43 It is noteworthy that this pro-
hibition encompasses the causing of risks, not just injury.
As a "universally agreed illustration of... an indiscriminate
weapon," the Air Force Manual on International Law cites biologi-
cal weapons, noting that the uncontrollable from such weapons
"may include injury to the civilian population of other states as
well as injury to an enemy's civilian population." '344 The Naval/
Marine Commander's Handbook states that such weapons are "in-
herently indiscriminate and uncontrollable." '345
The Air Force Manual on International Law further cites Ger-
many's World War II V-1 rockets, with their "extremely primitive
guidance systems" and Japanese incendiary balloons, without any
guidance systems.3 4 6 The Manual states that the term "indiscrim-
inate" refers to the "inherent characteristics of the weapon,
when used, which renders [sic] it incapable of being directed at
specific military objectives or of a nature to necessarily cause dis-
proportionate injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects." 34 7
The Navy Judge Advocate General, in his legal analysis of
the lawfulness of the Trident I (C-4) Missile, stated that
"[i]ndiscriminate weapons are those which cannot be accurately
directed at military objectives or those the effects of the use
which are so uncontrollable as to necessarily cause dispropor-
tionate injury or damage to civilian persons or objects. 341
342. Id.
343. Id. (emphasis omitted).
344. Id.
345. NAVAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK supra note 311, at 10-19 n.49.
346. A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 311, at 6-3.
347. Id. at 6-9 n.7.
348. NAvYJAG TRIDENT 1, supra note 272, at 9 (citing A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAW,
supra note 311, paras. 6-3, 6-3.c).
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B. Uncontrollability under Rule of Necessity
The requirement that the level of force implicit in the use
of a weapon be controllable and controlled by the user is a natu-
ral implication of the necessity requirement. If a State cannot
control the level of destructiveness of a weapon, it cannot assure
that the use of the weapon will involve only such a level of de-
structiveness as is necessary in the circumstances.
The Air Force Manual on International Law recognizes as a
basic requirement of necessity "that the force used is capable of
being and is in fact regulated by the user. 349
C. Uncontrollability under Rule of Proportionality
If the State using a weapon is unable to control the effects
of the weapon, it is unable to evaluate whether the effects would
satisfy the requirement of being proportionate to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack or to
assure such limitation of effects.
The Air Force Manual on International Law notes that the re-
quirement of proportionality prohibits "uncontrollable effects
against one's own combatants, civilians or property. 350
X. U.S. DISTORTION OF FACTS AND LAW IN APPLYING THE
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Following are what appear to be distortions of fact and law
in the United States' application of the law of armed conflict,
including the rules of proportionality, necessity, and discrimina-
tion, to the use of nuclear weapons.
A. U.S. Distortion 1: That Nuclear Weapons Cannot Be
Per Se Unlawful
The U.S. position, as expressed before the ICJ, is that there
is no per se rule banning the use of nuclear weapons because the
United States has not consented to any such rule, and hence that
each contemplated use of such weapons must be evaluated on
an ad hoc basis.
The United States argues that it is only bound by conven-
tional law specifically agreed to by the United States and custom-
349. A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAw, supra note 311, at 1-6.
350. Id. at 6-2.
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ary law established by the practice of the community of Nations,
including the Nations specially involved (according to the
United States, the nuclear powers), out of a sense of obligation.
The United States concludes that, since it has not agreed to a
convention specifically prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons
and has not refrained from their use out of a sense of obligation,
such use cannot be per se unlawful.351
Similarly, the Navy Judge Advocate General, in his legal
analysis of the lawfulness of the Trident I (C-4) Missile, stated
that the reality of "current state practice and the generally ac-
cepted rule" is that to be unlawful, a specific weapon must be
specifically addressed as prohibited. 52
This position is significant because it serves to justify the
possession and threatened use of nuclear weapons as a general
proposition and causes the possible use of the weapons to be
inculcated into the military's weapons acquisitions, training, and
planning.3 53 Given the fact that, in real world situations, deci-
sions as to the use of nuclear weapons would likely have to be
made upon extremely short notice, 54 ad hoc application of law
to the use of nuclear weapons effectively means that the law
likely will not be applied in any meaningful way in most situa-
tions of actual use. The U.S. policy of ad hoc legal evaluation is
really a policy of presumptive lawfulness.3 55 Applied to North
351. See Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Re-
quest for Advisory Opinion Submitted by the World Health Organization) & Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Request for Advisory Opinion Submitted by the
General Assembly of the United States), Verbatim Record, Public Sitting Held Nov. 15,
1995, 10 a.m., President Bedjaoui presiding, CR 95/34, at 49-50 [hereinafter ICJ Hear-
ing, Nov. 15, 1995]. In its arguments before the ICJ, the United States acknowledged
that scientific evidence could justify a total prohibition of nuclear weapons if it demon-
strated the unlawfulness of all such uses: "[S]cientific evidence could onlyjustify a total
prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons if such evidence covers the full range of
variables and circumstances that might be involved in such uses." Id.
352. See NAvYJAG TRIDENT I, supra note 272, at 12 (citing W. T. Mallison, Jr., The
Laws of War and the Juridical Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction in General and Limited
Wars, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 308, 331 (1967); see also MEREs S. McDOUGAL & FLOREN-
TINO P. FELICIANA, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER; THE LEGAL REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL COERCION 100 n.83 (1961); William O'Brien, Legitimate Military Necessity
in Nuclear War, 2 WORLD POLITY 35, 100 n.83 (1960)).
353. See generallyJoiN-r CHIEFS OF STAFF,JOINT PUB 3-12.1, DOCTRINE FORJOINT THE-
ATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS (Joint Pub. 3-12.1, Feb. 9, 1996), available at http://
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/newpubs/jp3-l2-l.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2004) [herein-
after 1996 DOCTRINE FOR JOINT THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS].
354. See id. at 111-10
355. See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS (Joint
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Korea, this policy would ostensibly mean that it is perfectly lawful
for North Korea to pursue a nuclear program and to threaten to
use, and ultimately to use, such weapons in many circumstances.
The problem with the U.S. position is that it overlooks the
existence of other sources of international law, including gen-
eral principles of law. It ignores the fact that the United States
has recognized that the broad rules of the law of armed conflict
- such as the rules of proportionality, necessity, and discrimina-
tion - apply to nuclear weapons 5 6 and that per se rules can arise
from them. 57
Once the applicability of such rules is acknowledged, the
United States, like any other State, is bound by their application
regardless of whether it agrees with the particular application.
Neither the consensual basis of international law nor the princi-
ple of sovereignty limits the application of established rules of
law. If the use of nuclear weapons is per se unlawful under those
principles, the United States, North Korea, any other State are
subject to such unlawfulness fully as much as if they had signed a
convention or purposefully joined in the formation of custom to
that effect.
The Air Force Manual on International Law states that the use
of a weapon may be unlawful based not only on "expressed
Pub 3-12, Dec. 15, 1995), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new-pubs/
jp3_12.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2004) [hereinafter 1995 DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR
OPERATIONS]. The DOCTRINE FORJOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS was a reissue (with minor
adjustments) to a 1993 manual of the same name and Joint Publication number. See
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DOCTRINE FORJOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS (Joint Pub. 3-12, April
29, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 DOCTRINE FORJOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS].
While the references to use of nuclear weapons against enemy combatants and for
other military objectives could be said to imply a more nuanced position, such a
nuanced reading itself seems overly theoretical for this kind of operational document.
The core of the policy, as communicated to the military by this authoritative document,
appears to be that of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. DOCTRINE FOR JOINT
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS supra, at 11-1. The Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations provides:
If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of
Service publications [presumably, the publications of any one service], this
publication will take precedence ... unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, normally in coordination with other members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance.
Id. at i.
356. The United States has recognized these rules as arising under customary and
treaty law and general principles of law. See MOXLEY, supra note 7, at 133 n.77, 136-39
nn.88-91 (proportionality), 124-25 nn.54-56 (necessity), 125-29 nn.57-65 (moderation
and discrimination), 146-48 nn. 111-19 (neutrality), 85-87 nn.246-52.
357. See A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAw, supra note 311, at 6-7.
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prohibitions contained in specific rules of custom and conven-
tion," but also on "those prohibitions laid down in the general
principles of the law of war. 358
Similarly, in discussing how the lawfulness of new weapons
and methods of warfare is determined, The Air Force Manual on
International Law states that such determination is made based
on international treaty or custom, upon "analogy to weapons or
methods previously determined to be lawful or unlawful," and
upon the evaluation of the compliance of such new weapons or
methods with established principles of law, such as the rules of
necessity, discrimination, and proportionality 59
The Air Force Manual on International Law notes that the In-
ternational Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in the case of the
Major War Criminals found that international law is contained
not only in treaties and custom but also in the "general princi-
ples of justice applied by jurists and practiced by military
courts."3 60
The Air Force Manual on International Law further states that
the practice of States "does not modify" the legal obligation to
comply with treaty obligations since such obligations are "con-
tractual in nature. 3 6 1
The Army's Law of Land Warfare states that "[t] he conduct
of armed hostilities on land is regulated by the law of land war-
fare which is both written and unwritten."362
The United States recognizes "analogy" as well as "general
principles" as sources of the law of armed conflict. The Air Force
Manual on International Law states:
The law of armed conflict affecting aerial operations is not
entirely codified. Therefore, the law applicable to air warfare
must be derived from general principles, extrapolated from
the law affecting land or sea warfare, or derived from other
sources including the practice of states reflected in a wide va-
riety of sources. 363
The Air Force Manual on International Law notes that per se
358. Id. at 6-1.
359. See id. at 6-7.
360. Id. at 1-6.
361. Id. at 1-15 n.35.
362. LAw OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 311, at 3.
363. A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAw, supra note 311, at 1-7.
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unlawfulness is not limited to prohibitions established in treaties
or customary law:
[A] new weapon or method of warfare may be illegal, per se, if
it is restricted by international law including treaty or interna-
tional custom. The issue is resolved, or attempted to be re-
solved, by analogy to weapons or methods previously deter-
mined to be lawful or unlawful.36 4
Based on the foregoing, it seems clear that the use of nu-
clear weapons can be unlawful per se regardless of whether there
is a treaty or custom establishing such unlawfulness.
Assuming that the use of nuclear weapons may be per se un-
lawful under the rules of proportionality, necessity, and discrimi-
nation, the question arises as to what the criteria are for the ap-
plication of a per se rule. The United States contended, 65 in a
position that the ICJ ostensibly accepted sub silentio,16 6 that 100%
illegality - the unlawfulness of all uses of nuclear weapons -
would be necessary before a rule of per se illegality could arise.
However, the Court's approach may have been affected by the
wording of the question referred to it by the General Assembly:
"Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance per-
mitted under international law?" '36 7
The law on this point does not appear to be settled. Opin-
ions of individual judges of the ICJ on the issue differed greatly.
Judge Higgins in her dissenting opinion assumed that 100% cer-
tainty must be present for there to be per se illegality:
I do not... exclude the possibility that such a weapon could
be unlawful by reference to the humanitarian law, if its use
could never comply with its requirements - no matter what
specific type within that class of weapon was being used and
no matter where it might be used.3 68
Judges Shahabuddeen and Weeramantry reached the oppo-
364. Id. at 6-7.
365. See ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 351, at 71; A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L
LAW, supra note 311, at 6-3, 6-7; NAVAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note
311, at 10-2.
366. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, at 822, 42; 823, 9 48;
829. 9 95; see also id. at 936-37. 9 27-33 (Higgins, J., dissenting); id. at 922, 9 6(xi)-
6(xii) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting); id. at 869 (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting).
367. Id. at 819 20.
368. Id. at 936, 9 26 (Higgins, J., dissenting). See also id. at 836, 839, 840, 842
(Schwebel, J., dissenting).
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site conclusion. Judge Shahabuddeen stated, "in judging of the
admissibility of a particular means of warfare, it is necessary, in
my opinion, to consider what the means can do in the ordinary
course of warfare, even if it may not do it in all circum-
stances." '3 69
Judge Weeramantry, addressing the issue from the perspec-
tive of nuclear decision-making, concluded that nuclear weapons
should be declared illegal in all circumstances, with the proviso
that if such use would be lawful "in some circumstances, however
improbable, those circumstances need to be specified."37 °
B. U.S. Distortion 2: That the Effects of Nuclear Weapons
are Controllable
At the ICJ, the United States did not retrench on the appli-
cability of the controllability requirement, but rather argued the
matter on a factual level, asserting that nuclear weapons - or at
least the type of nuclear weapons whose legality the United
States defended - are controllable.
Without arguing the lawfulness of the use of strategic nu-
clear weapons or even of a substantial number of tactical weap-
ons or of a small number of such weapons in urban areas, the
United States asserted the possible lawfulness of the use of a
small number of highly accurate low-yield nuclear weapons (os-
tensibly tactical weapons) directed against non-urban targets, ar-
guing that the effects of such attacks could be so limited and
controlled as to be lawful.
John H. McNeill, the U.S. Senior Deputy General Counsel,
Department of Defense, told the Court:
The argument that international law prohibits, in all cases,
the use of nuclear weapons appears to be premised on the
incorrect assumption that every use of every type of nuclear
weapon will necessarily share certain characteristics which
contravene the law of armed conflict. Specifically, it appears
to be assumed that any use of nuclear weapons would inevita-
bly escalate into a massive strategic nuclear exchange, result-
ing automatically in the deliberate destruction of the popula-
tion centers of opposing sides ....
Nuclear weapons, as is true of conventional weapons, can be
369. Id. at 869 (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting).
370. Id. at 915 (Weeramantry, J. dissenting).
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used in a variety of ways: they can be deployed to achieve a
wide range of military objectives of varying degrees of signifi-
cance; they can be targeted in ways that either increase or
decrease resulting incidental civilian injury or collateral dam-
age; and their use may be lawful or not depending upon
whether and to what extent such use was prompted by an-
other belligerent's conduct and the nature of the conduct.
3 7
'
Noting that it has been argued that nuclear weapons are
inherently indiscriminate in their effect and cannot reliably be
targeted at specific military objectives, McNeill stated, "This ar-
gument is simply contrary to fact. Modern nuclear weapon deliv-
ery systems are, indeed, capable of precisely engaging discrete
military objectives. ' 7 2
Alluding to the assumptions made by the World Health Or-
ganization ("WHO") in its 1987 study as to the effects of nuclear
weapons, McNeill objected to the "four scenarios" depicted by
the WHO as "highly selective" in that they addressed "civilian
casualties expected to result from nuclear attacks involving sig-
nificant numbers of large urban area targets or a substantial
number of military targets."3 73 But no reference is made in the
report to the effects to be expected from other plausible scena-
rios, such as a small number of accurate attacks by low-yield
weapons against an equally small number of military targets in
non-urban areas.
Reinforcing the point as to "other plausible [low-end use]
scenarios," McNeill stated that such plausibility "follows from a
fact noted in the WHO Report by Professor Rotblat: namely,
that 'remarkable improvements' in the performance of nuclear
weapons in recent years have resulted in their 'much greater ac-
curacy,' 175 stating that such scenarios "would not necessarily
raise issues of proportionality or discrimination."3 7 6
In its memorandum to the ICJ, the United States stated that,
through the technological expertise of "modern weapon design-
ers," it is now able to control the effects of nuclear weapons -
specifically, "to tailor the effects of a nuclear weapon to deal with
371. ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 351, at 68-69.
372. Id. at 70.
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various types of military objectives. '3 7 7 It has been argued that
nuclear weapons are unlawful because they cannot be directed
at a military objective. This argument ignores the ability of mod-
ern delivery systems to target specific military objectives with nu-
clear weapons, and the ability of modern weapons designers to
tailor the effects of a nuclear weapon to deal with various types
of military objectives. Since nuclear weapons can be directed at
a military objective, they can be used in a discriminate manner
and are not inherently indiscriminate.
Characterizing the effects of nuclear weapons as controlla-
ble indeed takes away much of the legal objectionability of the
weapons. If the United States can reliably deliver nuclear weap-
ons to their intended targets and control the effects, including
the radiation effects, of the weapons, nuclear weapons would ap-
pear to be just another weapon. On this basis, there would ap-
pear to be nothing wrong with North Korea's having such weap-
ons, threatening to use them, and potentially using them in
many circumstances.
The ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Decision did not
reach this issue of the controllability of the effects of nuclear
weapons. The Court determined that, because of the potential
of nuclear weapons to destroy civilization and the entire ecosys-
tem of the planet, the use of nuclear weapons would generally
be unlawful, but that it was not in possession of sufficient facts to
evaluate whether use of nuclear weapons (ostensibly, precision
low-yield tactical ones) could be lawful in extreme circumstances
of self-defense when a State's survival was at stake.3 7 8
377. U.S. ICJ Memorandum/GA App., supra note 315, at 416.
378. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, at 829, 1 91 (citing
United Kingdom, Written Statement, at 40, 1 3.44, 75, 1 4.2(3), 53, 1 3.70 and United
States of America, Oral Statement, CR 95/34, at 89-90), 830, 1 96, 831 1 105(E).
Judges Weeramantry and Higgins in their dissenting opinions pointed to the ambiguity
introduced by the Court's use of the word "generally." See id. at 881, 1 c(ii) (Weeraman-
try, J., dissenting), 936 para. 25 (Higgins, J., dissenting).
Judge Weeramantry in his dissenting opinion in the WHO Advisory Opinion pro-
ceeding noted that it is the Court's job to make findings as to disputed facts. Judge
Weeramantry cited the Court's observation in the Advisory Opinion on Namibia that "to
enable a court to pronounce on legal questions, it must also be acquainted with, take
into account and, if necessary, make findings as to the relevant factual issues." WHO
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 68, at 161 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting) (citing I.C.J. Re-
ports 1971 at 27). Judge Weeramantry further noted the contentions made by Finland
to the effect that:
[T]he legality of the use of nuclear weapons can only be determined in re-
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The Court stated that it did not have sufficient facts to de-
termine the validity of the argument of the United States and
other nuclear weapons States to the effect that highly accurate
low-yield tactical nuclear weapons could be used in such a way as
to limit and control their effects.37 9
The facts which the Court found to be missing ostensibly
had to do with the likely effects of the use of low-yield tactical
nuclear weapons and the risk of escalation. The Court first
noted the view expressed by the United Kingdom in its written
submission to the Court, and the United States in its oral argu-
ment:
The reality . . . is that nuclear weapons might be used in a
wide variety of circumstances with very different results in
terms of likely civilian casualties. In some cases, such as the
use of a low yield nuclear weapon against warships on the
High Seas or troops in sparsely populated areas, it is possible
to envisage a nuclear attack which caused comparatively few
civilian casualties. It is by no means the case that every use of
nuclear weapons against a military objective would inevitably
cause very great collateral civilian casualties. 380
The Court then noted the contrasting view of other States:
[R]ecourse to nuclear weapons could never be compatible
with the principles and rules of humanitarian law and is
therefore prohibited. In the event of their use, nuclear weap-
ons would in all circumstances be unable to draw any distinc-
tion between the civilian population and combatants, or be-
tween civilian objects and military objectives, and their ef-
spect of specific circumstances, for there can be a large number of potential
situations - e.g., first use, counter use, different practices of targeting, differ-
ent types of nuclear weapons - and [that] the Court cannot hypothesize
about all these possibilities.
WHO Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.CJ. 68, at 161 (citing Written Statement of Finland at
4).
The Court's language - "scarcely reconcilable" - seems hedged, perhaps the
product of drafting compromise. The Court went on to state: "Nevertheless, the Court
considers that it does not have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with cer-
tainty that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the princi-
ples and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance." Nuclear Weap-
ons Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, at 829, 95.
379. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, at 829, 91 (citing
United Kingdom, Written Statement, at 53, 3.70 and United States of America, Oral
Statement, CR 95/34, at 89-90), 92, 94.
380. Id. at 829 91 (citing United Kingdom, Written Statement, at 53 3.70;
United States of America, Oral Statement, CR 95/34, at 89-90).
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fects, largely uncontrollable, could not be restricted, either in
time or in space, to lawful military targets. Such weapons
would kill and destroy in a necessarily indiscriminate manner,
on account of the blast, heat and radiation occasioned by the
nuclear explosion and the effects induced; and the number
of casualties which would ensue would be enormous. The use
of nuclear weapons would therefore be prohibited in any cir-
cumstance, notwithstanding the absence of any explicit con-
ventional prohibition.
38 1
While concluding that it was unable to resolve these polar
factual positions, the Court noted that the proponents of legality
had failed to substantiate their position as to the possibility of
limited use, without escalation, of low level nuclear weapons or
even of the potential utility of such use if it were possible:
[N] one of the States advocating the legality of the use of nu-
clear weapons under certain circumstances, including the
'clean' use of smaller, low yield tactical nuclear weapons, has
indicated what, supposing such limited use were feasible,
would be the precise circumstances justifying such use; nor
whether such limited use would not tend to escalate into the
all-out use of high yield nuclear weapons. This being so, the
Court does not consider that it has a sufficient basis for a de-
termination of the validity of this view.3 8 2
While the ICJ did not reach the issue, it seems clear, based
on available information as the radiation effects of nuclear weap-
ons, that the U.S. position that it can control such effects is un-
founded. Neither before the ICJ nor ostensibly in any other
publicly available source has the United States presented any evi-
dence that it can control the radiation effects of nuclear weap-
ons, and there would appear to be no such evidence. While it is
true that the low yield tactical nuclear weapons that the United
States defended before the ICJ would release less radiation than
higher yield nuclear weapons, the low yield weapons release sub-
stantial radiation" 3 - and that radiation is uncontrollable in
381. Id. at 829, 92.
382. Id. at 829, 94.
383. See id. at 921 nn.183-84 (citing GEN. COLIN POWELL, A SOLDIER'S WAY 324
(1995)) ("No matter how small these nuclear payloads were.... [it] would be crossing a
threshold. Using nukes at this point would mark one of the most significant military
decisions since Hiroshima .... I began rethinking the practicality of those small nu-
clear weapons."); see also BULL. AToMIc SCIENTISTS, May 1985, at 35, 37.
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terms of how it will spread.38 4
The U.S. position as to the controllability of the spread of
radiation from an exploded nuclear weapon appears to ignore
the following essentially incontrovertible facts:
* Radiation is a defining feature of nuclear weapons. All
nuclear weapons emit radiation when detonated.38 5
* Radiation is inimical to life and cumulative in its buildup
and effects, surviving in the environment and genetically
in human and other life forms typically for many years (as
to some elements, for thousands of years).386
* The spread of radiation from the detonation of nuclear
weapons could not be controlled or predicted since radia-
384. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, at 904.
385. See id. at 821-22, 1 35. See generally DOCTRINE FORJOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS,
supra note 355.
For further discussions of the effects of nuclear weapons, see, e.g., WHO Advisory
Opinion, supra note 378, at 115-26 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting); id. at 173-80
(Koroma, J., dissenting). Judge Weeramantry in that proceeding further pointed out
differences between the effects of conventional and nuclear weapons: "The use of con-
ventional weapons in war does not spread disease. It does not cause genetic deformi-
ties. It does not imperil crops. It does not cause intergenerational climatic effects
which imperil the global food supply." Id. at 147 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
Judge Shahabuddeen stated: "[T]he use of nuclear weapons could result, even in
the case of neutral countries, in destruction of the living, in sickness and forced migra-
tion of survivors, and in injury to future generations to the point of causing serious
illness, deformities and death, with the possible extinction of all life." Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, at 873 (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting); see also DEP'T.
ARMY ET AL., NATO HANDBOOK ON THE MEDICAL ASPECTS OF NBC DEFENSIVE OPERA-
TIONS A MEDP-6(B) at 1.1 (1996) [hereinafter NATO HANDBOOK ON THE MEDICAL As-
PECTS OF NBC DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS] (adopted as Army Field Manual 8-9, Navy Medi-
cal Publication 5059, A.F. Joint Manual 44-151); DOCTRINE FORJOINT THEATER NUCLEAR
OPERATIONS, supra note 357, at 1-1-1-2; Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note
1, at 865 (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting); UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT FOR DISARMA-
MENT AFFAIRS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY 6-8 (1991).
386. See NATO HANDBOOK ON THE MEDICAL ASPECTS OF NBC DEFENSIVE OPERA-
TIONS, supra note 385, at 1.1; Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, at 873
(citing DICTIONNAIRE ENCYCLOPEDIQUE D'ELECTRONIQUE), 888 (citing RADIOECOLOGY
(1995)) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting). See generally INTERNATIONAL PHYSICIANS FOR THE
PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, BRIEFING BOOK ON NUCLEAR WAR (1992) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL PHYSICIANS FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR]. Numerous major
studies during the Cold War attempted to quantify the casualties that could be expected
from limited nuclear attacks. Several found that civilian casualties from a Soviet
counterforce strike on the United States would result in virtually as many deaths from
radiation as from direct blast. See William Daugherty et al., The Consequences of "Limited"
Nuclear Attacks on the United States, 10 INT'L SECURITY, Winter 1986, at 35; Frank N. von
Hippel et al., Civilian Casualties from Counterforce Attacks, 259 Scl. AM., Sept. 1988, at 42;
Barbara G. Levi et al., Civilian Casualties from "Limited" Nuclear Attacks on the USSR, 12
INT'L SECURITY, Winter 1987/1988, at 168.
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tion is dispersed in the environment by forces such as the
winds, the waters, the soil, animals, plants, and genetic ef-
fects, as well as vagaries as to the point of delivery of the
weapon in relation to the surface and applicable environ-
mental factors.3 87
" Radiation cannot discriminate between friend and foe,
combatant and noncombatant, adversary and neutral,
one's own population and forces and those of the en-
emy. 3
88
* Radiation from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, from
atomic testing, and from the Chernobyl releases have
caused and continue to cause substantial and widespread
injury to human health and other life and may be ex-
pected to continue to do so for generations to come. 389
387. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, at 821-22, 35; see also
id. at 905, 910 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting); id. at 932 (Koroma, J., dissenting); DoC-
TRINE FOR JOINT THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 357, at 111-2, 111-3; CHARLES
KEGLEY & EUGENE WITrKOPF, THE NUCLEAR READER: STRATEGY, WEAPONS, WAR 320-26
(1985); NATO HANDBOOK ON THE MEDICAL ASPECTS OF NBC DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS,
supra note 385, at 320; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, THE EF-
FECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 113 (May 1979) [hereinafter THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR]; 8
CHARLES S. GRACE, NUCLEAR WEAPONS: PRINCIPLES, EFFECTS AND SURVIVABILITY 29-30
(1994); TsIPIs, supra note 267, at 44-74, 115-295.
388. See DOCTRINE FORJOINT THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 353, at II-
7; Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, 35 I.L.M. at 829, 95; id. at 863-64
(Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting) (quoting Javez Perez de Cuellar, Statement at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, 24 March 1983, in 6(1) DISARMAMENT 91); Advisory Opinion on
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons - Declarations and Separate
Opinions Not Reproduced at 35 I.L.M. 809 (1996), at 1347, 20 (declaration of Presi-
dent Bedjaoui); Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, 35 I.L.M. at 839
(Schwebel, J., dissenting); id. at 904 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting); id. at 931-32
(Koroma, J., dissenting); id. at 834 (Fleischhauer, J., separate opinion).
389. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, at 821-22, 35; see also
id. at 864 (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting); NATO HANDBOOK ON THE MEDICAL ASPECTS
OF NBC DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS, supra note 385, at 1.1.3 §§ 303(c), at 320; NUCLEAR
WEAPONS: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY, supra note 385, at 79-84. It is estimated that only
half of the suffering would be over as of the end of the war itself: "A failure to achieve
[social and economic] viability ... would result in many additional deaths, and much
additional economic, political, and social deterioration. This postwar damage could be
as devastating as the damage from the actual nuclear explosions." THE EFFECTS OF NU-
CLEAR WAR, supra note 387, at 5. See JOHN W. GOFMAN, RADIATION AND HUMAN HEALTH
298-99 (1983) (estimating that the plutonium fallout will cause a total of 104,460 lung
cancer deaths in the United States, and 950,000 world wide). Investigators have also
concluded that the mortality rates during the 1950-1965 atomic testing period stopped
getting better after decades of improvement. When atomic testing was banned, the
mortality rate improved once again. SeeJAY GOULD ET AL., DEADLY DECEIT: Low-LEVEL
RADIATION, HIGH-LEVEL COVER UP 15, 92 (1990); see also Marvin S. Soroos, Preserving the
Atmosphere as a Global Commons, 40 ENVT., Mar. 1998, at 6; UNITED NATIONS SCI. COMMIT-
TEE ON THE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION, IONIZING RADIATION: SOURCES AND BIOLOGI-
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* With escalation, the levels of radiation will increase.390
Outside the courtroom, the United States recognizes the
potential uncontrollability of the effects of nuclear weapons.
This can be seen from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Joint
Pub 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, setting forth the cur-
rent operational planning for the integrated use by U.S. forces
of nuclear weapons in conjunction with conventional weap-
ons:39 "[T]here can be no assurances that a conflict involving
weapons of mass destruction could be controllable or would be
of short duration. Nor are negotiations opportunities and the
capacity for enduring control over military forces clear. '19 2
As noted by Judge Shahabuddeen in his dissent in the Nu-
clear Weapons Advisory Decision, the United States, in ratifying
the Treaty of Tlatelolco, subscribed to the following statement of
preamble as to the indiscriminate and excessive injury caused by
nuclear weapons:
The preamble to the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, Additional
Protocol II of which was signed and ratified by the five [nu-
clear weapons States, including the United States], declared
that the Parties are convinced.
That the incalculable destructive power of nuclear weapons
has made it imperative that the legal prohibition of war
should be strictly observed in practice if the survival of civili-
zation and of mankind itself is to be assured.
That nuclear weapons, whose terrible effects are suffered, in-
discriminately and inexorably, by military forces and civilian
population alike, constitute, through the persistence of the
radioactivity they release, an attack on the integrity of the
human species and ultimately may even render the whole
earth uninhabitable.39 3
CAL EFECrs 19 (1982); Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space, and under Water, 2 I.L.M. 889 (1963); NAT'L ACADEMY OF ScI., NUCLEAR
ARMS CONTROL: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 190-95 (1985). See generally G. T. SEABORG,
KENNEDY, KRUSHCHEV, AND THE TEST BAN (1981).
390. See The Effects of Nuclear War, supra note 387, at 22-25, 81; Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, at 868, 870, 879 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
391. See DOCTRINE FORJOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 355, at i, 1-2; see also
MOXLEY, supra note 7, at 585-605.
392. DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 355, at i, 1-6, 1-7 (em-
phasis omitted).
393. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America ("Treaty of
Tlatelolco"), Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762, 634 U.N.T.S. 762, 6 I.L.M. 521; see also Nu-
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The extreme and disproportionate effects threatened by nu-
clear weapons are acknowledged by the U.S. military in their op-
erational policy, training, and planning. The Nuclear Weapons
Joint Operations Manual states:
US nuclear forces serve to deter the use of WMD ["weapons
of mass destruction," including chemical, biological, and nu-
clear weapons] across the spectrum of military operations.
From a massive exchange of nuclear weapons to limited use
on a regional battlefield, US nuclear capabilities must con-
front an enemy with risks of unacceptable damage and dis-
proportionate loss should the enemy choose to introduce
WMD into a conflict.3 9
4
Similarly:
[S]omeday a nation may, through miscalculation or by delib-
erate choice, employ these weapons.... [A] n opponent may
be willing to risk destruction or disproportionate loss in fol-
lowing a course of action based on perceived necessity,
whether rational or not in a totally objective sense. In such
cases deterrence, even based on the threat of massive destruc-
tion, may fail.3 95
The Navy Judge Advocate, in his reviews of the lawfulness of
the Trident I (C-4) Missile and the Tomahawk Cruise Missile,
recognized the potential uncontrollability of escalation resulting
from the use of nuclear weapons and described the U.S. military
in light of such uncontrollability. With respect to the Trident I,
he stated that "[i]f escalation cannot be controlled, the United
States objective is to maximize the resultant political, economic
and military power of the United States relative to the enemy in
the postwar period in order to preclude enemy domination.
This is to be accomplished by: [following items, labeled a, b,
and c, are completely redacted in the declassified, released ver-
sion] .396 For the Tomahawk, he stated that, if escalation cannot
be controlled, the Tomahawk is meant to cause the
"[d]estruction of those enemy political, economic and military
resources critical to the enemy's postwar power and influence
clear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, at 863-64 (Shahabuddeen, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting from Treaty of Tlatelolco).
394. DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 355, at 1-2 (emphasis
omitted).
395. Id.
396. NAvJAG TRIDENr I, supra note 272, at 7.
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and national and military recovery." '97 This is inconsistent with
the rule which the Navy Judge Advocate acknowledges in the
same document that "[t]hat the only legitimate object which
States should endeavor to accomplish during was is to weaken
the military force of the enemy. "398
As to the radiation effects, the Navy Judge Advocate Gen-
eral, in his review of the lawfulness of the Trident I (C-4) Missile;
and the Tomahawk, noted the significance of where the weapon
detonates, vis-,.-vis the ground. As to the Trident I, he stated,
that " [t] he optimum height of burst against hard targets ... may
result in radioactive fallout contamination downwind from
ground zero."39 9 As to the Tomahawk, he stated that attacking a
hard target with a nuclear Tomahawk requires a close to the
ground air burst, resulting in "significant [post-detonation] radi-
oactive fallout."40
0
C. U.S. Distortion No. 3: That the United States Can Hit Desired
Targets with Great Accuracy
As noted above, the United States has argued that it can
now target nuclear weapons with great accuracy. 40 1 Based on
publicly available information, it similarly appears that at least
some of the North Korean missile delivery systems are capable of
considerable accuracy. 40
2
While such contentions as to the physical accuracy of partic-
ular missile systems may be accurate, they overlook the fact that
such accuracy is merely of a statistical nature, referring to the
fact that modern U.S. missiles are generally capable of extreme
397. U.S. Dep't of Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Memorandum for
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research & Development), Review of the Legality of
the TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile 12 (Jan. 6, 1977) [hereinafter NAwJAG ToMAHAWK],
available at http://www.nuclearweaponslaw.org/FOIA Materials.html (last VISITED Apr.
16, 2004) (formerly restricted data, redacted version obtained under the Freedom of
Information Act by Charles J. Moxley, Jr.).
398. NAwJAG TOMAHAWK, supra note 397, at 17 (emphasis omitted) (citing the St.
Petersburg Declaration renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
under 4000 Grammes Weight, November 29/December 11, 1868, I A,J. INT'L L. Supp.
95 (1907)).
399. JAG TRIDENT I, supra note 272, at 6.
400. NAVYJAG TOMAHAWK, supra note 397, at 6.
401. ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 351, at 71; U.S. ICJ Memorandum/GA
App., supra note 315, at 23.
402. See supra notes 267-72 and accompanying text.
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accuracy.4°3 A high percentage of missiles launched can be ex-
pected to strike within a close distance of their intended
targets.
40 4
However, the accuracy of any particular missile is uncertain
and no one can know where it might end up.4 °5
Variables affecting this matter are legion, including: the
weather; gravitational effects; the accuracy of test or computa-
tional assumptions as to how the missile will perform and as to
the location and nature of the target; the extent to which the
launch was programmed and implemented correctly to reach
the target; the extent to which the mechanical and electronic
equipment in the missile functions as intended; the effect of the
detonation of other nuclear or other weapons on performance;
and the height at which the warhead detonates.4 °6
The United States reportedly achieved an overall accuracy
level of some 82% in the Gulf War with its BG-109 Tomahawk
cruise missiles, but that was only an average, with some missions
403. See Tsipis, supra note 270, at 139; MOXLEY, supra note 45, at 506 n.8 and ac-
companying chart (regarding US weapons' CEPs); see also Kosta Tsipis, Cruise Missiles,
Sci. Am., Feb. 1977, 20-29; 1 THOMAS B. COCHRAN ET AL., NUCLEAR WEAPONS DATABOOK,
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR FORCES AND CAPABILITIES 118, 146 (1984); Nick Cook & John
Boatman, USAFLifts Veil on 'Secret'ACM, 14JANE's DEFENSE WEEKLY 549, no. 13, Sept. 29,
1990; AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile, FAS, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/
bomber/acm.htm; Robert S. Norris & William M. Arkin, US. Strategic Nuclear Forces End
of 1998; Abstract, 55 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, no. 1, Jan. 1999.
404. See David Fulghum, Clashes with Iraq Continue After Heavy Air Strike, AVIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 25, 1993, at 38.
405. See MOXLEY, supra note 45, at 525-27, nn.7-17, and accompanying text; see also
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT To CONGRESS: OPERATION DE-
SERT SToRM: EVALUATION OF THE AIR WAR 5-7 (July 1996); BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Sept. 7, 1998 [hereinafter BBC SUMMARY]; Pakistan - Cruise Missile Found
Near Pakistan Nuclear Test Site, FT ASIA INTELLIGENCE W'IRE, Aug. 24, 1998 [hereinafter
Pakistan - Cruise Missile Found].
406. See ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 351, at 80 (citing the Secretary-
General's 1990 Report on nuclear weapons, at 75, 290); TSIPIS, supra note 270, at
72-76; Ashton B. Carter, Sources of Error and Uncertainty, in MANAGING NUCLEAR OPERA-
TIONS 611-39 (1987). As the United States, through its attorney McNeill, argued to the
ICJ, the effects of nuclear weapons depend on such factors as "the explosive yield and
height of the burst of individual weapons, on the characteristics of their targets, as well
as on climatic and weather conditions," ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 351, at
80 (citing the Secretary-General's 1990 Report of Nuclear Weapons, at 75, 290), and
on "the technology that occasions how much radiation the weapon may release, where,
in relation to the earth's surface it will be detonated, and the military objective at which
it would be targeted." Id. at 89. As to the significance of such factors, McNeill argued,
"These differences, distinctions and variables cannot be ignored; they are critical to the
appropriate legal analysis." Id. at 87.
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achieving a near perfect success rate and one mission obtaining
a rate of only 67%.407
With the U.S. attacks on terrorist bases in Afghanistan and
Sudan in 1998, some missiles reportedly ended up in the wrong
country, for example, Pakistan.
40 8
Similarly, in the 1999 Kosovo operation, there were numer-
ous missile strikes that ended up at the wrong targets, both be-
cause of weapons and human error, including intelligence er-
ror.
409
Delivery of nuclear weapons by bomber, while having the
advantage that a bomber may generally be recalled before releas-
ing its weapons,41 ° is subject to equipment, pilot, and situational
407. See Fulghum, supra note 404, at 38; see also Stanley Kandebo, Operation Desert
Storm-Tomahawk Missiles Excel in First Wartime Use, 134 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH,
no. 3, at 61 (Jan. 21, 1991).
408. See BBC SUMMARY supra note 405; 2nd Unexploded U.S. Missile Found In Paki-
stan, THE COM. APPEAL (Memphis, TN), Aug. 30, 1998, at A2; see alsoJohn Diamond, US
Strikes May Not Be The Last, Warns Pickering, BIRMINGHAM (Ala.) POST, Aug. 22, 1998, at 8;
Ian Mackinnon, Pakistan Defuses US Cruise Missile, THE SCOTSMAN (Edinburgh), Aug. 25,
1998, at 8 [hereinafter Mackinnon, Pakistan]; Pakistan-Cruise Missile Found, supra note
405; Louise Branson, US Bombs "Terrorist Bases," STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Aug. 22.
1998, at 1.
According to a Pakistani foreign ministry spokesman, the two missiles ending up in
Pakistan had been fired from U.S. ships 120 nautical miles off the coast of Pakistan,
purportedly within the country's territorial waters, and landed near the sites where Pa-
kistan had tested nuclear weapons on May 28 and 30, 1998. See Mackinnan, Pakistan,
supra, at 8. Thus, the missiles that went astray had not even been sent a long distance.
A third unexploded warhead with its cruise missile delivery vehicle was reportedly
found in Afghanistan. See BBC SUMMARY, supra note 405 (Taliban said ready to sell
unexploded US cruise missile "to any country").
It is sobering that these deviations from targeting could occur in an operation
where the United States apparently went to great lengths to achieve accuracy and preci-
sion, even to the point, in planning an attack on a chemical plant in Sudan, of model-
ing the "likely plume of [the] attack beforehand, using such factors as weather condi-
tions, the building's structure and properties of the suspected chemicals inside." See
John-Alex Romano, Combating Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reviving the Doc-
trine of a State of Necessity, 87 GEO. L.J. 1023 (Apr. 1999) (quoting Eugene Robinson &
Dana Priest, Reports of U.S. Strikes'Destruction Vary; Afghanistan Damage 'Moderate to Heavy,
Sudan Plant Leveled, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1998, at Al).
409. See As Strikes Mount, So Do Errors, WASH. TIMES, May 11, 1999, at Al [hereinaf-
ter As Strikes Mount]; Joyce Price, Pentagon Regrets "Embassy Error," WASH. TIMES, May 9,
1999, at CIO; Bill Gertz & Rowan Scarborough, Inside the Ring, WASH. TIMES, May 14,
1999, at A9.
410. See DOCTRINE FOR JOINT THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 353, at
13-15; see alsoJohn F. McCarthy, Jr., The Case for the B-i Bomber, I INT'L SECURITY, No. 2,
Fall 1976, 78, 84-85; PAUL BRACKEN, THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR FORCE 6
(1983) ("Never has there been a Soviet-American confrontation during this modern
period ... The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was the highest level alert ever declared by
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error. In U.S. operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. military acci-
dentally bombed a wedding party and a cluster of Canadian
soldiers.41 ' During the recent invasion of Iraq, Iraqi officials
claimed that air strikes hit two crowded Baghdad markets, and a
missile hit a Syrian bus.4 1 2 Stephen Younger, the head of the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, recently stated that poor in-
telligence hampers the effectiveness of precision-guided muni-
tions.4 1 3
While certain of the more modern U.S. aircraft are extraor-
dinarily fast and ostensibly have the capability of eluding radar
detection, aircraft are inherently subject to pursuit, radar and
human error - and hence to substantial risk factors as to accu-
racy of delivery.414 These limitations on accuracy of delivery ob-
viously impose limitations on nuclear operations not present as
to conventional weapons where the implications of weapons go-
ing astray are much less serious.415 Even if the warhead is deliv-
ered accurately at the target, its performance is subject to its cor-
rect functioning.41 6 No doubt the accuracy of delivery of the
the United States."). At the height of the crisis, the U.S. nuclear alert level was raised to
Defense Condition 2, one stage before full thermonuclear war. Strategic Air Command
authorized nuclear-armed B-52 bombers to fly past their fail-safe points to preplanned
targets in the Soviet Union before being recalled. See id.
411. Max Boot, Sparing Civilians, Buildings and Even the Enemy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
2003. The article states that even smart bombs miss their targets "7 percent to 10 per-
cent of the time." Id.
412. See id.
413. See Roxana Tiron, Poor Intelligence Hampers Precision Weapon Performance, NAT'L
DEF., Mar. 1, 2004.
414. See As Strikes Mount, supra note 409; see also Price, supra note 409; KOSTA TsiPIs,
supra note 267, at 68-76, 114-15, 121-296; THE DOCTRINE FORJOINT THEATER NUCLEAR
OPERATIONS, supra note 353, at 13-15.
Reportedly the "success level of the United States' most advanced fighters" is less
than the 83% overall success rate that the Navy attained with its BG-109 Tomahawk
cruise missiles (conventional) during the 1991 Gulf War. See Fulghum, supra note 404,
at 38.
415. See KosTA TsIPIs, supra note 267, at 68-76, 114-15, 121-296; see also INTERNA-
TIONAL PHYSICIANS FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR IWAR, supra note 386 (quoted in
Peter Weiss, et al., Draft Memorial in Support of the Application by the World Health Organiza-
tion for an Advisory Opinion by the Court of International Justice of the Legality of the Use of
Nuclear Weapons Under International Law, Including the WH. 0. Constitution, reprinted in 4
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 721, 729-32 (1994)).
416. See KOSTA TsIPiS, supra note 267, at 68-76.
The NavyJudge Advocate General, in his review of the lawfulness of the Tomahawk
Cruise Missile, acknowledged that targeting of the missile involves questions as to the
"probability" of the missile performing as planned, all subject to the unknown effects of
possible "enemy action." Navy JAG Tomahawk, supra note 397, at 5.
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North Korean systems are subject to at least as much uncertainty.
D. U.S. Distortion No. 4: That the Effects of Nuclear Weapons Are
No Worse than Those of Conventional Weapons
The United States took the position before the ICJ that the
effects of nuclear weapons are essentially comparable to the ef-
fects of conventional weapons. McNeill argued:
It is true that the use of nuclear weapons would have an ad-
verse collateral effect on human health and both the natural
and physical environments, but so too can the use of conven-
tional weapons. Obviously, World Wars I and II, as well as the
1990-1991 conflict resulting from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,
dramatically demonstrated that conventional war can inflict
terrible collateral damage to the environment. The fact is
that armed conflict of any kind can cause widespread, sus-
tained destruction; the Court need not examine scientific evi-
dence to take judicial notice of this evident truth.417
This position, as applied to North Korea, would seem to be
as misguided as it is unfounded. It would seem to be indisputa-
ble that nuclear weapons threaten far greater damages than con-
ventional weapons. The ICJ described the "unique characteris-
tics" of nuclear weapons:
The Court ... notes that nuclear weapons are explosive de-
vices whose energy results from the fusion or fission of the
atom. By its very nature, that process, in nuclear weapons as
they exist today, releases not only immense quantities of heat
and energy, but also powerful and prolonged radiation. Ac-
cording to the material before the Court, the first two causes
of damage are vastly more powerful than the damage caused
by other weapons, while the phenomenon of radiation is said
to be peculiar to nuclear weapons. These characteristics
render the nuclear weapon potentially catastrophic. The de-
structive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in
417. ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 351, at 71.
While the damage caused by the Iraqi attack on Kuwait caused extensive environ-
mental damage, within less than ten years such effects have largely been dissipated. See
Tiffani Y. Lee, Environmental Liability Provisions under the U.N. Compensation Commission:
Remarkable Achievement with Room for Improved Deterrence, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. Rav. 209
(1998); Kyle Pope, Prognosis Good for Oil Fields, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 23, 1991; Kuwait:
Pollution Control Equipment Market, Industry Sector Analysis, Dept. of State, 1998 (for
samples of the Kuwaiti damage assessment).
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either space or time. They have the potential to destroy all
civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet.
The radiation released by a nuclear explosion would affect
health, agriculture, natural resources and demography over a
very wide area. Further, the use of nuclear weapons would be
a serious danger to future generations. Ionizing radiation has
the potential to damage the future environment, food and
marine ecosystem, and to cause genetic defects and illness in
future generations.
36. In consequence... it is imperative for the Court to take
account of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and
in particular their destructive capacity, their capacity to cause
untold human suffering, and their ability to cause damage to
generations to come.4 1 8
The effects of nuclear weapons were described further in
dissenting opinions of individual Judges of the ICJ. Judge Weer-
amantry stated that "[a] 5-megaton weapon would represent
more explosive power than all of the bombs used in World War
I1 and a twenty-megaton bomb more than all of the explosives
used in all of the wars in the history of mankind."41 9 Judge
Weeramantry also noted the electromagnetic pulse as a further
effect of the use of nuclear weapons, stating that this very sudden
and intensive burst of energy throws all electronic devices out of
action, including communications lines, such as nuclear com-
mand and control centers. The judge noted that the electro-
magnetic pulse caused by a nuclear explosion of some 400 kilo-
meters altitude "can instantly put out of service the greater part
of semiconductor electronic equipment in a large country, such
as the United States, as well as a large part of its energy distribu-
tion networks, without other effects being felt on the ground."42
418. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, at 1 34-35, 35 I.L.M. at
821-22; see also NATO HANDBOOK ON THE MEDICAL ASPECTS OF NBC DEFENSIVE OPERA-
TIONS, supra note 385, at 1.1 § 102(a); INTERNATIONAL PHYSICLANS FOR THE PREVENTION
OF NUCLEAR WAR, supra note 386; Carl Sagan, Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: Some
Policy Implications, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 257, 273 (Winter 1983/1984). See generally The Effects
of Nuclear War, supra note 387, at 16-17 (it is estimated that only half of the suffering
would be over as of the end of the war itself. "A failure to achieve [social and economic]
viability .. .would result in many additional deaths, and much additional economic,
political, and social deterioration. This post war damage could be as devastating as the
damage from the actual nuclear explosions"). Id. at 5.
419. 35 I.L.M. at 887 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
420. Id. at 873 (citing DICTIONNAIRE ENCYCLOPEDIQUE D'ELECTRONIQUE).
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Judge Weeramantry discussed the long-term nature of the
effects of radiation:
The effects upon the eco-system extend, for practical pur-
poses, beyond the limits of all foreseeable historical time.
The half-life of one of the by-products of a nuclear explosion
- plutonium 239 - is over twenty thousand years. With a
major nuclear exchange it would require several of these
"half-life" periods before the residuary radioactivity becomes
minimal. Half-life is "the period in which the rate of radioac-
tive emission by a pure sample falls by a factor of two ......
The following table gives the half-lives of the principal radio-
active elements that result from a nuclear test.
Nuclide Half-life
Cesium 137 30.2 years
Strontium 90 28.6 years
Plutonium 239 24,100 years
Plutonium 240 6,570 years
Plutonium 241 14.4 years
Americium 241 432 years
Theoretically, this could run to tens of thousands of years. At
any level of discourse, it would be safe to pronounce that no
one generation is entitled, for whatever purpose, to inflict
such damage on succeeding generations.4 21
With respect to the argument that Hiroshima and Nagasaki
show that nuclear war is survivable, Judge Weeramantry noted
not only that the bombs used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were
not of more than 15 kilotons explosive power, but also that the
use of those bombs ended the war, occurred in a context where
the target country was not a nuclear power, and there were no
other nuclear powers to come to Japan's assistance, all situations
unlikely to characterize any future use of such weapons.422
Judge Koroma stated:
According to the material before the Court, it is estimated
that more than 40,000 nuclear warheads exist in the world
today with a total destructive capacity around a million times
greater than that of the bomb which devastated Hiroshima.
A single nuclear bomb detonated over a large city is said to be
421. Id. at 888 (quoting 9 ENcyc. BRITANNICA MICROPAEDIA (1992 ed.); id. at 893
(citing RADIOECOLOGY (Holm ed., 1995)).
422. Id. at 895.
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capable of killing more than 1 million people. These weap-
ons, if used massively, could result in the annihilation of the
human race and the extinction of human civilization. Nu-
clear weapons are thus not just another kind of weapon; they
are considered the absolute weapon and are far more perva-
sive in terms of their destructive effects than any conventional
weapon.4 23
Judge Shahabuddeen quoted Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, to similar effect:
The world's stockpile of nuclear weapons today is equivalent
to 16 billion tons of TNT. As against this, the entire devasta-
tion of the Second World War was caused by the expenditure
of no more than 3 million tons of munitions. In other words,
we possess a destructive capacity of more than a 5,000 times
what caused 40 to 50 million deaths not too long ago. It
should suffice to kill every man, woman and child 10 times
over.
424
The U.S. Joint Chief of Staff's Joint Nuclear Operations man-
ual recognizes that "the use of nuclear weapons represents a sig-
nificant escalation from conventional warfare. ' '425 The manual
states: "The fundamental differences between a potential nu-
clear war and previous military conflicts involve the speed, scope,
and degree of destruction inherent in nuclear weapons employ-
ment, as well as the uncertainty of negotiating opportunities and
enduring control over military forces."4 26 Since nuclear weapons
have greater destructive potential, in many instances they may be
inappropriate. 427 The Joint Nuclear Operations manual further
recognizes: "The immediate and prolonged effects of WMD-
including blast, thermal radiation, prompt (gamma and neu-
423. 35 l.L.M. at 934 (Koroma, J., dissenting).
424. 35 I.L.M. at 863-64 (Shahabuddeen,J., dissenting) (quoting de Cuellar, supra
note 388, at 91).
425. DOCTRINE FORJOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 355, at II-1, 11-6, 11-7.
426. Id. at 1-6. The manual further stated:
Terminating a global war involving the use of large numbers of WMD on both
sides and the degradation and or destruction of their central means of control
could be vastly more difficult than ending a theater or regional nuclear con-
flict involving the relatively constrained use of a limited number of nuclear
weapons. In the latter case, war-termination strategies may more readily lead
to a cessation of hostilities, assuming that the belligerents' interests in war
termination are mutual.
Id.
427. DOCTRINE FOR JOINT THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 353, at v-vi.
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tron) and residual radiation-pose unprecedented physical and
psychological problems for combat forces and noncombatant
populations alike."428
The U.S. Joint Chief of Staff's Joint Theater Nuclear Operations
manual similarly states:
Nuclear weapons are unique in this analysis [as to "the long-
standing targeting rules of military necessity, proportionality,
and avoidance of collateral damage and unnecessary suffer-
ing] only in their greater destructive potential (although they
also different from conventional weapons in that they pro-
duce radiation and electromagnetic effects and, potentially,
radioactive fallout)429
E. U.S. Distortion No. 5: That the Radiation Effects of Nuclear
Weapons Are Not Relevant to the Lawfulness of the
Use of the Weapons
The United States contends that the radiation effects of nu-
clear weapons need not be taken into consideration in evaluat-
ing whether the use ot the weapons would be lawful since radia-
tion is a natural effect of nuclear weapons, not something inten-
tionally added by the United States to make nuclear weapons
more destructive. In its memorandum to the ICJ, the United
States argued:
[The prohibition against unnecessary suffering] was intended
to preclude weapons designed to increase the injury or suffer-
ing of the persons attacked beyond that necessary to accom-
plish the military objective. It does not prohibit weapons that
may cause great injury or suffering if the use of the weapon is
necessary to accomplish the military mission. For example, it
does not prohibit the use of anti-tank munitions which must
penetrate armor by kinetic-energy or incendiary effects, even
though this may well cause severe and painful burn injuries to
the tank crew. By the same token, it does not prohibit the use
of nuclear weapons, even though such weapons can produce
severe and painful injuries.4 30
428. DocTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 355, at 11-7.
429. DocTRINE FOR JOINT THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 353, at I-1
(emphasis omitted).
430. U.S. ICJ Memorandum/GA App., supra note 315, at 420 (citing LAw OF LAND
WARFARE, supra note 311, at 18). The memorandum noted that the prohibition against
unnecessary suffering has been applied, for example, to lances with barbed tips and
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U.S. attorney McNeill stated the point specifically in oral ar-
gument: "The unnecessary suffering principle prohibits the use
of weapons designed specifically to increase the suffering of per-
sons attacked beyond that necessary to accomplish a particular
military objective."43 '
By this position, the United States in effect is telling North
Korea that under international law, it may use nuclear weapons
without considering the radiation effects of such weapons upon
civilians, enemy forces, neutrals, or anyone else.
The United States cited no support for this requirement,
which appears to be contrary to the United States' general state-
ment of the requirements of the rule of necessity, as well as to its
statements of the rules of discrimination and proportionality. 2
It would seem clear, as a matter of law, that, in evaluating the
lawfulness of a use of nuclear weapons, a State is required to
consider all of the effects, including the radiation effects.
F. U.S. Distortion No. 6: That Only Specifically Intended Effects of
Nuclear Weapons Are Unlawful
The United States argued before the ICJ that uses of nu-
clear weapons causing unlawful effects would only be unlawful if
the State using the weapons specifically intended the unlawful
effects. U.S. attorney McNeill stated in his oral argument:
The argument that international law prohibits, in all cases,
the use of nuclear weapons appears to be premised on the
incorrect assumption that every use of every type of nuclear
weapon will necessarily share certain characteristics which
contravene the law of armed conflict. Specifically, it appears
to be assumed that any use of nuclear weapons would inevita-
bly escalate into a massive strategic nuclear exchange, result-
ing automatically in the deliberate destruction of the popula-
tion centers of opposing sides.4 33
The U.S. argument that the destruction of an enemy's pop-
ulation center must be "deliberate" to be unlawful appears to
assume that violations of the law of war must be intentional, as
bullets that are irregularly shaped, scored or coated with a substance that would unnec-
essarily inflame a wound. U.S. ICJ Memorandum/GA App., supra note 315, at 420 n.65.
431. ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 351, at 72.
432. See supra notes 315-50 and accompanying text.
433. ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 351, at 68 (emphasis added).
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opposed to grossly negligent or reckless. Such a limitation, as
applied to North Korea or any State, would appear to greatly
limit the scope of the law of armed conflict. This argument is
also contrary to settled law. As the Nuremberg proceedings ex-
emplified, individuals, not States, are potentially put in prison or
executed.43 4 States can, and historically have been, subject to
damages and reparations, but, in contemporary international
law, the focus of war crimes trials is on the responsible individu-
als. 4 3 5
The United States recognized a very broad range of poten-
tial criminal liability of individuals for war crimes, including not
only for activity of an intentional nature, but also for reckless,
grossly negligent, and even negligent conduct. Specifically, the
United States has recognized that States are subject to war
crimes culpability without regard to mental state;436 individuals
are subject to culpability based not only on recklessness, but also
on gross negligence; 437 and commanders are subject to culpabil-
ity based on mere negligence or something approaching it.438
Thus, The Air Force Manual on International Law goes on to
state that mens rea, or a guilty mind, at the level of purposeful
behavior or intention or at least gross negligence, is required for
individual, as opposed to State, criminal responsibility.439 The
434. See A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 311, at 15-2; see also IAN BROWNIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 150-71 (1963), Matthew Lipp-
man, Crimes Against Humanity, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 171, 189-201 (1997) (Interna-
tional Law and Human Rights Edition); Mark Allan Gray, The International Crime of Eco-
cide, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 215, 265 (1996) (citing Geoff Gilbert, The Criminal Responsibil-
ity of States, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 345, 357, 366 (1990)); Report of the Commission to
the General Assembly on the work of its forty-sixth session, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), at 348-49.
435. See BROWNIE, supra note 434, at 133-49; TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VI-
ETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 82-88 (1970).
436. See A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 311, at 15-2
437. See id. at 15-3, 15-8 n.13 (citing JAMES MOLONY SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR
RIGHTS 57, 58 (1947)).
438. See id. at 15-2 to 15-3; see also THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 311, at
178; THE A.F. COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 8-1; THE NAVAL/MARINE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 6-5, 6-5 n.13 (citing United States v. Wil-
helm List et al., 9 TWC 127 (1950)); CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YuGoSLAVIA 361, 362 (1996)
(citing The High Command Case, 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (1949) (This case is also
known as United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb)).
439. THE A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 311, at 15-2, 15-8 n.13 (citing
SPAIGHT, supra note 437, at 57-58 (1947)).
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manual quotes Spaight's statement of the rule:
In international law, as in municipal law intention to break
the law-mens rea or negligence so gross as to be the
equivalent of criminal intent is the essence of the offense. A
bombing pilot cannot be arraigned for an error of judgment
... it must be one which he or his superiors either knew to be
wrong, or which was, in se, so palpably and unmistakably a
wrongful act that only gross negligence or deliberate blind-
ness could explain their being unaware of its wrongness.440
As to commander liability, a commander is responsible to main-
tain and prevent violations of the law of war by subordinates and
can be liable based on such violations.
The Air Force Manual on International Law states that
"[c]ommand responsibility for acts committed by subordinates
arises when the specific wrongful acts in question are knowingly
ordered or encouraged. 44' The manual states that the com-
mander is also responsible "if he has actual knowledge, or
should have had knowledge" that his subordinates "have or are
about to commit criminal violations, and he culpably fails to take
reasonably necessary steps to ensure compliance with the law
and punish violators thereof."44 2
The Naval/Marine Commander's Handbook quotes the United
States Military Tribunal's decision in The Hostages case for the
proposition that the commander is charged with available infor-
mation even if not personally aware of same:
Want of knowledge of the contents of reports made to him
(i.e., to the commander general) is not a defense. Reports to
commanding generals are made for their special benefit. Any
failure to acquaint themselves with the contents of such re-
ports, or a failure to require additional reports where inade-
quacy appears on their face, constitutes a dereliction of duty
which he cannot use in his behalf.44 3
The handbook states that the responsibility of a command-
ing officer "may be based solely upon inaction" and that it is "not
always necessary to establish that a superior knew, or must be
440. Id. at 15-8 n.13.
441. Id. at 15-3, 15-9 n.23 (citations omitted).
442. Id. at 10, 15-2 to 15-3; see also LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 311, at 178.
443. NAVAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 6-5 n.13 (quot-
ing United States v. Wilhelm List et al., 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREM-
BERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 127 (1950)).
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presumed to have known of the offense committed by his subor-
dinates. '4 44 "While a commander may delegate some or all of
his authority, he cannot delegate responsibility for the conduct
of the forces he commands. 445
In upholding the defendant's conviction in the Yamashita
case, the U.S. Supreme Court ostensibly saw commander respon-
sibility as a way of dealing with the risk of wanton acts by troops
against protected persons:
The question then is whether the law of war imposes on an
army commander a duty to take such appropriate measures as
are within his power to control the troops under his com-
mand for the prevention of the specified acts which are viola-
tions of the law of war and which are likely to attend the occu-
pation of hostile territory by an uncontrolled soldiery, and
whether he may be charged with personal responsibility for
his failure to take such measures when violations result. It is
evident that the conduct of military operations by troops
whose excesses are unrestrained by the orders of or efforts of
their commanders would almost certainly result in violations
which it is the purpose of the law of war to prevent.446
It is also clear that the law of armed conflict generally recog-
nizes recklessness and other mental states less than strict inten-
tionality as a basis for war crimes liability.447 The Geneva con-
ventions extensively provide for criminal culpability for viola-
tions committed willfully, 448 a state of mind broadly recognized
444. Id. at 6 n.13.
445. Id. at 6-5.
446. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946).
447. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on Protocol Ad-
ditional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1997, Part V: Execution
of the Conventions and of This Protocol: Section I-Repression of Breaches of the
Conventions and of this Protocol, Art. 85 - Repression of Breaches of This Protocol,
available at www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) [hereinafter International
Committee of the Red Cross].
448. See id. at 3474; Amnesty International - Report - IOR 40/10/98 May
1998 United Nations, The International Criminal Court Making the Right Choices -
Part V Recommendations to the Diplomatic Conference, available at www.amnesty.it/
campaign/icc/library/aidocs/IOR401098.htrml (last visited Apr. 16, 2004); see also THE
A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 311, at 15-1 to 15-2; 15-8 n.12 (quoting Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, and other Geneva Conventions).
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as encompassing recklessness. 4 49 The law of armed conflict simi-
larly recognizes criminal culpability for acts of wantonness and
of "wanton destruction," acts also not reaching the level of strict
intentionality. 4
5 °
Similarly, in imposing war crimes culpability for "an attack
which may be expected to cause" certain impermissible effects,
as prescribed, for example, in Protocol I to the Geneva Conven-
tions, Article 51(5), or for acts that are "intended, or may be
expected, to cause" certain impermissible effects, as prescribed,
in Protocol I, Article 35(3), the law again recognizes potential
culpability for war crimes committed with a mental element of
less than strict intentionality.4 1
While the ICJ did not address this issue in its Nuclear Weap-
ons Advisory Decision, several of the judges in their individual
decisions did. Judge Weeramantry, in his dissenting opinion, re-
jected the notion that there is no State responsibility for the ef-
fects of nuclear weapons - "by-products" or "collateral damage"
- that are not specifically intended:
Such results are known to be the necessary consequences of
the use of the weapon. The author of the act causing these
consequences cannot in any coherent legal system avoid legal
responsibility for causing them, any less than a man careering
in a motor vehicle at a hundred and fifty kilometers per hour
449. See International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 447.
450. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Statute of the
International Tribunal, as amended May 13, 1998, adopted May 25, 1993, art. 3(b), avail-
able at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004);Jor-
dan J. Paust, International Law Association - American Branch: Committee on a Permanent
International Criminal Court: The Preparatory Committee's "Definition of Crimes" - War
Crimes, 8 ClaM. L.F. 431, 438-41 (1997) (emphasis omitted) (citing U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
95/15 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1523); Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 & Add. 1
(1993), Annex, arts. 2(d), 3(b); Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5-I (Int'l Trib. for
Former Yugo., Indictment, July 24, 1995), at 27, 41, 44; Report of the International Law
Commission on Its Second Session, June 5-July 29, 1950, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 12,
at 11-14, at 99, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950); 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALs 757 (1948);
Report of Justice Robert H.Jackson to the President of the United States, released June
7, 1945, reprinted in PAUST ET AL., INT'L CRIMINAL LAw at 1027; Instructions for the Gov-
ernment of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24,
1863, arts. 16, 44, [Lieber Code]; Responsibilities Commission of the Paris Peace Con-
ference, List of War Crimes (1919); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, adopted Aug. 12,
1949, art. 50-51, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf (last visited
Apr. 16, 2004).
451. Paust, supra note 450, at 438-41 (citations and emphasis omitted).
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through a crowded market street can avoid responsibility for
the resulting deaths on the ground that he did not intend to
kill the particular person who died.4" 2
Judge Weeramantry added: "The plethora of literature on
the consequences of the nuclear weapon is so much part of com-
mon universal knowledge today that no disclaimer of such
knowledge would be credible."453
To the argument that the rule of moderation - the prohi-
bition of the use of arms "calculated to cause unnecessary suffer-
ing" - requires specific intent ("calculation"), Judge Weera-
mantry cited the "well-known legal principle that the doer of an
act must be taken to have intended its natural and foreseeable
consequences. '454 He also stated that reading into the require-
ment such a requirement of specific intent would not "take into
account the spirit and underlying rationale of the provision - a
method of interpretation particularly inappropriate to the con-
struction of a humanitarian instrument. 4 55 He added that nu-
clear weapons "are indeed deployed 'in part with a view to utiliz-
ing the destructive effects of radiation and fall-out.' "456
G. U.S. Distortion No. 7: That A Potential Use Of A Nuclear
Weapon Could Only Be Deemed Unlawful In Advance If It Were
Clear That It Would "Necessarily " And "Inevitably " Lead To
Impermissible Collateral Effects
The United States argued to the ICJ that the unlawful ef-
fects of the use of nuclear weapons would have to be necessary
and inevitable effects of such weapons for the use to be unlawful.
As noted above, U.S. attorney McNeill argued:
The argument that international law prohibits, in all cases,
the use of nuclear weapons appears to be premised on the
incorrect assumption that every use of every type of nuclear
weapon will necessarily share certain characteristics which
contravene the law of armed conflict. Specifically, it appears
to be assumed that any use of nuclear weapons would inevita-
bly escalate into a massive strategic nuclear exchange, result-
452. 35 I.L.M at 901 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
453. Id.
454. Id. at 48.
455. Id.
456. Id. (citing Ian Brownlie, Some Legal Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 14
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 445 (1965)).
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ing automatically in the deliberate destruction of the popula-
tion centers of opposing sides.4 57
This formulation of the law gives North Korea great leeway
to use nuclear weapons without considering unlawful effects that
are likely but not inevitable, essentially taking such effects out of
the equation in evaluating the lawfulness of a particular use of
nuclear weapons.
The United States, however, cites no legal authority for so
limiting the applicable law and there would appear to be none.
The rules of discrimination, necessity, and proportionality, as ar-
ticulated by the United States itself, contain no such require-
ment that unlawful effects be necessary and inevitable.45
To the contrary, the United States has recognized that the
rules of discrimination, necessity, and proportionality are rules
of reason,459 subject to application on an objective not a subjec-
tive basis. 46 0 As such, the rules are to be applied in light of all
reasonably available information and based on what is reasona-
ble in the circumstances.
When considering the meaning and requirements of the
rules of discrimination, necessity, and proportionality, the
United States appears essentially to have taken the position that
unlawful effects that are likely should be taken into considera-
tion,"' obviously a far more demanding standard than necessity
and inevitability. In its memorandum to the ICJ, the United
States argued:
Whether an attack with nuclear weapons would be dispropor-
tionate depends entirely on the circumstances, including the
nature of the enemy threat, the importance of destroying the
objective, the character, size and likely effects of the device,
and the magnitude of the risk to civilians. Nuclear weapons
are not inherently disproportionate.462
457. ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 351, at 68.
458. See supra notes 340-44, 367-68 and accompanying text.
459. See MOXLEY, supra note 7, at 43-44, 61-62, 65.
460. See MOXLEY, supra note 7, at 62; NAVAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK,
supra note 311, at 6-5, 6-5 n.12.
461. See supra notes 325-50 and accompanying text.
462. U.S. ICJ Memorandum/GA App., supra note 315, at 416; LAW OF LAND WTAR-
FARE, supra note 311, at 5.
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H. U.S. Distortion No. 8: That Only Direct Effects Need
Be Considered
The United States further takes the position that only the
direct or "automatic" effects of the use of nuclear weapons need
be considered.463 This position appears to give considerable lee-
way to North Korea and other States to use nuclear weapons
without consideration of the likely indirect effects, such as es-
calatory uses of biological, chemical, and/or nuclear weapons by
one's adversary or its allies or indeed by oneself in preemptive or
actual response to one's adversary or its allies.
The United States provides no legal authority for limiting
the relevant effects to those that are automatic and there would
appear to be no such authority. To the contrary, the law seems
clear that all possible effects that may reasonably be anticipated
must be considered.464
I. U.S. Distortion No. 9: That the Collateral Killing of Civilians Is
Lawful as Long as the Civilians Were Not Targeted "As Such"
The United States argued before the ICJ that collateral in-
jury to civilians incidental to an attack on a military target is ac-
ceptable as long as the civilians are not targeted "as such. 465
The United States argued that the rule of civilian immunity
"would not be violated by the use of nuclear weapons to attack
targets that constitute legitimate military objectives .... 466
The Air Force Manual on International Law quotes the articula-
tion of this rule - "[t]hat it is prohibited to launch attacks
against the civilian population as such" 67 - from United Na-
tions Resolution 2444 (XXIII), recognized by the United States
as "an accurate declaration of existing customary law. 4 68
The Navy Judge Advocate General, in his review of the law-
463. ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 351, at 68 (emphasis added).
464. NAVAL/MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 6-5, 6-5 n.12;
MOXLEY, supra note 7, at 43-44, 61-62, 65.
465. U.S. ICJ Memorandum/GA App., supra note 315, at 415-16; LAW OF LAND
WARFARE, supra note 311, at 4.
466. Id. at 416.
467. THE A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAw, supra note 311, at 5-7 (emphasis added).
468. Id. (citing Arthur Rovine, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 118, 122-25 (1973) (quoting DOD, General Coun-
sel, Letter to the Effect that Resolution 2444 is "declaratory of existing customary inter-
national law")).
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fulness of the Trident I (C-4) Missile, stated the U.S. memorably,
"Nuclear attack planning is not directed towards civilian popula-
tion or residential structures per se, although substantial injury/
damage to population and residential structures may result from
targeting to accomplish [the national strategic objectives pur-
sued by employment of the weapons] ."469
This argument, if valid, would give North Korea wide leeway
in killing civilians through attacks on military targets. However,
this interpretation of the limited scope of civilian immunity is
questionable.
The "as such" principle is based on the medieval doctrine of
double effect, whereby necessary and foreseen but unintended
evil effects of an otherwise good action are accepted on the
ground that they were not intended.47 °
This doctrine, useful as it may be as a philosophical matter
for distinguishing between various kinds of actions, seems fatally
anachronistic when made to bear the weight of the lawfulness of
nuclear weapons use. The extreme destruction likely to result
from nuclear weapons ostensibly has a legal and moral content
transcending the niceties of intentionality. In any event, to the
extent intentionality is relevant; the principles of commander
and other individual liability would seem to trump this medieval
doctrine.
This over-used and poorly understood doctrine even by its
own terms does not appear to justify the use of nuclear weapons.
One of the elements of the doctrine is that the actor does not
use the evil effect as an end or as a means to an end.4 7 ' Yet the
United States, like other nuclear nations, is not only threatening,
but also, in the case of use, would be using, the "evil effect," the
469. Navy JAG Trident I, supra note 271, at 7-8.
470. See MOXLEY, supra note 7, at 363-65 nn.43-45, 387-88, nn.2-3 and accompany-
ing text; see also id. at 353-66, 387-96; ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I-II,
Quest. 64, art. 7; Stephen R. Latham, Aquinas and Morphine: Notes on Double Effect at the
End of Life, 1 DEPAULJ. HEALTH CARE L. 625, 633 (1997); D. W. BowEr-r, SELF-DEFENCE
IN INT'L LAW 10 (1958).
471. See MOXLEY, supra note 7, at 388-89 nn.3-5 and accompanying text; see also
AUSTIN FAGOTHEY, S.J., RIGHT AND REASON, ETHICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 107-08
(1963); MICHAEL WALZER,JUST AND UNJUST WARS, A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 129, 153 (1968) (citing DOUGHERTY, GENERAL ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE MORAL LIFE ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 65-66
(1959)); John C. Ford, S.J., The Morality of Obliteration Bombing, in WAR AND MORALITY
(Richard Wasserstrom ed., 1970).
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excessive and indiscriminate injury to the enemy's non-combat-
ants and other protected persons and objects, since the doctrine
of deterrence by its terms threatens such excessive and dispro-
portionate effects.
4 7 2
As stated previously, the Joint Chief of Staff's Joint Nuclear
Operations manual states that "the US nuclear capabilities must
confront an enemy with risks of unacceptable damage and dis-
proportionate loss should the enemy choose to introduce WMD
into a conflict"473 and that the adversary is in the position of
"risk[ing] destruction or disproportionate loss. '4 74
The principle of double effect also includes a requirement
of proportionality between the evil effect and the direct effect,
here the achieving of the military objective.4 75 Accordingly, the
principle of double effect, on this basis as well, would be unavail-
able to provide a legal justification for the effects of the use of
nuclear weapons unless the proportionality rule could be com-
plied with.
Hence, the "as such" rule, based not only upon its terms but
also upon its underlying rationale and the developments in
weapons and law since the Middle Ages, is ostensibly not applica-
ble to nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. The estab-
lished substantive rules of law, with their requirements as to
mental state, govern.
Nuclear weapons will have effects on protected persons and
objects. The Navy Judge Advocate General, in his review of the
lawfulness of the Tomahawk Cruise Missile, stated: "Collateral
fatalities/injuries associated with a nuclear warhead attack
against military or industrial targets will result."
4 76
J. U.S. Distortion No. 10: That Nuclear Weapons May Lawfully Be
Used in Reprisal
The United States argued before the ICJ that, even if the
472. See DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 355, at I-1, 1-2;
MICHAEL WALZER, supra note 471, at 153, 273-83 (1968); FACOTHEY, supra note 471, at
113 n.l.
473. DOCTRINE FOR JoINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 355, at I-1 (emphasis
omitted).
474. Id. at 1-2.
475. See MOXLEY, supra note 7, at 353-67; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, cmt. 3,
at 14-15 (A.L.I. 1985).
476. Navy JAG Tomahawk, supra note 397, at 7.
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use of nuclear weapons were deemed per se unlawful, such weap-
ons could still be used in reprisal:
Even if it were to be concluded-as we clearly have not-that
the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be unlawful, the
customary law of reprisal permits a belligerent to respond to
another party's violation of the law of armed conflict by itself
resorting to what otherwise would be unlawful conduct.4 7 7
While the United States recognized that a reprisal must be
proportionate to the other side's violation, it impliedly argued
that many uses of nuclear weapons could satisfy such a require-
ment and constitute a lawful reprisal. This position gives great
leeway to North Korea and other States as to the circumstances
in which nuclear weapons might lawfully be used. This position
is not legally tenable. As discussed above, the use of a weapon
cannot satisfy the test of proportionality if the effects of the
477. ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 351, at 75. See A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L
LAW, supra note 311, at 10-3, 10-6 n.12 (quoting United States v. Ohlendorf, 4 TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 493 (1950)); A.F. COM-
MANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 8-1; LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 311, at
177; Col. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, Taming Shiva: Applying International Law to Nu-
clear Operations, 42 A.F. L. REV. 157 (1997).
Ironically, to an extent MAD is still U.S. policy. The U.S. position is that it is enti-
tled to target civilians in circumstances when reprisals are appropriate. Col. Charles J.
Dunlap, Jr. (USAF), Judge Advocate, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base,
Nebraska, in a 1997 article, stated:
Legal advisors should likewise be aware that while the U.S. does not target
populations per se, it reserves the right to do so under the limited circum-
stances of belligerent reprisal. The U.S. (along with other declared nuclear
powers) insists that Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions does not apply to
nuclear weapons. Hence, prohibitions contained in Protocol I forbidding re-
prisals against civilians are not, in the U.S. view, applicable to nuclear opera-
tions.
Id. at 163.
Secretary of Defense Perry described MAD:
I would liken MAD to two men holding revolvers and standing about 10 yards
away and pointing their revolvers at each others' head, and the revolvers are
loaded, cocked, their fingers are on the trigger, and then to make matters
worse they're shouting insults at each other. And that characterized MAD,
which was what we had to control this arms race-this nuclear terror during
all the periods of the Cold War.
Secretary of Defense William Perry & General John Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Defense Department Briefing, COMPASS NEWSWIRE, Sept. 22, 1994.
478. See U.S. ICJ Memorandum/GA App., supra note 315, at 30-31; see also ICJ
Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 351, at 75; A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note
311, at 10-3, 10-4, 10-5; NAv./MARINE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 6-17,
6-18 (including a similar list).
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weapon cannot be controlled.4 79 In addition, the action taken in
reprisal must be "taken in the last resort, in order to prevent the
adversary from behaving illegally in the future"4 0 and "may not
significantly exceed the adversary's violation either in violence
or effect."48
The probabilities are overwhelming that a second use of nu-
clear weapons would be designed to punish the enemy and, not
incidentally, in the case of a substantial nuclear adversary, to use
one's own nuclear assets before they could be preemptively
struck by the adversary, and to attempt to preemptively strike the
adversary's nuclear assets (many of which would likely be "co-
located" with civilian targets) before they could be used. Even
assuming adequate command and control, crucial decisions
would have to be made within a very short time and would likely
be dictated largely by existing war plans contemplating nuclear
weapons use. The notion of a second strike as limited to the
legitimate objectives of reprisal seems oxymoronic.
In addition, the United States, while it disputes the applica-
bility to nuclear weapons of the limitations upon reprisals im-
posed by Protocol 1,482 recognizes that the law of armed conflict,
including that as to reprisals, is subject to the limitations inher-
ent in the purposes of the law of armed conflict, such as preserv-
ing civilization and the possibility of the restoration of the peace,
purposes that would likely be exceeded by the use of nuclear
weapons.
Even if it were assumed that certain second uses of nuclear
weapons, although otherwise unlawful, might be legitimized as
reprisals, such legitimization, like the lawfulness of the limited
use of a small number low-yield nuclear weapons in remote areas
asserted by the United States before the ICJ, would only affect a
small portion of the potential uses for nuclear weapons contem-
plated by U.S. policy and planning. It would leave unaffected
the unlawfulness of the vast bulk of potential uses and virtually
479. See supra note 350 and accompanying text.
480. A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAw, supra note 311, at 10-3, 10-6 n.12 (quoting United
States v. Ohlendor, 4 TRILus OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBU-
NALS 493 (1950)); see also A.F. COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 8-1, 8-4(b);
LAW OF LAND IWARFARE, supra note 311, at 177.
481. Id. at 10-5.
482. See MOXLEY, supra note 7, at 93-94 n.274-77, 150-51 n.127-29, 228-29,
nn.246-49 and accompanying text.
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the totality of likely possible uses, including first uses against bio-
logical, chemical, and conventional weapons targets, second uses
intended to defeat and destroy the enemy, disproportionate sec-
ond uses, and other high-mega-tonnage nuclear strikes with
likely extreme effects.
XI. AGENDA BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
NORTH KOREA
It is difficult to be certain of the true agenda between North
Korea and the United States. The background as to the post-
World War II division of Korea, the Korean War of 1950-1953,
and the Cold War position of North Korea as a member of the
Soviet camp no doubt partially explain the current situation.
Unlike Eastern Europe, Russia, and to a large extent, China,
North Korea, even more so than Cuba, has not yet come in out
of the cold.483
The question presents itself whether, when North Korea
says it wants a non-aggression pact and economic support,484 it
might mean what it is saying. If the United States were willing to
bring North Korea under the umbrella of its economic and mili-
tary systems, would the North Korean situation largely resolve
itself?
While North Korea is an arms proliferator, exporting mis-
siles to States unfriendly to the United States, such as Iran and
Libya,48 5 it is not clear that North Korea's conduct is worse than
that of other States with which the United States maintains ami-
cable relations. These states include Pakistan, with its actual nu-
clear weapons and its ostensible permitting of actual exports of
nuclear weapons technology;486 Saudi Arabia, ostensibly a major
breeding ground of international terrorism, including the 9/11
483. See, e.g., Cashing in on China Reform, July 31, 2003, available at http://
www.business-times.asial.com.sg/story/0,4567,89466,00.html (last visited Apr. 16,
2004); Bonnie S. Glaser, U.S.-China Relations: The Best Since 1972 or the Best Ever, Comp.
CONNECTIONS PAC. F., CSIS (Oct. 2003); Cuba's Agriculture: Collapse and Economic Reform,
Economic Research Service, USDA, Oct. 1998, at 26, available at http://
www.ers.usda.gov/publications/agoutlook/oct1998/ao255h.pdf. (last visited Apr. 16,
2004).
484. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
485. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
486. See Leonard Weiss, Nuclear Weapon States and the Grand Bargain, ARmS CON-
TROL TODAY, December 2003, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/
weiss.asp (last visited Apr. 16, 2004); Transcript of Nuclear Scientist Abdul Qudeer
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attacks;48 7 and Iraq in the 1980's with its actual use of chemical
weapons against Iran and the Kurds.4"'
With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military and the
supporting industrial complex lost much of their reason for be-
ing, at least at the level they were then constituted. The world
appeared to be facing the prospect of substantial demilitariza-
tion. This diminution of the military appeared to be happening
for a number of years, at least to some extent.
48 9
At the time of demilitarization, the thought occurred to
many that, if an enemy did not emerge, the industrial, military,
and political systems of the United States would find an en-
emy.4 90 President Dwight D. Eisenhower had long previously
warned of the risks of the development of this kind of think-
ing.49 1
The United States' antagonism with Iraq starting in the
early 1990s seemed to have many of the earmarks of such a con-
trived instigation of military antagonism. Saddam Hussein had
long been the friend and ally of the United States, going back to
the early 1980s.4 9 2 The United States supported him in many of
Khan on Pakistan TV, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/
aqkhan0204O4.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
487. See Josh Meyer, Saudi Government Promised Aid to 9/11 Hijackers, Sources Say,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2003, at Al; see also David Johnston & James Risen, Threats and
Response: Tracking Terrorism: 9/11 Report Says Saudi Arabia Links Went Unexamined, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2002, at Al.
488. See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
489. For example, U.S. military spending steadily decreased from 1992 through
1999 to a low-point of U.S.$298.4 billion (in 2002 dollars) in 1999. See Information
Compiled from the Center for Defense Information, available at www.cdi.org (last vis-
ited Apr. 16, 2004). Projected spending for 2004 is U.S.$379.9 billion, not including
the recently approved U.S.$87 billion to fund the Iraq war. See id. This puts military
spending back to its actual 1992 level of $379.5 billion, assuming these are actual, not
time or inflation adjusted numbers. See id.; see also Carl Conetta and Charles Knight,
Post-Cold War US Military Expenditure in the Context of World Spending Trends Pro-
ject on Defense Alternatives, Briefing Memo Jan. 10, 1997, available at http://
www.comw.org/pda/bmemolO.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (reporting that from
1986 to 1994 U.S. military expenditure decreased 21%); U.S. Military Spending, 1945 -
1996, Center for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
490. See, e.g., Who's The Enemy Now?, Center for Defense Information, American
Defense Monitor, Sept. 5, 1993, available at http://www.cdi.org/adm/651/ (last visited
Apr. 23, 2004).
491. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Militasy-Industrial Complex Speech, 1961, Public Papers
of the Presidents, 1960, at 103540.
492. See supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
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his ventures, including his 1980-1988 war against Iran.493 In-
deed, it was revealed as recently as December 2003 that, during
the Reagan administration, the United States aided Iraq's war
against Iran while knowing Iraq was using chemical weapons on
the Iranians, as well as on Kurdish rebels.4 94 It was revealed in
Iraqi transcripts of a meeting on July 25, 1990 between U.S. Am-
bassador Glaspie and Saddam Hussein that Glaspie had signaled
to Hussein that the United States would not seriously object if
Hussein invaded Kuwait.495
Similarly, there are numerous indications that the United
States' 2003 attack on Iraq was initiated without substantial im-
minent need or justification and possibly on a contrived and
preconceived basis.496
If anything, the measured response of the United States to
North Korea's renewed nuclear weapons program could be read
by North Korea and other States as confirming the wisdom of
acquiring such weapons. The question remains whether the
United States would so readily have attacked Iraq in 2003 if Iraq
possessed nuclear weapons.
XII. NORTH KOREA'S POTENTIAL USE AND THREAT OF USE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Given that North Korea, like any State, has a right of self-
defense, may North Korea resort to nuclear weapons for such
self-defense? While there is some ambiguity it its decision,4 9 7 the
ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Decision determined that
the exercise of self-defense is subject to humanitarian law: "[A]
use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-defence,
must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the
law applicable in armed conflict which comprise in particular
the principles and rules of humanitarian law."49
The ICJ further noted that if a weapon is unlawful, the fact
493. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
494. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text; Nerve Gas Used in Northern Iraq
on Kurds, Physicians for Human Rights, available at http://www.phrusa.org/research/
chemicalweapons/chemiraqgas2.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
495. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
496. See supra notes 171-89 and accompanying text.
497. MOXLEY, supra note 7, at 174-84.
498. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, at 42.
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that it is used for lawful self-defense or other lawful purpose does
not immunize the unlawfulness:
39. [Articles 51 and 42] do not refer to specific weapons.
They apply to any use of force, regardless of the weapons em-
ployed. The Charter neither expressly prohibits, nor permits,
the use of any specific weapon, including nuclear weapons. A
weapon that is already unlawful per se, whether by treaty or
custom, does not become lawful by reason of its being used
for a legitimate purpose under the Charter.
4 99
Thus, the question, which was not reached by the Court,
becomes whether the use of nuclear weapons is potentially law-
ful in any circumstance? For the reasons set forth above, I sub-
mit that the use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful in virtu-
ally any situation, given their extreme destructiveness and the
uncontrollability of their effects.
If the use of nuclear weapons is unlawful, it would appear
that the threat of such use is also unlawful. The ICJ in the Nu-
clear Weapons Advisory Case stated the rule as to threats as fol-
lows: "If an envisaged use of weapons would not meet the re-
quirements of humanitarian law, a threat to engage in such use
would also be contrary to that law. '50 0
The Court further appeared to find that the policy of deter-
rence, and indeed possibly even the mere possession of nuclear
weapons, would be unlawful if the actual use of the nuclear
weapons would be unlawful. The Court stated:
47. In order to lessen or eliminate the risk of unlawful attack,
states sometimes signal that they possess certain weapons to
use in self-defence against any state violating their territorial
integrity or political independence. Whether a signaled inten-
tion to use force if certain events occur is or is not a "threat" within
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter depends upon various factors.
If the envisaged use of force is itself unlawful, the stated readiness to
use it would be a threat prohibited under Article 2, paragraph 4.
499. Id. at 1 39.
500. Id. at 1 78, 35 I.L.M. at 827 (emphasis added); but see Lord Advocate's Reference
No. I of 2000 [Mar. 30, 2001], 2001 SCCR 296, 2001 SC 143, Misc 11/00 H.C.J. (Scot.),
1 86, 96 (The Scottish High Court ofJusticiary, in a case involving a challenge to the
United Kingdom's policy of nuclear deterrence, concluded that that State's policy of
deterrence was not specific enough to constitute a threat under international law); see
also Charles J. Moxley, Jr., The Unlawfulness of the United Kingdom's Policy of Nuclear Deter-
rence,JURIDIcAL REVIEW, Part 6, 2001;JOHN BURROUGHS, THE (IL)LiGALrrV OF THREAT OR
USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 32-37 (Lit Verlag, Mfinster Germany 1997).
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Thus it would be illegal for a state to threaten force to secure
territory from another state, or to cause it to follow or not
follow certain political or economic paths. The notions of
"threat" and "use" offorce under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Char-
ter stand together in the sense that if the use offorce itself in a given
case is illegal -for whatever reason - the threat to use such force will
likewise is illegal. In short, if it is to be lawful, the declared readiness
of a state to use force must be a use offorce that is in conformity with
the Charter. For the rest, no state - whether or not it defended
the policy of deterrence - suggested to the Court that it
would be lawful to threaten to use force if the use of force
contemplated would be illegal.
48. Some states put forward the argument that possession of
nuclear weapons is itself an unlawful threat to use force. Pos-
session of nuclear weapons may indeed justify an inference of
preparedness to use them. In order to be effective, the policy
of deterrence, by which those states possessing or under the
umbrella of nuclear weapons seek to discourage military ag-
gression by demonstrating that it will serve no purpose, neces-
sitates that the intention to use nuclear weapons be credible.
Whether this is a "threat" contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, depends
upon whether the particular use of force envisaged would be directed
against the territorial integrity or political independence of a
state, or against the Purposes of the United Nations or whether, in
the event that it were intended as a means of defence, it would neces-
sarily violate the principles of necessity and proportionality. In any
of these circumstances the use of force, and the threat to use
it, would be unlawful under the law of the Charter.
5 0 1
The United States in its appearances before the Court did
not dispute the unlawfulness of a threat to commit an unlawful
act and indeed appeared to recognize that the policy of deter-
rence constitutes a threat to use nuclear weapons. U.S. lawyer
Michael J. Matheson, in his oral argument to the Court, stated:
[E]ach of the Permanent Members of the Security Council
has made an immense commitment of human and material
resources to acquire and maintain stocks of nuclear weapons
and their delivery systems, and many other States have de-
cided to rely for their security on these nuclear capabilities.
If these weapons could not lawfully be used in individual or
501. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, at 823, 47-48 (emphasis
added). The ICJ further stated in Paragraph 67 of its opinion (35 I.L.M. at 826) that it
did not intend to pronounce upon the practice known as the "policy of deterrence." Id.
at 67, 35 I.L.M. at 826.
THE SWORD IN THE MIRROR
collective self-defense under any circumstances, there would
be no credible threat of such use in response to aggression
and deterrent policies would be futile and meaningless. In
this sense, it is impossible to separate the policy of deterrence
from the legality of the use of the means of deterrence. Ac-
cordingly, any affirmation of a general prohibition on the use
of nuclear weapons would be directly contrary to one of the
fundamental premises of the national security policy of each
of these many states. °2
XIII. WISDOM OF U.S. POLICY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Because of its own nuclear program and policy of deter-
rence, the United States is in the continuing position of legiti-
mizing nuclear weapons - and hence inevitably legitimizing
them in the hands of North Korea and other States. A better
course for the United States would be to recognize the unlawful-
ness of nuclear weapons and to start the process of de-legitimiz-
ing nuclear weapons.
While progress in the development of international law is
reflected in the fact that biological and chemical weapons have
been largely banned by international convention and ostensibly
by international customary law,50 3 it cannot be said pragmatically
that these bans have been effectively implemented. Not only is it
believed that there are at least sixteen States currently having
chemical weapons and eight States having biological weapons, as
well as numerous additional States readily capable of acquiring
them,50 4 but also the United States, through the current Bush
administration, has resisted the imposition of an inspection re-
gime on the Biological Weapons Convention 50 5 and, through
numerous administrations, has ostensibly circumvented both the
Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions.50 6
502. ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 351, at 62-63.
503. See Deller, supra note 123.
504. Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs Past and Present, availa-
ble at http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). The
Federation of American Scientists list is more inclusive and includes countries capable
of producing chemical or biological weapons. There are twenty-six countries capable of
acquiring chemical weapons and twenty capable of acquiring biological weapons. States
Possessing, Pursuing, or Capable of Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction, at http://
www.fas.org/irp/threat/wmdstate.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
505. See Deller, supra note 123.
506. See Federation of American Scientists, supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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It seems unrealistic to expect that the States of the world
will ever agree to an effective ban on chemical and biological
weapons as long as the United States is supporting - indeed
asserting - the legitimacy of nuclear weapons.
This leads to a dangerous world, ostensibly more dangerous
than the Cold War World, given the loss of coherency and con-
trol imposed by the Cold War strategic situation. Biological and
Chemical weapons are extremely dangerous. Some credible
sources have concluded that, in circumstances favorable to the
attacker, biological weapons have the potential to cause as much
injury as nuclear weapons.5 °7 A small amount of a toxin or virus
could poison substantial portions of the population of any U.S.
city through only a few droplets placed in the water supply or
through aerosol sprayed into the air.5 °8
The underlying technical information as to biological and
chemical weapons, including information as to ingredients and
to production technology - is more available and much less
complex than that for nuclear weapons. 509  The underlying
materials, many of which have other innocent applications, are
507. See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PROLIFERATION
OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: ASSESSING THE RISKS, OTA-ISC-559, at 3, 8, 54, 100
(Washington, DC, Aug. 1993) [hereinafter PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DE-
STRUCTION] (report prepared at request of Congress "to assist Congress in its efforts to
strengthen and broaden U.S. policies to control the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction"); Daryn Kagan & Eileen O'Connor, President Clinton to Announce Plan to
Counter Biological Weapons Threat, CNN MORNING NEWS, May 22, 1998 (statement ofJohn
Boatman of Jane's Information Group); Chemical & Biological Weapons Resource
Page, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Stud-
ies, available at http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/index.htm (last visited Apr. 16,
2004); Jonathan B. Tucker, Biosecurity: Limiting Terrorist Access to Deadly Pathogens,
Peaceworks 52, United States Institute for Peace, available at http://www.usip.org/
pubs/peaceworks/pwks52.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004); Wayne Turnbull and
Praveen Abhayaratne, 2002 WVMD Terrorism Chronology: Incidents Involving Sub-National
Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials, Center for Nonprolifer-
ation Studies 2003, available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/cbrn2k2.pdf
(last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
508. See Kagan & O'Connor, supra note 507. The delivery through aerosol of
"[l]ess than ten pounds of anthrax" could have the effect of destroying "a city the size of
Albuquerque." Anne Boyle, Biological Weapons Still Pose a Serious Threat, Sandia Labs Re-
searcher Says, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Aug. 7, 1997, at A6.
509. See Gertz, supra note 198. "Highly advanced communications are putting
such weapons know-how in the hands of anyone with a computer and modem. 'The
ingredients for sarin and other chemical weapons are easily accessible over the In-
ternet,' said Sen. Sam Nunn (D. Ga.), the senior Democrat on the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee, 'as is information about biological weapons and even instructions on
how to make a nuclear device.'" Id.
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likewise generally more available,5"' and the prerequisites for ac-
quiring, implementing, and setting up the necessary production
facilities and processes are less daunting.
5 1
Biological and chemical weapons programs are also less ex-
pensive, 51 2 smaller,513 less technically intensive, 51 4 and easier to
disguise.515 Because of such factors and also the greater prolifer-
ation that has already occurred, as well as the number of the
States possessing such weapons, and the number of times such
weapons have actually been used,51 6 the risks of biological and
chemical weapons proliferation are substantial, from States, the
510. See PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, supra note 507, at 6.
"Virtually all the equipment underlying production of biological and toxin agents has
civil applications and has become widely available as fermentation technology, and the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries more generally, have spread worldwide."
Id.
511. See id. at 1. "Barring a shortcut, such as the direct acquisition of nuclear
materials usable in weapons, the infrastructure required to produce nuclear weapons is
considerably more difficult and expensive than for either biological or chemical weap-
ons. Mass production of lethal chemicals requires a greater investment than that of
biological weapons, but is not nearly as expensive or challenging as production of nu-
clear materials." Id.
Similarly, "A nuclear bomb in the hands of a deranged person has long been the
stuff of nightmares, but the materials needed to make such a device are hard to obtain
and exceedingly tricky to assemble. Biological weapons are not nearly so difficult to
manufacture." TAYLOR, supra note 435.
512. It is often said that biological and chemical weapons are a poor man's nuclear
weapons, because they are appreciably cheaper, more accessible and substantially easier
to deliver. See Boyle, supra note 508; see also Thomas Graham, Conventional Response;
Nuclear Stance Could Worsen Chem-Bio Threat, DEFENSE NEWS, Feb. 23, 1998/Mar. 1, 1998,
at 31.
513. See David Rohde, Standoff With Iraq: The Inspections, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998,
at A6. ("In a 1996 report on biological weapons, the Center for Strategic and Int'l Stud-
ies, a public policy research institution in Washington, D.C., warned that it was easy for
a would-be terrorist to assemble biological weapons - using commercial equipment
with a capacity of 130 gallons"). Chemical weapons generally require somewhat larger
production facilities that would be visible from the air. See Boyle, supra note 508.
514. See Boyle, supra note 508 ("Anybody who has taken Microbiology 202 can
make a biological weapon .... Sophisticated lab equipment and exotic materials are
not needed. You can brew up a biological weapon in a small brewer-like one you'd
use for homemade beer").
515. See Gertz, supra note 198. A Nation or group gains tremendous flexibility if it
chooses a biological weapons program: "Unlike chemical weapons programs, which
require the use of large scale industrial equipment and possession of precursor chemi-
cals, BW weapons do not need to be stockpiled. Nations can keep small quantities or
even sample cultures on hand in freeze-dried form. Cultures can be mass produced at
any time." Id. With biological weapons, "the threat resists taming because the weapons
are easy to make and their production is hard for international monitors to detect."
Boyle, supra note 508.
516. MOXLEY, supra note 7, at 630-31.
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black market, terrorist organizations, and other criminal
sources.5 17 Because they are lighter and smaller, bacteriological
and chemical weapons are also easier to deliver.518
It is noteworthy that the fundamental reason biological and
chemical weapons have been outlawed by convention is the vast
destructiveness to human life and the uncontrollability of their
effects.
5 1 9
The U.S. policy of legitimizing nuclear weapons, and inevi-
tably biological and chemical weapons, would appear to be con-
517. See Gertz, supra note 198. "Samples of deadly viruses needed for starting BW
programs can be obtained on the international black market. U.S. counterproliferation
officials are especially concerned that BW starter cultures could be smuggled out of the
territory of the old Soviet Union by scientists looking to make money." Id. "The num-
ber of [N] ations capable of developing and possessing WMD is steadily increasing. De-
veloping nations are receiving these weapons or means to develop them through tech-
nology transfer, overt or covert direct transfer, or support to belligerent groups or gov-
ernments." JOINT DOCTRINE FOR NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL (NBC) DEFENSE,
supra note 512, at I-1.
518. "Crude dissemination of biological agents in an aerosol cloud can be per-
formed with commercially available equipment, such as an agricultural sprayer
mounted on a truck, ship, or airplane." PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUC-
TION, supra note 507, at 6.
For at least the next decade, few if any [States actively working to develop
weapons of mass destruction] will be able to deliver such weapons more than a
thousand kilometers or so in a reliable and timely manner ... Despite there
current limitations in long-range military delivery systems, however, proliferate
states-at least in principle-can threaten any country on earth using uncon-
ventional means (e.g., covert or disguised delivery systems such as a ship or
truck).
Id. at 4. A chemical or biological weapon can be delivered by "even a suitcase." Id. at 3.
"[A] given quantity of certain lethal microorganisms would probably kill even more
people if spread effectively by human agents than if by a missile." Id. at 3.
In addition, the proliferation of ballistic missiles, such as the Soviet-made SCUD
systems, has increased the risks of the potential use of chemical or biological weapons.
See JoINT DOCTRINE FOR NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL (NBC) DEFENSE, supra
note 512, at 1-3. "Ballistic missiles offer potential proliferators several advantages in
delivering NBC weapons . . . The potential for coercion is, perhaps, the long-range
ballistic missile's greatest value to proliferators . . . [to] threaten distant cities and ...
distract and tie up military resources." 1997 COUNTERPROLIFERATION PROGRAM REVIEW
COMMITTEE REPORT TO CONGRESS 3-8 (1997).
519. As a "universally agreed illustration of... an indiscriminate weapon," THE
A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAw cites biological weapons, noting that the uncontrollable
effects from such weapons "may include injury to the civilian population of other states
as well as injury to an enemy's civilian population." See id. at 6-3. The manual further
states that the "wholly indiscriminate and uncontrollable nature of biological weapons
has resulted in the condemnation of biological weapons by the international commu-
nity, and the practice of states in refraining from their use in warfare has confirmed this
rule." Id.
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trary to the national interest of the United States, certainly more
so in the current era than during the Cold War.
In the Cold War era, the United States permitted itself to be
in an inferior position to the Soviets in terms of conventional
weapons and resorted to nuclear weapons to redress the bal-
ance. 521 In the current era, the United States has overwhelming
conventional weapons superiority and is facing the threat of nu-
clear weapons from militarily-inferior nations.5 2
XIV. IRONY THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IN THE NUCLEAR
WORLD NOW FAVORED BY THE UNITED STATES, COULD BE
LAWFUL FOR NORTH KOREA WHILE BEING UNLAWFUL
FOR THE UNITED STATES
As noted above, North Korea, as an economic justification
for its nuclear weapons program, relied upon the fact that pos-
520. See NSG-68 in AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY 288 (Schuyler Forester & Edward N.
Wright eds., 1990) [hereinafter NSC-68]. Per NSC-68, the classic American policy state-
ment on the necessity of countering Soviet conventional superiority in Europe with
American nuclear superiority approved by President Truman in 1950, the United States
would not renounce the first-use of nuclear weapons given its "present situation of rela-
tive unpreparedness in conventional weapons." Id.
See also LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY 71 (1989).
Under NSC-68,
[u]ntil conventional forces had been built up, the United States had no
choice but to rely on its nuclear arsenal, and extend its breathing space by
maintaining, for as long as possible, a clear superiority in nuclear capabilities
over the Soviet Union. The imbalance in conventional capabilities meant that
the United States was not even able to hold back nuclear weapons as a last
resort.
Id. Cf John Lewis Gaddis & Paul Nitze, NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered, 4 INr'L
SECURITY, No. 4, Spring 1980, at 164-76; Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Massive
Retaliation, Address to the Council on Foreign Relations, Jan. 12, 1954 (DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Jan. 25, 1954), in AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY, supra, at 288, 294; William J. Perry, Secre-
tary of Defense, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 84-85 (U.S.
Government Printing Office); HENRY KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 218 (1979); Testi-
mony of Adm. Noel Gayler, U.S. Navy (Retired), Former Commander in Chief, U.S.
Forces in the Pacific, Former Director, National Security Agency, in Hearings on the
Role of Arms Control in U.S. Defense Policy, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, 2d Sess., at 126 (June 20, 21, 26,July
25, 1984); NSC-68, supra, at 288. See also MOXLEY, supra note 7, 400 nn.14-15, 474-77 nn.
29-35, and accompanying text.
Cf Gaddis & Nitze, supra, at 164-76.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Massive Retaliation (Address to the Council
on Foreign Relations, 12 Jan. 1954 (DEP'T ST. BULL., 25 Jan. 1954), in AMERICAN DE-
FENSE POLICY, supra, at 294.
521. MOXLEY, supra note 7, at 485, 493-94 nn.48-52 and accompanying text.
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sessing nuclear weapons will enable it to avoid greater expendi-
tures for conventional weapons, thereby enabling it to commit
more of its resources to civilian needs.522 Ironically, the United
States gave this same economic justification for its nuclear weap-
ons program during the Cold War, as it permitted the Soviet
Union to become more powerful in conventional weapons and
relied on nuclear weapons for defense and deterrence.523
However, there is an emerging issue in international law as
to whether, under such rules as discrimination, necessity, and
proportionality, a State may intentionally forswear development
and procurement of a reasonably available less destructive and
more discriminating weapon and then use a more destructive
and blunderbuss weapon, in circumstances where the lesser
weapon would have been sufficient had it been available.
The issue has recently come up in the context of high-tech
smart weapons the United States has used in its most recently
military engagements, including in the Iraq and Kosovo con-
flicts. Specifically, the question has become whether the United
States, or other States in similar situations, may lawfully use old-
fashioned dumb weapons for missions that could be accom-
plished through the use of smart weapons, with appreciably less
risk of collateral injury to protected persons and objects. 5 2 4
The point is established beyond question that a State may
not use nuclear weapons if the use of conventional weapons
522. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. North Korea's factual assumption
that nuclear weapons are cheaper than conventional weapons will likely turn out to be
mistaken, given the United States' experience as to the indirect costs of nuclear weap-
ons, including the ongoing costs of storing and disposing of associated toxic and radio-
active waste and the costs of dismantling nuclear weapons systems and disposing of
surplus nuclear materials. See also MOXLEY, supra note 7, at 548 n.44 and accompanying
text; Stephen I. Schwartz, Introduction, in ATOMIC AUDIT 4 (Stephen I. Schwartz ed.,
1998).
523. See id. (quoting S. Conc. Res. 46, 82 Cong. 1 sess., introduced September 18,
1951, and referred to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy). Resolution 46 stated in
its preamble: "The cost of military fire power based on atomic bombs is hundreds of
time cheaper, dollar for dollar, than conventional explosives." Id. at 4-5; see also id. at 2
n.3.
524. See, e.g.,John F. Murphy, Legal and Ethical Dimensions of Collateral Damage, in 78
INT'L LAw STUDIES 232 (Andru E. Wall ed., 2002); Lieutenant Commander Stuart Belt,
Missiles Over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary Norm Requiring the Use of Precision
Munitions in Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL L. REv. 115, 130 (2000); Danielle L. Infeld, Precision-
Guided Munitions Demonstrated Their Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert Storm: But Is A Country
Obligated to Use Precison Technology to Minimize Collateral Civilian Injury and Damage?, 26
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 109, 188 n.74 (1992); MOXLEV, supra note 7 at 367-74.
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would suffice to accomplish the military mission.525 Given that
the rule of necessity is a rule of reason,526 to be applied based
upon an objective consideration of all available facts, 527 it would
seem that a State has an obligation, to the extent feasible, to
maintain sufficient conventional weapons as not to run the risk
of bring upon itself the necessity to use nuclear weapons when
conventional weapons would have sufficed.528
This becomes a very significant legal point in the real world.
Given the capability of today's high-tech nuclear weapons, the
United States is essentially in the position of being able to
achieve with conventional weapons virtually any military mission
for which it might previously have felt the need to resort to nu-
clear weapons.529
The same is not true of North Korea. With the United
States as its enemy, North Korea is ostensibly in a position
525. The A.F. Commander's Handbook states that, in making the proportionality de-
termination, the commander must decide, "in the light of all the facts known . . .
whether to adopt any alternative method of attack to further reduce civilian casualties
and damage." A.F. COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 311, at 3-3
THE A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAW states that application of the proportionality test
requires consideration "whether some alternative form of attack would lessen collateral
damage and casualties." THE A.F. MANUAL ON INT'L LAW, supra note 311, at 5-9.
The manual adds that "[t]hose who plan or decide upon an attack" must "[t]ake all
feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoid-
ing, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
and damage to civilian objects." Id. at 5-9.
Thus, the determination of proportionality with respect to the use of nuclear weap-
ons includes a comparison of the probable results of using conventional as opposed to
nuclear weapons. See MOXLEY, supra note 7, at 339-46, 141-42, 472-77 nn.27-36 and
accompanying text. See also 1996 DOCTRINE FOR JOINT THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS,
supra note 353, at vii-viii, 11-7.
The rules of discrimination and necessity similarly require that nuclear weapons
could not be used if conventional weapons would suffice. See MOXLEY, supra note 7, at
57, 42 n.87, 51-53 nn.108-09, 57 n.129, 60 n.140, and accompanying text.
526. See MOXLEY, supra note 7, at 53 n.112, 54-55 nn.116-20, 56 n.126, 60 n.138, 62
n.142, 95 n.283 and accompanying text.
527. See id. at 49 n.104, 53 n.112, 54-55 nn.114-120, 61 n.139 and accompanying
text.
528. See id. at 57, 42-43 nn.87-90, 668 n.56, 695-98 nn.157-69, 737 n.30, 738 n.34,
769-70 nn.173-79 and accompanying text.
529. See GARY W. LANE, NEW CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, REDUCING RELIANCE ON A
NUCLEAR RESPONSE TOWARD AGGRESSORS (2002); MOXLEY, supra note 7, at 53 nn.110-12,
56 n.128, 633-50. See also id. at 400-01 nn.15-17, 633 n.1, 637 nn.13-14, 641-45
nn.37-52; NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL, TRANSFORMING DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY IN
THE 2 lST CENTURY 51 (Dec. 1997); David Learmount, Smart Bombs in Demand, FLIGHT
INT'L, June 9, 1999; William J. Perry, Desert Storm and Deterrence, 70 FOREIGN AFF., no. 4,
Fall 1991, at 66.
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whereby, even if it spent every last penny of its national budget
on conventional weapons, leaving nothing for civilian purposes,
it would be unable to defend itself with conventional weapons
against the United States.53 ° On such a basis, the use of nuclear
weapons, if it is ever potentially lawful, as the United States as-
serts, could arguably be lawful for North Korea, but not for the
United States.53'
This, in a sense, dramatizes the tragic dimension of the cur-
rent Bush administration's nuclear adventurism, threatening
specific States, including China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea,
Russia, and Syria, with nuclear attack and preparing contingency
plans to attack them, while expanding its nuclear arsenal and
lowering the threshold as to the circumstances in which it would
use such weapons: 532 The United States is legitimizing weapons
- virtually assuring their proliferation - that the United States
does not need and would likely never use, but which certain
other States and organizations might well use against us. Rather
than genuinely trying to curtail these weapons, the United States
is taking the risk of legitimizing its own destruction.
The tragedy is the squandering of a hegemony that could be
directed towards the construction of a safer world for one and
all.
CONCLUSION
Given North Korea's repressiveness, economic desolation,
weapons proliferation practices, and hostility to the United
States, a nuclear North Korea is of great concern. Circum-
stances are readily imaginable in which North Korea might sell
530. This year the U.S. Defense Department has requested $401.7 billion for its
fiscal year 2005 budget. See Defense Department Announces 2005 Budget Request, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040123-0263.html (last visited Apr. 16,
2004). This is compared to North Korea, whose GDP for 2002 is 22.26 billion. See
WORLD FACTBOOK 2003: NORTH KORE.A, supra note 201.
531. See 78 LEGAL AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF NATO's Kosovo CAMPAIGN, INT'L LAW
STUDIES 243, 302, 303 (Andru E. Wall ed., 2002); Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of
Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare, 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143, 155, 169 (1999);
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF JUNE 8, 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVEN-
TIONS OF AUG. 12, 1949, at 384 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
532. See Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, available at http://
www.nuclearweaponslaw.org/2002NPR/2002NPRArticle.html (Jan. 8, 2000) (available
with accompanying briefing speech and slides). See also Charles J. MoxleyJr., 2002 Nu-
clear Posture Review: Strategic and Legal Ramifications, available at http://www.
nuclearweaponslaw.org (Apr. 16, 2002).
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or barter nuclear weapons and/or related equipment, materials
and know-how to terrorist States and groups.
Nuclear weapons are extremely dangerous and are and
should be unlawful. The United States' legitimization of these
weapons flies in the face of the law of armed conflict and is
against the United States' own interest. Nonetheless, as long as
the United States advocates the lawfulness of the use of these
weapons and follows the policy of nuclear deterrence, the
United States will be in no position to object on legal grounds to
North Korea's nuclear program and policy of deterrence or that
of other States or adversary groups with nuclear ambitions.
The threat posed by the nuclear weapons regime propa-
gated by the United States is intertwined with the threat posed
by biological and chemical weapons. As long as the United
States legitimizes nuclear weapons, biological and chemical
weapons, the "poor Nation's nuclear weapons," will be de facto
legitimized.
An opportunity may be present to bring North Korea into a
more productive relationship with the family of nations. There
is no reason to maintain this remaining vestige of the Cold War
and every reason to throw North Korea the lifeline that may
form the catalyst for transforming its society.
The United States must find the wisdom to overcome the
forces of militarization warned of by President Eisenhower.
Whatever truth may be present in the suggestion that our mili-
tary industrial system seeks to expand itself and find occasions
for the use of force must be faced and this tendency put under
control.
The United States should recognize the unlawfulness of the
use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and embark on the
process of de-legitimizing them. While the process will likely
take decades and be challenging, with effort progress can be
made. Absent effort, it seems inevitable that proliferation and
the related risks will increase.
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